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ABSTRACT 
This thesis investigates whether productivity can be enhanced by institutional quality 
through financial development in the sub-Saharan African region. Specifically, it seeks to 
achieve four main objectives: first, to capture both the market and non-market features of 
institutional quality in order to bring out the full contribution of institutional quality to 
economic growth within the framework of finance-growth nexus; second, to investigate the 
role of market and non-market institutions in the finance-growth nexus for a group of 
twenty-one SSA economies; third, to detect and account for structural breaks introduced by 
historical events to produce more reliable estimates in our investigation; and fourth, to 
consider the constant elasticity of substitution and the variable elasticity of substitution in 
addition to the Cobb-Douglas production function to not only relax the constraints but also 
check the robustness of the analysis. Total factor productivity is decomposed into two items: 
1) pure technical progress; and 2) institutional quality linked efficiency gain, which captures 
financial development and institutional quality. Twenty-one sub Saharan African countries 
were selected to test this proposition using annual data from 1985 to 2015. Based on the 
Solow neoclassical framework, the Cobb-Douglas, Constant Elasticity of Substitution and 
Variable Elasticity of Substitution specifications of the production function are employed 
where the pure technical progress and institutional quality linked efficiency gain were 
incorporated. Both panel and time series cointegration techniques that account for structural 
breaks and cross-sectional dependence to increase the power of the regressions and avoid 
possible model misspecification are employed. The results indicate that there are significant 
and positive long-run associations between growth, capital, financial development and 
institutional quality that generate productivity gains over net factor productivity in the panel 
of 21 countries from sub-Saharan Africa only when structural breaks and cross-sectional 
dependence are considered within the Cobb-Douglas framework. The impact of institutional 
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quality through finance on productivity and growth is positive and significant for eight 
countries when there are no structural breaks but reduce to six countries with the 
incorporation of a full regime break. In the cases of the constant elasticity of substitution 
and the variable elasticity of substitution production functions, such productivity generating 
impact remained significantly positive and generally higher for the panel but insignificant 
for Mali, the case country tested. This study provides important policy implications in the 
effective strategies for stimulating economic growth via financial development and 
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1.1 Background to the study 
A well-functioning financial system offers many opportunities for growth by providing 
services to the real sector and hence providing a link to economic growth. Many researchers 
have confirmed that emphasis must be placed on financial development when economic 
growth is either desired or needs to be sustained (Murinde, 2012; Balach and Law, 2015; 
Levine, 2005; Enisan-Akinlo and Egbetunde, 2010; Popov, 2018) 1   
 
Opinions differ as to the nature of the relationship between financial development and 
economic growth where such a relationship exits (Bist, 2018; Cline, 2015; Murinde, 2012; 
Green, Kirkpatrick and Murinde, 2006; Levine, 2005; Gries, Kraft, and Meierrieks, 2010). 
The difference in opinion occurs in establishing whether there are phenomena that moderate 
or dictate the presence, direction and extent of this finance-growth relationship (Popov, 
2018; Murinde, 2012; Pagano, 1993). One strand of literature sees financial development as 
influencing economic growth (Bijlsma, Kool and Non, 2017; Murinde, 2012; Schumpeter, 
1911; Bagehot, 1873; Levine, 2005), while others view growth as influencing financial 
development (Robinson, 1952; Patrick, 1966; Greenwood and Jovanovich, 1990).  
 
There is yet another strand that views the relationship as bi-directional (Bangake and Eggoh, 
2011; Fry, 1997; Calderón and Liu, 2003). There is also the group that seems not to argue 
                                                 
1 Arizala, Cavallo, and Galindo (2013), Ahmed (2010), Eng and Habibullah, 2011, Ahmed and Wahid (2011), 
King and Levine (1993a, b); Fisman and Love (2003) all emphasize the need for finance towards achieving 
growth 
 
   
2 
 
for any relationship between finance and growth (Arcand, Berkes and Panizza, 2015; 
Demetriades and Hussein, 1996; Rousseau and Wachtel, 2011; Rodrik and Subramanian, 
2009; Lucas, 1988). Finally, with respect to the relationship, a few non-monotonic studies 
have shown the positive effect of financial development on growth reversing after a certain 
level of financial development and or during a specific period in a nation’s life (Berkes, 
Panizza and Arcand, 2012).  
 
These conflicting results call for further research into the relationship and to ascertain 
whether there are some moderating factors that influence the relationship between financial 
development and economic growth. Fundamentally, macroeconomic theory postulates 
financial development as a determinant of economic growth. Others have proposed the need 
to introduce factors that enhance the finance-growth relationship. According to Murinde 
(2012), one such factor is the quality of institutions. He stresses the need for further research 
on the role of institutional factors among others that may possibly be relevant and important 
to the finance-growth nexus (Huang, 2010; Fernández and Tamayo, 2015). 
 
The most commonly used definition of institutions in recent literature stems from the 
seminal work of North (1993), who describes institutions as the rules of the game of a 
society2. Demetriades and Law (2006) state that institutions, which are often treated as 
‘social technologies’ in the production of economic products, are the rules, laws and 
conventions that dictate the behaviour and form of economic interactions by economic 
agents. Institutions are the constraints put in place by humans as devices that help structure 
human interaction. Institutions are made up of formal constraints (rules, laws, constitutions), 
informal constraints (norms of behaviour, conventions, and self-imposed codes of conduct), 
                                                 
2 See also Kunčič (2014) and Khan et al. (2019) 
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and their enforcement characteristics. Institutions, according to North, are made by humans, 
define incentive, structure and shape interaction in the form of formal and informal 
constraints and enforcement characteristics (North, 1994). 
  
In attempting to investigate the relevance of institutional quality in financial development, 
Huang (2005) initially identified three groups of factors that moderate the growth and level 
of financial development. These are the institutions, the policy and the geography that 
prevail and define the jurisdiction under study.  However, Huang (2005) concludes that the 
institutional environment emerges as the most important. Both Balach and Law (2015) and 
Demetriades and Law (2006) attest to the significance and importance of institutional 
quality in enhancing productivity in the finance–growth relationship.  
 
Strong institutions, such as contract enforcement and a stable macroeconomic environment, 
tend to reduce information asymmetry, thus leading to a reduction in financial sector 
fragility and increasing efficiency through reduced information and transaction costs 
(Balach and Law, 2015; Demetriades and Law, 2006; Levine 1998; 1999; Haber, 2008; 
2010; Rajan and Zingales, 2003). This study is therefore intended to examine the influence 
of institutional factors that impact the relationship between financial development and 
economic growth in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) when capital, labour and technological 
advancement are all considered in the production framework.   
   
With SSA consistently being characterized by relatively weak institutions (ICRG, 2017; 
World Governance Indicators, 2017; Knutsen, 2009; Shobee, 2017; Milo, 2007), it is 
important to investigate what specific institutional factors moderate financial development 
and hence economic growth in the region. Rodrik (2000), in his seminal presentation on 
   
4 
 
institutions for high quality growth, maintains that markets need to be supported by non-
market institutions in order to perform well and SSA markets are no exception (North and 
Weingast, 1989). These factors and others mentioned in the literature include the protection 
of rights of parties involved in a contract, the political environment, the quality of judicial 
enforcement, the effectiveness of social insurance, the macroeconomic stabilisation as well 
as institutions for conflict management and economic freedom (La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes 
and Shliefer, 1997; Beck, Clarke, Groff, Keefer, and Walsh, 2001). 
  
Research on the role of finance in economic growth is essential for shaping future policy-
oriented research and generates useful information that helps policy makers, regulators and 
governments prioritize effective financial sector policies in relation to economic growth. 
This is primarily because a large pool of evidence on the finance-growth relationship 
documents the significant transformations that have taken place in economies that have 
worked towards a more developed financial sector (Menyah, Nazlioglu and Wolde-Rufael, 
2014; Gries, Kraft and Meierrieks, 2009; Levine, 2005).  
 
Sub-Saharan Africa, without a doubt, needs to find the most viable and effective policies 
that will use the financial sector as a channel of enhancing productivity and economic 
growth3. A portion of the literature however suggests that financial sector reforms in the last 
few decades have not significantly and positively impacted economic growth. One 
attributable reason could be the lack a stable and effective institutional environment in the 
region. There is therefore, the need to identify institutional factors surrounding financial 
development in the region. The institutional factors and its quality reduce the transaction 
                                                 
3 The World Bank’s structural adjustment programs aimed at stabilisation, liberalisation, deregulation and 
privatization which runs on the top of financial reforms in SSA over the last three decades has been highly 
criticized as ineffective and retrogressive (Summers and Pritchett, 1993). 
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and information costs associated with financial intermediation, improve predictability as 
well as allocative efficiency and thus enhance productivity4 (Murinde, 2012; Balach and 
Law, 2015; Demetriades and Law, 2006; Beck, Demekrug-Kunt and Levine, 2000; Chinn 
and Ito, 2005). Hence, based on the availability of data, a panel of 21 sub-Saharan African 
countries is studied in this research. These countries include Botswana, Congo Republic, 
Cote d'Ivoire, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, 
Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania United Republic, Togo, 
Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe 
 
1.2 Objectives of the study 
It is well established in the literature that institutional quality plays a vital role in promoting 
economic growth by raising the efficiency level of the economic system. (Rodrik, 2000; 
2002; North, 1991; Boettke and Coyne, 2009; Houkonou et al., 2012; Glylfason, 2004; 
Berhane, 2018; Bass, 2019). A number of theoretical arguments underpin the efficiency-
enhancing impact of institutions in the economy. Firstly, institutions are known to broaden 
the reach of economic analysis beyond traditional markets and are able to capture a more 
complete set of mechanisms by which resources are moved from one place to another 
(Hovenkamp and Coase, 2011; Williamson, 2000). Secondly, adequate institutions ensure 
that information and transaction costs associated with economic transactions are mitigated 
by reducing information asymmetry and adverse selection (Tamayo and Fernandez, 2015; 
Coase, 1936; 1984; North 1990; 1991; 1995; Grief, 1989; North and Weingast, 1989). 
Thirdly, institutions mediate particular economic relationships such as business firms and 
contractual agreements by serving as governance structures (Williamson, 1987; 1996; North 
                                                 
4 Boyd and Prescott (1986) advance this discussion on transaction cost using finance itself (See also Bordo 
and Rousseau, 2006; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silane, Shleifer and Vishny, 1998;2000; Huang, 2005, 2007, 2010; 
Levchenko, 2007; Baltagi, Demetriades and Law, 2009; Arizala, Cavallo and Galindo, 2013; Kendall, 2012). 
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1996). Finally, in his seminal research, Rodrik (2000) summarises the role of adequate 
institutions by positing that they allow greater predictability and stability, are more resilient 
to shocks and deliver superior distributional outcomes.  Better institutions therefore allow 
markets to work more efficiently. 
 
This role of institutions is depicted in the finance-growth relationship as well by many 
researchers as adequately working institutions contribute to the positive impact of financial 
development towards enhancing economic growth (Demetriades and Law, 2006; Balach 
and Law, 2015; Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001; Easterly and Levine, 2003; 
Huang, 2010; Murinde, 2012). Following a thorough review of existing literature, this study 
identifies several gaps in previous studies in this strand, which motivates the broad objective 
of this research as to examine whether institutional quality can work through financial 
development to contribute to higher productivity gains and hence GDP per capita growth. 
We provide a more detailed discussion on each specific objective and its rationale as 
follows. 
  
First of all, existing studies on institution and economic growth often focus solely on 
market-based institutions (Demetriades and Law, 2006; Balach and Law, 2015; Issakson, 
2007; La Porta et al., 1997; Rajan and Zingales, 2003; Gries and Meirrekes, 2010). 
However, as emphasised by Rodrik (2000) and Williamson (2000) among others, the 
economic system has both market and non-market institutions. Indeed, a number of studies 
has emphasised that non-market institutions are as important as market institutions 
(Addison, Chowdhury and Murshed, 2002; Gries and Mereirrekes, 2010). Rodrik (2000) 
further states that non-market institutions play an irreplaceable role in promoting high 
quality economic growth. Overlooking the role of non-market institutions leads to an 
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incomplete understanding of the productivity-enhancing effect of institutional quality. 
Therefore, the first objective of this study is to capture both the market and non-market 
features of institutional quality in order to bring out the full contribution of institutional 
quality to economic growth within the framework of finance-growth nexus.  
 
Secondly, based on the economic catching-up literature, poorer economies grow at a faster 
rate than their wealthier counterparts so that per capita incomes will eventually converge 
(Solow, 1956; 1957). The SSA’s economy has consistently been regarded as one of the most 
under developed regions in the world (WDI, 2017; Ssozi and Asongu, 2016). Thus, it holds 
huge potential for economic growth. Furthermore, in response to the call in Agenda 2063 
of the African Union, which is tasked to ensure inclusive and sustainable economic growth 
and development in the region, it is important to enlist and examine institutional quality as 
an engine of economic growth in SSA. Yet, literature in this area is emerging but still rare, 
and studies that examine both market and non-market institutions within the finance-growth 
framework for the SSA region are non-existent. Therefore, it leads the second specific 
objective of this study as to investigate the role of market and non-market institutions in the 
finance-growth nexus for a group of twenty-one SSA economies.  
 
Over the past few decades, many political and economic events have taken place across the 
globe, shaping the world’s development years sometime decades after their occurrence. 
Given their profound influence, many researchers have emphasised to account for structural 
changes brought by these events for more accurate analysis (Westerlund, 2006a; Banerjee 
and Carrion-i-Silvestre, 2015; Lee and Strazicich, 2004). In the case of the SSA region, 
Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) instituted by the World Bank in the late 1980s, 
1990s and early 2000s, which saw the liberalisation of closed financial systems, the 
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adoption of flexible exchange rate regimes, the institutionalisation of trade openness and 
the democratisation over the years have induced unprecedented political and economic 
changes. The region has also witnessed various ethnic and tribal conflicts such as the Ivorian 
civil war in 2010, the 2008 and 2009 Boko Haram insurgency and Niger Delta conflicts in 
Nigeria and the Liberian civil war, which spanned over several years in the 1990s. It is 
against this background the third object of this study is to detect and account for structural 




Finally, despite being the most widely employed production function (Gerchet et al., 2019; 
Demetriades and Law, 2006), the Cobb-Douglas production function has its own limitation 
including that fact that it only allows unitary elasticity of substitution, limited number of 
inputs and constant returns to scale among others. The constant elasticity of substitution 
(CES) and the variable elasticity of substitution (VES) production functions can suitable 
address some of these limitations by accommodating more inputs, allowing for different 
values of elasticities of substitution and, in the case of the VES, accommodating varied 
returns to scale properties (Karagiannis, Palivos, and Papageorgiou, 2004; Barro, Mankiw 
and Sala-i-Martin, 1992). Therefore, the final specific objective of this thesis is to consider 
CES and VES in addition to the Cobb-Douglas production function to not only relax the 
constraints but also check the robustness of our analysis.  
 
1.3  Contribution to Knowledge  
This thesis seeks to make four significant contributions to the existing literature. Firstly, 
previous analyses on the finance-institutions-growth nexus often focuses on market-based 
institutions alone and only very few have considered both market and non-market 
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institutions. Our study presents a first study analysing market and non-market institutions 
within the framework of financial development and economic growth nexus. In particular, 
we employ the market and non-market institutions proposed by Rodrik (2000) and capture 
institutions induced efficiency gains via an innovative decomposition of TFP into pure 




Secondly, financial and economic reforms have occurred in many SSA countries to promote 
institutional development and efficiency in the past few decades and the region. As an 
underdeveloped region, SSA has huge potential for growth as indicated above. Several 
global initiatives have been put forward to promote development and growth in this region 
(e.g., Agenda 2063 of the African Union, 2030 Sustainable Development Goals). Yet, 
previous studies on the role of institutional quality in the finance-growth nexus have 
overlooked the SSA region. As such, this analysis enriches the literature by examining the 
role of institutional quality in the finance-growth nexus in the under-researched SSA region 




Thirdly, from an operational point of view, any analysis that does not consider structural 
breaks in the past few decades when clearly a range of influential historical events have 
taken place in the SSA region would be misleading. Indeed, for this group of countries, no 
study on finance, institutions and growth has considered the impact of single and multiple 
breaks. Hence, the analytical tools adopted that can account for historical and future events 
in the form of multiple structural breaks constitute a major contribution to the study.  
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Finally, available literature suggests that with respect to the financial development, 
institutional quality and productivity, the emphasis on the few studies that are available, has 
been on the Cobb-Douglas production framework. This study, for the first time compares 
the effect of IQLEG on productivity using the CES and VES in addition to the more widely 
employed Cobb-Douglas production. Doing so not only addresses the limitations of the 
Cobb-Douglas production, but also provide evidence in terms of whether the growth impact 
of institution quality is sensitive to the choice of production function.  
 
1.4 Organization of the Study 
The rest of the study is organized as follows. Chapter Two entails a discussion on the 
theoretical framework underpinning the research. The Neoclassical growth framework and 
the endogenous growth model are discussed following which the analytical framework in 
this research is presented. The three production functions under study are extended and 
derived through the decomposition of total factor productivity. The analytical determination 
of the efficiency gains from pure technical progress and institutional quality linked 
efficiency gain is highlighted.  The empirical literature on the finance-institutions-growth 
linkage is reviewed in Chapter Three with the development of the research gaps and 
questions followed by the empirical methodology in Chapter Four. The empirical 
methodology is a discussion of the choice of data, sources of the data and the various 
econometric and analytical tools used in estimating the relationship under study. 
 
 In Chapter Five, the effect of financial development and institutional quality on 
productivity and economic growth without breaks is tested at both the panel and time series 
level. Chapter Six follows with the aim of testing the long run relationship between financial 
development, institutional quality and economic growth and determining efficiency gains 
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when various structural breaks are introduced into both the time series and panel models. In 
Chapter Six, panel cointegration tests that have various types of multiple structural breaks 
whilst addressing cross-sectional dependency are used to test the long run relationships 
between variables. These include Westerlund (2006a) and Banerjee and Carrion-i-Silvestre 
(2015) cointegration tests. The time series estimators include Gregory and Hansen (1996) 
and Hatemi-J (2008) cointegration tests.  
 
In Chapter Seven, the contribution of institutional quality and financial development to 
productivity is determined for the CES and VES production technologies. The robustness 
of the relationship is tested within the CES and the VES framework of the production 
function. Non-Linear Least Square Estimators are used to determine the relationship 
between the variables when the assumptions surrounding the Cobb-Douglass production 
framework are varied. Finally, the findings and conclusions are stated, policy 
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 CHAPTER TWO 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
2.1 Introduction 
The role financial development plays in the growth process has theoretically been linked 
with the enhancement of capital accumulation (Levine, 2005; Murinde, 2012), increases in 
productivity levels (Demetriades and Law, 2006; Balach and Law, 2015) or both (Levine, 
2005; Pagano, 1993). In this research, based on the formulation of the Cobb-Douglas, 
Variable Elasticity of Substitution (VES) and the Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) 
production functions, these production functions are extended by decomposing total factor 
productivity into two parts. The role finance and institutions play in productivity 
enhancement is explored by estimating the extended production functions and calculating 
efficiency levels. In view of the fact that the effect of financial development and institutional 
quality is expected to be felt through total factor productivity, the contribution of IQLEG to 
TFP is expected to be positive.  
 
The model constructed for this research is derived for the work of neoclassical growth 
framework5 Solow (1956, 1957) and draws on and utilizes the productive efficiency channel 
of growth depicted in the aggregate Cobb-Douglas production function in the equation,   
𝑌(𝑡) = K(t)α(𝐴(𝑡)𝐿(𝑡))1−𝛼                                                                        (2.1)  
Where 𝑌(𝑡) is output, K(t) is the stock of capital,  𝐿(t) is the labour force, 𝛼 and 𝛽 = 1 −
𝛼 are the physical and share of output whilst  𝐴(𝑡) reflects the role of technology and 
innovation. 𝐴(𝑡) is called Total Factor Productivity (TFP) and reflects the efficiency of 
capital and labour. TFP is an important element of the production function in the 
                                                 
5 The basic concept of the neoclassical growth theory is explained in Section 2.2.2 of this Chapter 
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neoclassical framework as it is seen as the main driver of productivity and hence long-term 
growth. This research dwells on a modification of TFP 
 
 
The main proposition made in this thesis is that TFP, which is viewed as the measure of 
technological advancement or the net productivity of factors of production, can be 
decomposed to reflect efficiency gains from other fundamental sources of growth. Financial 
development, enhanced by institutional quality, can be incorporated into the production 
function to generate higher productivity levels. Efficiency levels are enhanced when 
institution quality measures proposed by Rodrik (2000) interact with financial development 
through TFP. The level of productivity is thus proposed to be above that of pure technical 
progress in the Solow neoclassical framework. The decomposition of the technological 
advancement measure is vital to the efficiency of the production function’s productivity in 
this thesis. Institutional quality modified financial development is thus viewed as a 
productivity-promoting component of economic growth (You and Sarantis, 2013; 
Demetriades and Law, 2006; Effiong, 2015).  
 
It is important to note that a consideration of finance related growth studies using the 
neoclassical growth framework shows that some studies use an open economy-based 
approach by including trade openness, exchange rate and net export among others as control 
variables. These variables are usually introduced into models as additional inputs whose 
effect on the growth of the economy is measured in addition to the main variables of interest. 
They did not estimate the production function (Demetriades and Law, 2006; Balach and 
Law, 2015; Sadraoui et al, 2019). This research departs from the above approach by 
applying the method of You and Sarantis (2013). This method seeks to address the 
contribution of IQLEG to TFP by estimating the production function and measuring the 
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contribution of FD and IQ to productivity. The effect of the factors that make the economy 
open is assumed to be captured in the NFP. With this goal in mind, the research is based on 
the neoclassical growth model in a closed economy.  
 
This chapter firstly examines the major theories of economic growth, financial development 
and institutional quality. The different theoretical relationships between growth and 
financial development as well as growth and institutional quality are explored. Secondly, 
the main analytical framework that this thesis is based on is presented with the derivation 
of the extended production functions  
 
2.2 Overview Economic Growth 
Economic growth is defined as the steady process by which the productive capacity of the 
economy is increased over time to bring about rising levels of national output and income 
(Todaro and Smith, 2009; Khan and Khan, 2012, p. 24).  Economic growth comes in two 
forms: an economy can either grow "extensively" by using more resources (such as physical, 
human, or natural capital) or "intensively" by using the same amount of resources more 
efficiently (productively). The components of economic growth include capital 
accumulation realized from savings, growth in population and technological progress 
(Todaro and Smith, 2009; Romer, 2006).  
 
Traditionally various theories and associated models have been put forward by economists 
to explain growth and differences in income in the different economies of the world. These 
theories have spun from Adam Smith, David Ricardo, Karl Max, Robert Solow and many 
other Economists. Other interwoven theories and models include the classic theories such 
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as Rostow’s stages of growth model, the Harrod-Domar (The AK model) and Lewis’ 
structural change model. The market fundamentalism theories and the neo classical theories 
of growth such as Robert Solow’s neoclassical growth theories, the infinite horizon model, 
the overlapping generations’ model and the endogenous growth theories are all classical 
economic growth theories. Contemporary models such as the Translog growth model are 
included on the list. A thorough examination of all these theories depicts certain 
commonalities and differences between them.  
 
In spite of seeming differences in theoretical approaches, economic growth and 
development theories simply seek to explain the determinants or sources of economic 
growth. These theories are aimed at either explaining why some economies grow faster than 
others or why economies do not converge to a steady state level of growth. Kaldor (1963) 
examined commonly occurring features and characteristics about economic growth and 
listed a number of stylized facts that typically characterize the process of economic growth. 
These facts are growth in per capita output over time wherein the growth rate does not fall; 
growth in per worker capital over time with a near constant rate of growth of return to 
capital, labour and capital as a share of national income is almost constant; and a generally 
considerable disparity in growth rate of output per worker across countries.  
 
These disparities in growth rate of output per worker, although seemingly small, add up 
over years and result in serious consequences for standards of living.  As such, there is an 
urgent need to study and contribute to literature on government policy that affects long-term 
growth.  Economic growth has, at its very centre, the welfare and standards of living of 
individuals in an economy and any finding that contributes to understanding the dynamics 
relating to growth should be of great importance to all stakeholders. Investigating the 
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theories that help identify the determinants of growth is not just key but is imperative to 
forward the efforts at lessening world poverty.   
 
Three main categories of modern theories can be identified under economic growth. These 
theories are the Classical, Neo Classical and the New Growth theories also termed the 
endogenous growth theory. The underlying framework of all these theories is that economic 
growth is needed for economies to experience higher levels of welfare. Secondly, economic 
growth, whether in the short or long run, is achieved as a result of changes in certain factors 
or phenomena. However, these schools of thought vary in their view on areas such as the 
constituents of these factors and whether they have long-run or short-run impacts on the rate 
of growth of an economy. Two of the main commonly used   theories in the growth literature 
are briefly discussed below. 
 
2.2.1 The Endogenous Growth Theory  
The endogenous growth theory (EGT) was proposed out of the seeming inadequacy of the 
Solow (1956; 1957) neoclassical growth theory in addressing the problem of how other 
factors might contribute to growth, nor what impact might be made by market 
imperfections. What does this mean?  It takes its roots from the Schumpeterian era and was 
thrust into prominence by Romer in the 1980s.  The endogenous growth theory emphasises 
the key role played by knowledge, technical change and innovation, learning, human capital 
and institutions. According to Romer (1986), ideas are what fuel long term economic growth 
(See Romer, 1990; 1994; Aghion et al., 1998; Schilirò, 2019)6 
                                                 
6 Seminal theoretical advocacy and contributions to research on the endogenous growth theory include (MRW, 
1992; Pagano, 1993; Lucas, 1988, Easterly and Levine, 2001, Barro, 1990; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1992; 
Peretto, 2017) 
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In the EGT framework, growth is endogenously determined through new knowledge. 
Agents' decisions that do not incorporate any outside technological progress, as stressed in 
the neoclassical growth theory, are a major determinant of long-run economic growth. This 
new knowledge, which is developed within the economic system, positively impacts on per 
capita growth and productivity. New knowledge is deemed an intangible capital good, 
which is a fundamental production input. An important property of new knowledge is that 
it has increasing marginal productivity. Another important feature of the EGT is the role of 
division of labour through specialisation. Romer thus stresses that in the EG framework, 
increasing returns are the results of specialization. Increasing returns are realized from 
specialization and this fuels long-term growth. The degree of specialisation in the economy 
is depicted by a multiplicity of intermediate goods. The growth inducing effect of learning 
by doing or positive externalities that technologically spill over from one agent to another 
is again a vital characteristic of the EGT.  
 
Based on the aggregate production function, which has capital and labour as its inputs, the 
EGT, extends the one sector growth production framework to a boundless number of 
mechanisms for generating productivity increase. These mechanisms result in increasing 
returns to scale happening directly within the production function or through the application 
of produced R&D or through the production of human capital. The endogeneity of this 
growth theory also stems from the fact that parameters that generate growth are based on 
choice (Fine, 2000; Benos and Zotou, 2014).  
 
Despite its seeming strengths, the EGT, which is based on the Cobb-Douglas production 
function, has not been without its fair share of criticism. Firstly, the EGT abstracts wrongly 
from reality by assuming a single product market or a symmetrical nature of different sectors 
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of the economy. Variables that contribute to inefficiencies and impede economic growth are 
not considered in the concept. These include poor infrastructure, institutional inadequacies 
and imperfect markets, institutions, transaction costs and the political nature of innovations. 
Secondly, unlike the neoclassical growth framework, there’s no distinction between the role 
of capital and that of technological progress in the EGT whilst it is plagued with problems 
of scale effects (Onyimadu, 2015). Thirdly, despite its widespread acceptance and usage, 
unlike the neoclassical framework, it is not validated empirically (See Cavusoglu and 
Tebaldi, 2006; Schilirò, 2019; Peretto, 2017). Romer (1994) advocates that if the 
assumption of exogenous technological change as well as the equality of the level of 
technological opportunities available to all nations of the Solow Neoclassical model were 
to be dropped, the problem of non-convergence in the EGT would be addressed.  
 
2.2.2 The Neoclassical Growth Model 
The model is built on the expansion of the Harod-Domar or AK formulation. Labour is 
added as a second factor of production and an independent variable, technology, is 
introduced. Unlike the AK model, which assumes constant returns to scale and a fixed 
coefficient, the neoclassical growth model (also termed Solow-Swan or Solow model) 
created by Solow (1956; 1957), assumes diminishing returns to labour and capital separately 
and constant returns to both factors jointly. It is the basic framework for the study of 
convergence across countries. The central concept of the model is that, given the same rates 
of depreciation, savings, labour force growth and productivity growth, economies will 
conditionally converge to the same level of income.   
 
In Solow's model, the saving rates and the rate of population growth are exogenous and 
determine the steady state of income per capita. The model posits that capital accumulation 
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cannot explain the vast long run growth in output per person and the differences in 
individual country’s output per person. Capital accumulation affects output by making 
direct contributions to production for which it is paid its marginal product. If changes in 
capital accumulation lead to changes in output, Solow asserts that the change in real income 
or output over time and across countries is far too vast to be explained by changes in capital 
stock.  
 
In effect, there are other potential sources of differences in real output. These potential 
sources, some of which are technological progress and positive externalities from capital 
are not explained by the model and are treated as exogenous or even altogether absent.  
There is no optimization in the Solow model as it takes the saving rate as constant and 
exogenous. The steady-state capital-labour ratio is related positively to the rate of saving 
and negatively to the rate of population growth. The central predictions of the Solow model 
concern the impact of saving and population growth on real income. Solow’s model 
originally projects that, with respect to standards of living, real income is higher in countries 
with higher saving rates and lower in countries with higher values of population and 
depreciation growth rates. The model features four variables, namely output (Y), capital 
(K), labour (L) and knowledge or effectiveness of labour (A), which captures the effect of 
technology, also called total factor productivity. The model is theoretically stated as in 
equation (3.1)  
 
Critics of the Solow Neoclassical model firstly question the assumption of that the 
unemployment rates of labour and capital are constant and find it largely unrealistic. 
Secondly, the neoclassical growth framework is supply based and has as one of its main set-
backs, the absence of a well-structured aggregate demand side, which would have accounted 
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for short-run and medium run economic fluctuations. The third challenge is that the 
neoclassical growth theory is limited by assuming that, in a steady state, it is the labour-
augmenting technological progress that solely determines the growth rate per capita income 
(An Encyclopedia of Macroeconomics, 2002).  
 
Notwithstanding these set-backs, the Solow model, which looks at the implications for the 
vast differences in standard of living over time and across countries for human welfare, has 
been widely applied in empirical research. One advantage of the Solow Neoclassical growth 
theory has over the EGT is that been theoretically and empirically validated (Cavusoglu and 
Tebaldi, 2006).  Indeed, according to Romer (2006), the Solow model is the starting point 
of almost all analyses on economic growth. Research that aims at determining the role of 
TFP in growth has been based on the Neoclassical growth framework (You and Sarantis, 
2013; Demetriades and Law, 2006; Balach and Law, 2015).   
 
In addition to the above defence for the neoclassical theory of growth, when the basic 
Neoclassical Solow model is extended by being considered in different contexts such as 
within the Constant Elasticity of Substitution and Variable Elasticity production forms, it 
provides a more realistic and holistic impetus for its application and ensures robustness in 
the conclusions and findings generated. This thesis therefore dwells on the Solow 
Neoclassical Growth Theory. Prior to a discussion on the mathematical representation of 
the main theoretical framework, a discussion on financial development and institutional 
quality follows in the next sessions.  
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2.3 Financial Development 
The 2012 World Economic Forum on Financial Development Report (p.7) defines financial 
development as ‘the factors, policies and institutions that lead to effective financial 
intermediation and markets as well as deep and broad access to capital and financial 
services. Levine (2005, p. 861) defines financial development as involving ‘improvement 
in the production of ex-ante information about possible investment, monitoring of 
investment and implant of corporate governance, trading, diversification and management 
of risk and exchange of goods and service’, stressing that each of the above financial 
functions may influence savings and investment decisions and hence, economic growth and 
may have different institutional settings. Financial development as a phenomenon becomes 
noteworthy if it is related to the overall economic goal of better or higher living standards 
measured by economic growth and development. The various theoretical postulations 
related to financial development have all been given within the context of the role played 
by the financial system and the related impact on economic growth.  
 
The above definitions of financial development among others, suggests that financial 
development can be defined as the ability of an economy, through effectively working 
institutions, to consistently minimize investment risks, reduce the cost of information and 
transactions and allocate capital and investment into the most efficient use such that 
productivity is enhanced from improvements in financial intermediation, instruments and 
market activities, and there is a general increase in access to deep and broad financial 
services. In effect, discussing financial development without its end goal of impacting 
welfare and productivity is virtually impossible.   
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A well-developed financial sector, among others, is a key feature of economic growth 
(Gries, Kraft and Meierrieks, 2009; Menyah, Nazlioglu and Wolde-Rufael, 2014; Baltagi, 
Demetriades and Law, 2009; Cavallo and Galindo, 2013; Kendall, 2012; King and Levine, 
1993a). The importance and relevance of financial development in the realisation of 
economic development has been extensively investigated (Fernández and Tamayo, 2015; 
Huang, 2010; Murinde, 2012; Levine, 2005). The ensuing discussion will consider the 
various theoretical underpinnings that relate to finance and growth; a relationship that has 
been extensively investigated and researched in the literature and has churned out a wide 
variety of opinions and hypotheses (Greenwood and Jovanovich, 1990; Pagano, 1993; 
Demetriades and Hussein, 1996; Levine, 1997; 2003; 2005; Rajan and Zingales, 1998; 
Levine, Loayza and Beck, 2000; Al-Yousif, 2002; Beck and Levine, 2004; Cline, 2015)7.  
 
2.3.1 Early Concepts of Financial Development 
Economists have always sought to understand the dynamics and determinants of economic 
growth and the reasons for different rates of growth in various countries. Schumpeter (1911) 
pioneered the investigations into the possible role of finance in economic growth and 
development and argued that when financial intermediaries mobilise savings, evaluate 
projects, manage risk and monitor managers, they provide services that facilitate overall 
economic growth. Financial development theories have journeyed through various 
conceptual and theoretical phases to include the liquidity preference theory (LPT)8 of 
Keynes (1936) that detected possibilities for negative or, at best, neutral effects of financial 
development on income levels.  
                                                 
7 See also Bertocco (2008), Hasan, Koetter and Wedow (2009), Jalil, Feridun and Ma (2010), Rahaman (2011), 
Bijlsma, Kool and Non (2017), Valickova, Havranek and Horváth (2015), Khalifa Al-Yousif (2002) and 
Popov (2018). 
 
8 According to the LPT, liquidity preference tends to push the real interest rate above its full employment 
equilibrium level, which leads to income falling to equate savings and investment plans. 
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According to the LPT, liquidity preference tended to push the real interest rate above its full 
employment equilibrium level, which leads to income falling to equate savings and 
investment plans. Keynes recommends interest rate ceilings to limit liquidity preference and 
reduce the real interest rate. Tobin (1965), along the lines of financial repression, suggested 
that, by reducing the preference for liquidity as in financial repression, it can increase the 
capital/labour ratio and hence accelerate economic growth. In practice however, this 
financial repression-led growth formulation was not realistic. High rates of inflation and 
low fixed interest rates and other measures of financial repression did not accelerate growth. 
However, Goldsmith (1969), Shaw (1973) and McKinnon (1973), through their ground-
breaking research work, provided the theoretical basis for countering the Keynes-Tobin 
school of thought.   
 
Goldsmith (1969) submits what seems to be the furthering of the Schumpeterian view that 
the structure of the financial system contributes, albeit not decisively, to the growth rate of 
real national product. Goldsmith underscores the need to isolate the specific effects and 
impacts of financial factors in the economic growth process. Goldsmith used the financial 
interrelations ratio (FIR), which he found to be the most informative and single special 
measure of financial structure.   The FIR was used to conduct a theoretical determination of 
specific characteristics of the financial structure that affected or are affected by economic 
growth. This enabled the determination of whether there were ‘typical’ financial structure 
characteristics that could be general to capitalist countries. Although the FIR measure, 
which consisted of dead-weight debt ratio and two layering ratios, was a sufficient measure, 
Goldsmith (1969) found it necessary to include further subdivisions of the FIR in order to 
capture differences in the financial structures between countries or over time.  
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In conclusion, Goldsmith found that the higher the level of FIR, the higher the level of 
growth of the financial sector, which in turn, translated into higher national output.  The 
concept of dead weight debt in Goldsmith’s submission was, however, criticized by Shaw 
(1973) who found the use of dead-weight debt statistically restrictive and observed that the 
central conclusions regarding dead-weight debt included bearing a high proportion to 
national assets and national wealth in most advanced countries and being largely responsible 
for the complex and powerful network of financial intermediaries in advanced countries. In 
1973, Shaw and McKinnon independently proposed seminal theories, which have been 
combined to become a reference point for most finance-growth studies. 
 
2.3.2 Later Concepts of Financial Development-The McKinnon-Shaw Framework 
The economy analysed by McKinnon and Shaw is a financially repressed developing one 
and the basis of their argument is that, where there is financial repression, there will be 
random changes and distortions in prices, interest rates and exchange rates, which in turn, 
will reduce the real rate of growth and the real size of the financial system relative to non-
financial magnitudes9.  
 
In this framework, because the money that is given to the private sector is backed by the 
internal debt in the same sector, it is called inside money. The role of financial institutions 
as usual is to bring savers and investors together through intermediation. Savings grow at 
the same rate as the economy and are positively related to the real interest rate and are 
distributed between tangible assets and deposits. These tangible assets are used to hedge 
against inflation and the deposits attract the nominal rate of interest. Financial repression 
                                                 
9 The McKinnon-Shaw framework is thoroughly investigated by Fry (1988) who brings out the common and 
essential elements in the framework. 
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here refers to the fixing of the nominal interest rate by the government such that the real 
interest rate is always below its equilibrium level.  
 
The actual investment in the society becomes less by being limited to the amount of saving 
that can be obtained at the real interest rate. Assuming the interest rate ceiling is only applied 
to the deposit rate, the investor’s interest rate will be the one that clears the market given 
the fact that the supply of saving is limited; and since the banking system, although 
competitive, is regulated, the spread will be used on non-price competition.10 Loan rate 
ceilings and deposit rate ceilings are fairly common in most financially repressed societies 
and this is accompanied by reductions in the demand for real money as the explicit real 
deposit interest rate decreases in a financially repressed economy. Financially repressed 
societies tend to have loan rate ceilings that are usually enforced by state owned financial 
institutions whilst private commercial banks, because of compensating balances, are able to 
evade them.  
 
As long as loan rate ceilings are fully in effect, non-price rationing of loanable funds occur 
and the allocation of credit is mainly done according to transaction costs and not because of 
the risk or probability of default. Other things that could affect the allocation of loans 
include political pressures, loan size, the hidden or private benefit to loan officers, ‘name’ 
and quality of the collateral. Investments that could be potentially high yielding tend to be 
rationed as the use of loan rate ceilings decreases risk taking and thus the charging of risk 
premia. The yields on investments are generally not above the ceiling interest rate and the 
rate of return to investment is usually dispersed in a financially repressed economy.   
                                                 
10 Such as branch opening and say, advertising services, which may not be at  par with interest payments. 
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McKinnon (1973) highlights the need to consider the negative effects ‘great discrepancies’ 
in interest rates when economic development is measured merely in terms of the 
accumulation of capital that is homogenous and yields the same productivity levels and 
rates. Hence, economic development actually occurs when the variability in rates of return 
is reduced. The distortive effects of interest rate ceilings are seen in low deposit rates that 
can incorrectly lead to increases in current consumption and reduce future consumption, 
which means savings and investments are held below their socially optimum levels.  
 
Prospective depositors may end up investing in low-yielding investments that will be 
directly arranged by them instead of depositing their funds in a bank that will, in turn, on-
lend these funds to the best investors in higher yielding projects. Finally, investment that 
will be relatively capital-intensive will be increased as bank borrowers will take all the loans 
as they require a low interest rate on loans. Therefore, when the interest rates on loans and 
deposits are below the equilibrium level, the quality and quantity of investment will be 
likely to reduce thus constraining economic growth. 
 
In the framework of McKinnon and Shaw, an increase in interest rate ceiling increases the 
saving and investment rates and levels.  The saving rate is better and low-yielding projects 
are discontinued when the real rate changes, leading to an increase in average returns and 
the efficiency of investments. This leads to an increase in the rate of growth of the economy 
as the saving function increases with a rightward shift (McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973). 
Policy makers in the McKinnon-Shaw financially repressed economy can correct the 
constrained rate of growth by either increasing interest rates or reducing the inflation rate 
or, better still, by abolishing interest rate ceilings and thus usher the economy into financial 
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openness, optimizing the return on investments and increasing average efficiency further on 
investment.    
     
The differences in the McKinnon and Shaw framework can be seen from their starting 
positions and the theoretical assumptions that underlie their propositions. McKinnon bases 
his analysis on the outside money model, which effectively implies that financing is limited 
to self-finance and that consumption expenditures are lower than investment expenditures. 
This means that, unless money balances have first been accumulated, investment cannot be 
undertaken. In other words, the demand for money is positively related to the share of 
investment in total expenditures - the outside money (commodity money) assumption held 
by Tobin in contradistinction to the Keynesians. In McKinnon’s model, money supply 
conditions have a first order impact on savings showing that there is a complementarity 
between money and capital. This provides the link between savings and investments in the 
McKinnon model.  
 
Shaw, on the other hand, stresses the role of the financial intermediation process. The chain 
of causality in Shaw begins with higher real institutional interest rate leading to increased 
financial intermediation between savers and investors, which in turn, raises real returns to 
savers and lowers real costs to investors. Thus, with Shaw, financial institutions perform 
their intermediation role of maturity preference transformation, risk pooling, economies of 
scale, lower information costs to both savers and investors, and increased operational 
efficiency. It precludes all notion of "outside money" (money not backed by private debt) 
and investment, postulating instead an "inside money" assumption, or money backed by 
private debt - for the most part productive investment loans. This emphasis on financial 
   
28 
 
intermediation necessitates an increase in real returns on all forms of wealth, money 
included, in order to boost savings (Shaw, 1973).  
 
The positions of both McKinnon and Shaw are in tandem when it comes to their assertion 
that low interest rates have a detrimental impact - according to McKinnon, because they 
depress savings and investments; and, according to Shaw, because they discourage financial 
intermediation. Under both assumptions, repressed financial markets will lead to lower 
growth and a suboptimal allocation of resources. The two views can, on the other hand, be 
considered complementary as has been done by Molho (1986) to the extent that McKinnon's 
argument applies to projects financed internally, while Shaw's applies to projects financed 
through borrowings: most projects tend to be financed in both ways simultaneously  
 
The policy implications of the McKinnon-Shaw camp are that, generally, repressive 
regulation of the financial sector is unambiguously harmful in developing countries as it 
discourages both savings and investment; fosters an inefficient allocation of resources; 
encourages the coexistence of two levels of technology; and worsens income distribution. 
Financial liberalization (the removal or at least gradual phasing out of repressive regulation) 
is a high priority as it would alleviate the harmful effects of repressive regulation and set 
the country on a financial development course that would lead to higher savings, a better 
allocation of resources, balanced growth, and an improved income distribution.  
 
Following the ground-breaking McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis, a plethora of work with 
varying conclusions has been produced on the dynamics and existence of a finance-growth 
relationship.  These include the neoclassical growth framework and the endogenous growth 
models, which have already been discussed in Section 2.2 (Durusu-Ciftci, Ispir, and 
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Yetkiner, 2017; Bucci and Marsiglo, 2019). It is important to note, however, that to this day, 
research on the role of financial development in economic growth uses the seminal 
McKinnon-Shaw framework as a reference point whilst applying economic growth theories 
such as the neoclassical or endogenous growth concepts and their variants.  
 
2.3.3 Financial Development and Economic Growth  
 
Four main schools of thought emerge from the empirical literature with regards to the 
finance-growth relationship. The main strands of literature identified theoretically and 
tested empirically lean heavily towards an existing relationship between finance and growth, 
although the extent and direction of this relationship is largely inconclusive. With the causal 
relationship supply leading, the main hypothesis is that financial development has a positive 
effect on economic growth. According to this view, financial intermediation contributes to 
economic growth through two main channels: (1) by raising the efficiency of capital 
accumulation and in turn the marginal productivity of capital (Goldsmith, 1969); and (2) by 
raising the savings rate and thus the investment rate (McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973).  This 
view that higher levels of economic growth are in part due to higher levels of financial 
development has received considerable support from empirical studies (see Levine, 2000; 
Murinde, 2012; Pagano, 1993; Bencivenga and Smith, 1991; Greenwood and Jovanovich, 
1990; Thakor, 1996)11.  
 
                                                 
11 More recently, Bijlsma, Kool and Non (2017) found a positive but decreasing effect of finance on growth. 
Popov (2018) demonstrates that finance can benefit growth and slow down growth; and Valickova, Havranek 
and Horváth (2015) found a positive and statistically significant effect. 
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The second strand of theory is the demand following the hypothesis introduced by Robinson 
(1952) where financial development changes as a result or consequence of economic 
growth. In Robinson’s words, “where enterprise leads, finance follows” (Robinson, 1952, 
p. 86). Here, as the real side of the economy expands, demand for financial services 
increases, causing further growth in financial services. Hassan, Sanchez and Yu (2011) 
found causality running from growth to finance in South Asia and SSA supporting the 
hypothesis that growth leads to finance in developing countries because of the increasing 
demand for financial services. Other studies holding the growth led finance viewpoint 
include Demetriades and Hussein (1996) and Ireland (1994).  
 
Thirdly, there is the view that the relationship between financial development and economic 
growth is mutually causal, that is, they have bidirectional causality. In the same studies, 
Hassan, Sanchez and Yu (2011) found a two-way causality between finance and growth in 
all regions of the world except SSA, East Asia and The Pacific. On the other hand, Acaravci, 
Ozturk and Acaravci (2009) found a bi-directional causality for a panel of 24 SSA countries. 
Other studies that confirm the bidirectional relationship between growth and financial 
development include Bangake and Eggoh (2011), Demetrides and Hussein (1996) and 
Greenwood and Smith (1997). Another strand of theory, which is relatively less popular and 
was advanced by Lucas (1988), is that financial development and economic growth are not 
causally related. Eichengreen, Gullapalli, and Panizza (2011; 2018) find that this role of 
financial factors in economic growth is rather being overemphasized12. 
 
                                                 
12 See also (Arcand, Berkes and Panizza, 2015; Demetriades and Hussein, 1996; Rousseau and Wachtel, 2011; 
Rodrik and Subramanian, 2009).  
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Patrick (1966) introduces another view point, which is termed the proposition of the stage 
of development hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, supply-leading financial 
development can induce real capital formation in the early stages of economic development. 
Innovation and development of new financial services opens up new opportunities for 
investors and savers and, in so doing, inaugurates self-sustained economic growth. As 
financial and economic development proceeds, the supply-leading characteristics of 
financial development diminish gradually and are eventually dominated by demand 
following financial development (Calderon and Liu, 2003). These non-monotonic studies 
have shown the positive effect of financial development on growth reversing after a certain 
level of financial development and or during a specific period in a nation’s life.  
 
This research is premised on the view that there is an existing relationship between finance 
and growth, which can be further enhanced by institutional quality. It wades into the 
determinants, promoters or moderators of the effects of financial development emphasizing 
the role institutional quality plays. The determinants of a well-functioning financial system 
are numerous (Pagano, 1993), one of which is the quality of the institutions that govern the 
policies and conduct of an economy. McKinnon (1973, p.1) states that extraordinary 
differences among nations in cultural heritage, natural resources, colonial experience and 
political structure seem to defy purely economic analysis. This study explores the role that 
institutional quality plays as determinant of the financial development in a society. In effect, 
will financial systems work adequately without the needed institutional setting and how do 
these institutions ensure that financial development is affecting economic growth 
positively?  
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2.4 Institutional Quality 
The most commonly used definition of institutions in recent literature stems from North 
(1991; 1993), who describes institutions as the rules of the game of a society (Aluko and 
Ibrahim, 2020). North further states that institutions are the humanly devised constraints 
that structure human interaction. Institutional quality refers to the adequacy of institutions 
and their efficacy, which results in their role in resource allocation and enhancement of 
efficiency. A discussion on institutional quality is rooted in the concept or subject of 
institutional economics, which has long been in existence (Coase, 1937; 1960; Veblen, 
1978; 2005; Commons, 1931; Wells, 1976; Foster, 1981). To understand the concept of 
institutional economics, later referred to as modern or new institutional economics, there is 
a need to consider the meaning of the word ‘institutions’ itself from existing literature.  
 
 Institutions are made up of formal constraints (rules, laws, constitutions), informal 
constraints (norms of behaviour, conventions, and self-imposed codes of conduct), and their 
enforcement characteristics. North describes a continuum with unwritten taboos, customs, 
and traditions at one end and constitutions and laws governing economics and politics at the 
other. Institutions, according to North, are made by humans, define incentive structure, and 
shape interaction in the form of formal and informal constraints and enforcement 
characteristics (North, 1994). 
 
Prior to North’s definition, Commons (1931) defined an institution as collective action in 
control, liberation and expansion of individual action with the view that a universal 
circumstance common to all behaviour is known as institutional. He defined collective 
action as ranging from unorganized custom to the many organized going concerns, such as 
the family, the corporation, the trade association, the trade union, the reserve system and 
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the state. Furthermore, this control has the sole intention of resulting in either a gain or a 
loss to another or other individuals. Hodges (2006) states that institutions are the kinds of 
structures that matter most in the social realm. He goes on to extend the definition by stating 
that institutions are a set of systems established and prevalent social rules that structure 
social interactions. These definitions, although not the same, all refer to the existence of 
structures and systems in the social realm that impact the collective society’s interactions, 
which range from non-market sectors to market sectors.  
 
Institutions broaden the reach of economic analysis beyond traditional markets and are able 
to capture a more complete set of mechanisms by which resources are moved from one place 
to another.  Hovenkamp and Coase (2011) explain that the first generation of institutionalists 
emphasized the importance of human-created institutions that serve to allocate power or 
resources, the rules that these institutions develop and employ, and their effect in the overall 
economy.  Indeed, the gaps between economics and institutionalism are many. For example, 
the marginalists and neoclassicalists view that, within the context of institutionalism, social 
institutions wield a lot of power over individuals. Hence, individuals do not have infinite 
power and freedom to make exchanges as professed in the world of competition. This view 
is mainly criticized by early institutionalists for being too abstract and lacking empirical 
content.  
 
The roots of institutionalism make the fact that neoclassicism stresses rationality over 
evolution as a device for explaining human choice unacceptable. Thirdly, institutionalism 
criticized what is typically termed as ‘overly focused’ on market exchange as the main 
method of social interaction. As such, institutionalism questions the scope of economics. A 
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conscious effort has to be made to investigate the power that some social institutions wield 
over individuals and how this power affects economic interactions in the society.  
 
2.4.1 The Concept of Institutional Economics 
To further understand institutional economics, it is imperative to investigate the forces that 
shape economic institutions and the impact they make. Commons (1931) established the 
difficulty in defining exactly what an institution is and viewed institutional economics as 
covering a broad range of economic and legal issues that should not be considered as strictly 
stand-alone concepts. Commons (1931) underscores the need to conduct further research 
studies to establish the links between market transacting and the legal system and developed 
a theory of institutions as “going concerns” governed by “working rules”, and whose 
principal resource deployment device was the “transaction”.   
 
In trying to determine the role of property rights in economic exchange, institutionalism has 
increased the level of economic analysis of the legal system. This has resulted in greater 
attention being paid to the relationship between economic markets and the legal systems 
within both the statutory and common law context. Common’s work identified the need to 
marry economics and law as the main framework in institutional economics. Coase (1936) 
revolutionized research based the concept of transaction when institutional economics is 
extended within the framework of exploring the marriage between economics and 
institutions. 
 
Coase (1936; 1984) extends the concept and idea of institutional economics by introducing 
what is called the New or Modern Institutional Economics (NIE) where emphasis is placed 
on the transaction and its cost. Just as Commons had earlier identified, Coase suggests that 
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Modern Institutional Economics has an impact on normative economics. He argues that 
there is the need to ‘extract’ institutional quality and its effects in order to answer the age-
old question of why there are divergences in income levels of economies.  
 
2.4.2 Coase’s Concept of New Institutional Economics 
 
The difference between NIE and institutional economics is the fact that new institutional 
economists recommend a realists’ approach and with realistic benchmarks instead of the 
hypothetical benchmarking characterized by neoclassical approaches. It does not in any way 
eschew social phenomena such as corporate culture, organizational memory, and the like, 
but follows strict methodological individualism, always couching its explanations in terms 
of the goals, plans and actions of individuals. The rise of NIE saw an extension into the 
institutionalists’ and neoclassicists’ ideology in that attention began to be given to the 
relationship between institutions and economic transactions.   
 
According to Coase, the major distinguishing feature between NIE and institutional 
economics is the ability to study man as he is, acting within the constraints imposed by real 
institutions. He further states that institutional economics have been greatly helped to be 
more realistic by being infused with legal material. Economic policy makers are therefore 
forced to analyse real choices in order to realize the richness of institutional alternatives. 
The institutional proposals and underpinnings of this research are rooted in the theories of 
new institutional economics (NIE) and will focus mainly on Coase’s contribution to this 
discipline.  
 
The main hypothesis made by Coase is that when the gains from abiding by a contract are 
more than gains from not abiding, the rational player can be bound, all things being equal. 
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Coase’s idea is mainly based on the market and the essence of property rights with the 
argument that neoclassical theories in economics have endogenised institutional quality. 
Coase tries to establish a realist and tractable definition of the firm using the idea of 
substitution at the margin. He attacks the neoclassic doctrine that the economic system 
works itself and the assumption that the direction of resources depends directly on price 
mechanism.  
 
Furthermore, unlike the neoclassical context, preferences are not simply accepted as given 
because the interest seemed to be in studying the sources of human preferences, 
emphasizing their links with either evolutionary biology or behaviourist psychology. Hence, 
when there are exchanges in the market that are voluntary, there is evidence of institutions 
that have evolved to move resources through the society. In examining the relationship of 
Coase's thought to neoclassicals and institutionalism, it is further concluded that first 
generation institutionalists do not subscribe to the notion that it is only the prerogative of 
the economic scientist to study   individual preference. Indeed, in the world of scarce 
resources, which are very expensive to move, different types of institutions arise or evolve 
to determine the where and how resources are moved when individuals are forced to make 
trade-offs (p. 501). Coase emphasizes the role of transaction costs in the movement of 
resources without disregarding the fact that individual preference orderings and market 
exchange are the main movers.  
 
The gap that new institutional economists sought to fill in a purely neoclassical regime of 
economic thought was to bring in the costs associated with moving resources from one place 
to another. This school of thought maintains that transactions are created by humans as 
vehicles to help them move resources. New intuitionalism merged marginalism and 
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institutional economics. In the view of the neoclassical economists, the economic system 
largely operated without internal operations and decision making. The firm, for instance, 
made its presence on the market as purchaser and seller; but what actually happened for 
these to take place in the internal operations and workings were unknown or not considered 
(North, 1995).  
 
Neoclassical marginalists depended on the presumption that equilibrium occurred when 
individuals, firms and markets arranged their own preferences and ignored the cost of 
moving resources from one place to another, resulting in very abstract reasoning in the view 
of institutional and neo-institutional economics.  Coase therefore deduced that, from an 
ordinalist’s view point, the concern of economics was properly limited to three things: (1) 
market exchange and the costs of the exchange process; (2) price theory, which employed 
a currency of constant value; and (3) the internal preferences exercised by the single 
economic actor, including the business firm, making decisions under scarcity. Thus, the firm 
was not different from the individual, and they both tended to maximize utility: although 
with the firm, the utility was replaced with profits and losses that could be quantified with 
price.  
 
Coase’s ideas were further extended to governments, interest groups, religions, families, 
labour unions etc. He differed from the first-generation institutionalists by using 
marginalists’ behaviour in explaining the behaviour of economic agents and welfare-
enhancing outcomes.   To the extent that parties are able to bargain, at low cost, or the legal 
system is able to replicate and achieve the same outcome on behalf of individuals, welfare 
was being achieved. Welfare increases did not really include the transfer of wealth 
involuntarily from the wealthy to the poor. With a strong and consistent resistance to 
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government intervention and strong support for voluntary exchanges in welfare 
maximization with low transaction costs, Coase took a purely neoclassical viewpoint.  
Hovenkamp and Coase (2011) conclude that Coase's ideas represented a neoclassical 
takeover of institutionalism.  
 
2.4.3 North’s Concept of New Institutional Economics 
 
North (1993) however rejects the assertion that the means to reduce transaction costs is by 
introducing institutions into a system and claims that looking at the historical and current 
capital as well as other markets, institutions have not played a credible role in reducing 
transaction costs. North suggests that organizations are the primary source of institutional 
change. He recommends that credibility will ensure adequate institutions. One of the major 
statements that North makes is that institutions will only work when both formal and 
informal rules (norms, conventions etc.) are placed side by side. He stated further that to 
restructure an economy successfully required, firstly, a correctly incentivized restructure of 
property rights; and secondly, participants who are conditioned mentally to take advantage 
of the corrected incentives.  
 
 Features of New Institutional Economics 
The main features of NIE are identified as: (1) a focus on collective rather than individual 
action; (2) a preference for an ‘evolutionary’ rather than mechanistic approach to the 
economy; and (3) an emphasis on empirical observations over deductive reasoning. These 
ideas are further enhanced in the literature by Rutherford (1983), Langlois (1989) and 
Hodgson (1998). Klein (2000) attempts an exposition on new institutional economics by 
identifying the main constituents of NIE, which he identified as “a rapidly growing literature 
combining economics, law, organization theory, political science, sociology and 
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anthropology to understand social, political and commercial institutions” (p. 32), the 
strongest and largest discipline being economics. He further identified two main categories 
of institutions - the institutional environment and the institutional arrangement.  
 
An institutional environment refers to the background constraints, or ‘rules of the game’, 
that guide individuals’ behaviour such as the legal environment. These can be both formal, 
explicit rules (constitutions, laws, property rights) and informal, often implicit rules (social 
conventions, norms) and institutional arrangements, which are typically specific guidelines 
- what Williamson (1987; 1996) calls ‘governance structures’ - designed by trading partners 
to mediate particular economic relationships such as business firms and contractual 
agreements. It is a marriage between Economics and Law. In effect, this is a probe into the 
mechanisms by which legal rules change. The institutional environment is thus the 
relationship between NIE and legal realism (North, 1995).  
 
With NIE, there is an increased level of attention given to rules, social and legal norms that 
would not be considered as part of economics but that truly underlie economic activity. The 
field of economics was criticized as unrealistic and reductionist, however, in view of the 
fact that NIE brought, if you will, a human touch to neoclassical economics, its usefulness 
and impact continues to be felt in the literature on economics (newworldencyclopedia.org). 
The main aspects of law that are relevant to NIE are, firstly, contract and property laws. It 
is interesting to note that NIE, apart from the formal confines of the court system, regards 
private solutions as essential forms of holding or constraining behaviour. Without the 
informal rules that structure social conduct, institutionalizing rule of law and property rights 
would not be possible as these tend to impose constraints and shape choices (Klein, 2000).  
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With the evolution of NIE, the neoclassical paradigm of viewing economic growth and 
development as a gradual transformation from autarky to specialization and division of 
labour has shifted to the view that economic growth thus depends on the degree to which 
the potential hazards of trade (shirking, opportunism and the like) can be controlled by 
institutions, which reduce information costs, encourage capital formation and capital 
mobility, allow risks to be priced and shared and otherwise facilitate cooperation. An 
economic related problem such as that of agency-principal was solved through kinship or 
close social ties, and a threat of being ostracized was a disciplinary device. Standardized 
weights and measures, units of standardized weights and measures, units of account, media 
of exchange and procedures are used to resolve disputes.  
 
These constraints usually support trade expansion and lower information costs (Greif, 1989; 
North and Weingast, 1989). Product and factor markets can only grow depending on 
established and secure property rights. Furthermore, as an economy industrializes, more and 
more commercial activity involves ‘transacting’: trade, finance, banking, insurance and 
management. Indeed, industrialization requires institutions to mitigate the costs associated 
with these transactions.  In addition to contract and law, the environment and political 
institution serve as another facet of NIE. This is rooted in public choice and positive political 
theory. People decide which political institutions they would adopt. Here, the main idea is 
to determine the effect of political institutions on public policy, including macroeconomic 
policy, welfare policy, budgets, regulation and technology policy (Weingast, 1997).  
 
Williamson (2000) attests to the fact that the neoclassical economists were dismissive of 
institutions and hence very little has been done with regards to coming up with a unified 
theory on institutions. Indeed, studying the complexity of institutions has been done under 
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various ways and contexts; pluralism is what holds promise for overcoming our ignorance. 
Williamson (2000) mentions two propositions by Matthews (1986). First, "institutions do 
matter"; and second, "the determinants of institutions are susceptible to analysis by the tools 
of economic theory”. How then does NIE work?  
 
Williamson’s Four Levels of Social Analysis 
Williamson (2000) presents four levels of social analysis where the top level is the social 
embeddedness. At this level, the norms, customs, mores, traditions, etc. are located. 
Religion plays a large role at this level whilst the second level is referred to as the 
institutional environment. The structures observed here are partly the products of 
evolutionary processes, but design opportunities are posed. Beyond the informal constraints 
(sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, and codes of conduct), which are found in the first 
level, formal rules (constitutions, laws, property rights as indicated in North (1991)) open 
up the opportunity for first-order economizing. This is done to get the formal rules of the 
game right.   
  
Constrained by the shadow of the past, the design instruments at Level 2 include the 
executive, legislative, judicial and bureaucratic functions of government as well as the 
distribution of powers across different levels of government (federalism). The definition 
and enforcement of property rights and of contract laws are important features showing or 
suggesting that future success is likely. The third level is where the institutions of 
governance are located. Although property remains important, a perfectly functioning legal 
system for defining contract laws and enforcing contracts is not contemplated. Costless 
court ordering being a friction, much of the contract management and dispute settlement 
action is dealt with directly by the parties through private ordering. The need to come to 
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terms with contract laws (plural), rather than an all-purpose law of contract (singular) is 
posed. The governance of contractual relations becomes the focus of analysis at this level.  
 
At the fourth level, neoclassical analysis is assumed to work. Optimality apparatus, often 
marginal analysis, is employed, and the firm, for these purposes, is typically described as a 
production function. Adjustments to prices and output occur more or less continuously. 
Agency theory, which emphasizes ex ante incentive alignment and efficient risk bearing 
rather than ex post governance, nonetheless makes no provision for neoclassical 
complications, of which multi-tasking is one. Being an important omission, attention is 
given to technology at this level within the NIE framework. Williamson stresses that the 
governance of contractual relations becomes the focus of analysis.  
 
In the context of this research, these are embodied in five main institutional categories 
proposed by Rodrik (2000). Rodrik (2000) identifies five main institutions that allow 
markets to perform adequately. Hence, in line with the fact that the definition of economic 
growth includes established and well-functioning financial markets, coupled with 
overwhelming evidence that the relation between finance and growth tends to be positive, 
irrespective of the direction (Murinde, 2012; Levine, 2005), the need to critically examine 
and establish a link between these institutional arrangements and quality, and financial 
development in the SSA region arises (Haber, 2008). 
 
Rodrik’s Institutions for High Quality Growth 
Five types of market-supporting institutions have been identified by Rodrik (2000), namely 
property rights; regulatory institutions; institutions for macroeconomic stabilisation; 
institutions for social insurance; and institutions of conflict management. Consequently, for 
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financial markets to play their role of financial inclusion and acceleration of economic 
growth in SSA, these five institutions must be adequately functioning. Rodrik further states 
that the most important question to ask in this context is: which particular institutions matter 
and how does one acquire them? The implication here is that there is a need to go beyond 
focusing on price reforms and looking into the institutional underpinnings of market 
economies, a situation revealed by the encounter between neoclassical economics and 
developing societies. Indeed, in the absence of adequate institutions, the probability for 
incentives to work will be very low and often generate perverse results.  
 
Rodrik points out that a clearly delineated system of property rights; a regulatory apparatus 
curbing the worst forms of fraud, anti-competitive behaviour, and moral hazard; a 
moderately cohesive society exhibiting trust and social cooperation; social and political 
institutions that mitigate risk and manage social conflicts; the rule of law; and clean 
government are social arrangements that economists take for granted but which are 
conspicuous by their absence in poor counties. Rodrik (2000) identifies democracy as a base 
for building good institutions. He provides evidence that participatory democracies enable 
higher-quality growth: they allow greater predictability and stability, are more resilient to 
shocks, and deliver superior distributional outcomes.  
 
There’s a need to recognize the importance and uniqueness of the institutional arrangement 
in different countries is important. In effect there is no one size fits all institutional 
arrangement that must dominate for overall performance. Institutional diversity must be 
considered. There is no reason to suppose that modern societies have already managed to 
exhaust all the useful institutional variations that could underpin healthy and vibrant 
economies.  
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Two scenarios can be considered for adopting functional institutions. The first is by 
adopting what has occurred in advanced countries such as a blue print or manual (Rodrik, 
2000); and the second is that institutions can be developed locally, relying on hands of 
experience, local knowledge and experimentation. Even under the best possible 
circumstances, an imported blueprint requires domestic expertise for successful 
implementation. Alternatively, when local conditions differ greatly, it would be unwise to 
deny the possible relevance of institutional examples from elsewhere. For regions like SSA, 
should countries then converge to western institutional arrangements or should they focus 
on institutional experimentation? Rodrik’s view of these five is that they do cut across 
regional boundaries and promote growth.   
 
The process of financial development making a positive impact on economic growth may 
in fact have its intended impact when it occurs in the presence of these institutional 
arrangements. The brief review on definition and features of economic growth, financial 
development and institutional quality is thus followed by a discussion on how financial 
development and institutional quality relates to growth based on the theoretical and 
empirical approach of the aggregated production function.  The existing relationships 
between financial development and economic growth, institutional quality and growth, and 
financial development, institutional quality and economic growth will be discussed in that 
order. 
 
2.5 Institutional Quality and Economic Growth 
Based on existing literature, the role of institutional quality in economic growth cannot be 
overemphasized (Rodrik, 2000; Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi, 2002; North, 1991; 
Williamson, 1987; Boettke and Coyne, 2009). According to Rodrik (2002), rich countries 
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are those that provide investors with a sense of security about their property rights. In rich 
countries, the rule of law prevails, private incentives are aligned with social objectives, 
monetary and fiscal policies are grounded in solid macroeconomic institutions, idiosyncratic 
risks are appropriately mediated through social insurance, and citizens have recourse to civil 
liberties and political representation. On the other hand, Rodrik (2002) continues, poor 
countries are marked by the absence or ill-formation of these arrangements.  
 
It is important however to note that these institution-growth relations may not necessarily 
be uni-directional as high-quality institutions are perhaps as much a result of economic 
prosperity as they are their cause. Indeed, the fact that institutions exert a very strong 
determining effect on aggregate incomes is being increasingly confirmed in empirical 
research (Hall and Jones, 1999; Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2001; Easterly and 
Levine, 2003; Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi, 2002). Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi. 
(2002) therefore hypothesise that institutions, in particular property rights and the rule of 
Law, account for the differences in income levels between the world's richest and poorest 
countries. 
 
The evolution of economies does not necessarily assure economic growth. Rather, the 
incentive structure provided by the basic institutional framework creates opportunities for 
the consequent organizations to evolve. The economy at each stage involves increasing 
specialization and division of labour and consistently more productive technology. 
According to North (1991), transaction costs are lowered by innovations that consists of 
organizational changes, instruments, and specific techniques and enforcement 
characteristics that lowered the costs of engaging in exchanges and occur at three cost 
   
46 
 
margins. These margins are those that reduce information costs, those that increased the 
mobility of capital and those that spread risk.  
 
North (1991) argues that institutions have historically had a role in the performance of 
economies and in fact still do as they are meant to constrain human interaction and 
exchange. Exchange, which is the main activity underlying economics, takes resources as 
defined and enforced. North links the transactions cost associated with exchange and profit 
maximization to the presence of institutions. He writes: 
‘Even if everyone had the same objective function (like maximizing the firm's profits), transacting would take 
substantial resources; but in the context of individual wealth-maximizing behaviour and asymmetric 
information about the valuable attributes of what is being exchanged (or the performance of agents), 
transaction costs are a critical determinant of economic performance. Institutions and the effectiveness of 
enforcement (together with the technology employed) determine the cost of transacting. Effective institutions 
raise the benefits of cooperative solutions or the costs of defection, to use game theoretic terms. In transaction 
cost terms, institutions reduce transaction and production costs per exchange so that the potential gains from 
trade are realizable’ (North, 1991, p. 98).  
 
In production theory, it is hypothesised that reductions in costs with the same amount of 
resources is an indication of increasing efficiency and productivity. This, in turn, translates 
into increasing growth. The neoclassical aggregate production relationship confirms that, 
when they are adequate, institutional arrangements and environments induce productivity. 
Productivity is central to growth just as effective resource allocation is. It is important 
therefore for nation states to strive towards activities that induce productive efficiency for 
increased growth and overall welfare. It is important to note that unproductive activities 
lead to economic stagnation or decline (Boettke and Coyne, 2009). Institutions are thus 
regarded as being central to the enabling context created for productivity growth (Biggs, 
2007; Hounkonnou et al., 2012).  
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Williamson (1975, 1987) focuses on the role of institutions as providing efficient tools to 
solving the problems of a competitive organization or establishment. These efficient 
solutions include market exchange, franchising or vertical integration. However, these 
solutions do not explain why there are historical and current differences in the performance 
of economies. North (1991) attempts to explain how an economy achieves competitive 
markets that are efficient.  The idea that political institutions ensure property rights and 
economic constraints needs to be given a second look because many economies have not 
been able to produce and enforce rules. Indeed, economic development and growth will be 
realised when there are political and economic institutions that create an economic 
environment that brings about increasing productivity. 
 
Although traditional and modern growth theory such as the neoclassical and endogenous 
growth framework emphasizes the accumulation of capital and technological advancement 
as the main sources of growth, these proximate determinants of growth have often failed to 
provide answers to the reason why some societies manage to accumulate and innovate more 
rapidly than others. Institutions have been cited as one of the fundamental or deeper factors 
that determine which societies will innovate and accumulate, and therefore develop, and 
which will not. 
 
 
2.6 Financial Development, Institutional Quality and Productivity – Establishing the 
Theoretical Framework  
Financial development provides incentives for the participants of the financial system to 
enhance welfare through access to credit and other financial services at optimally 
determined transactions costs (Boyd and Prescott, 1986; Levine, Loayza and Beck, 2000; 
Aluko and Abrahim, 2020).  Indeed, according to the seminal work in Levine (1999), the 
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features of a well-developed financial system include an improved production of ex-ante 
information about possible investment, an adequately monitored investment and implant of 
corporate governance, trading, diversification and management of risk and exchange of 
goods and service. These features, Levine further states, are likely to influence savings and 
investment decisions and hence, economic growth.  
 
By their very definition, institutions are targeted at enhancing efficient resource allocation 
and fairness. Rodrik (2000) emphasized that incentives would only result in adverse results 
when a society lacks the presence of institutions and adequate levels of institutional quality. 
Markets therefore need to be supported by non-market institutions in order to perform well. 
Indeed, Rodrik attributes the Asian financial crisis to allowing financial liberalisation to run 
ahead of financial regulation. Rodrik provides evidence to support his view that institutions 
such as participatory democracies enable higher-quality growth. By allowing a higher level 
of predictability, institutions ensure that these societies are more resilient to shocks, and 
deliver superior distributional outcomes.  
 
In having the right level of quality of institutions, the effect of financial development will 
be felt in total factor productivity through the further reduction of transaction costs and 
hence improvement in efficiency of the financial system, which will thus affect productivity 
positively. The argument being made in this research is that, in spite of these concepts that 
place finance as a determinant of productivity, some economies do not benefit from these 
deliberate attempts to improve the economy because institutional quality is virtually non-
existent or is weak. The role of institutional quality in further enhancing productivity with 
a developed financial system is that institutions reduce the cost of information and 
transactions since they reduce the probability of adverse selection and moral hazard.  
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Institutional quality enhances allocative efficiency already set in motion by the financial 
system as it develops. King and Levine (1993a) state that the financial system does not 
necessarily influence growth via the accumulation of capital. When financial systems 
actively assist the process of evaluating, managing and funding entrepreneurial activities, 
and thereby reduce the costs associated with these activities, productivity growth occurs as 
efficiency is enhanced. Issakson (2007) argues that both institutions and capital intensity 
and policies that encourage investment are major determinants of TFP growth. All these 
enhance the efficient allocation of resources, which is captured in structural change.  
 
Thus well-developed financial systems link savings to high-return investments at a much 
lower cost and ensures allocative efficiency by increasing TFP; and adequately working 
institutions, which are deemed as determinants of TFP, complement the effectiveness of the 
financial system by ensuring higher efficiency levels through reductions in the costs 
associated with information and mitigating the incidence and impact of moral hazard and 
adverse selection in financial markets as it performs it functions. The functions include 
acquiring information about investment for efficient allocation of capital; risk amelioration; 
and monitoring and exerting corporate governance control on both managers and firms, 
respectively. Additional functions are mobilizing and pooling savings and facilitating 
exchange of goods and services. In the presence of quality institutions, these functions are 
efficiently carried out to further increasing productivity.  
 
 
 It is therefore essential to consider institutional quality as a productivity enhancing agent 
due to its hypothesized ability to impose constraints on human behaviour and interaction 
and thus ensure that contracts are enforced, rules and regulations are adhered to and property 
   
50 
 
rights are secure among others (or the rules of the game are obeyed). Equally important is 
the need to reflect on the specific mix of institutions that maximize the effect of these 
reductions in transaction and information costs. This is where Rodrik’s (2000) institutions 
for high quality growth discussed earlier comes in. The next section features a brief 
discussion of some of the empirical studies and findings on the link between institutional 
quality, growth and productivity and financial sector development in SSA.  
 
As already stated, the Solow Neoclassical Growth theory is the main theoretical bedrock of 
this thesis.  Like the EGT, the aggregate Cobb-Douglas production function is the main tool 
for explaining the Solow model. However, emphasis is placed on intensive economic 
growth by focusing primarily on the exogenous technological advancement and its assumed 
constituents in this research. Decomposing the technological advancement measure is vital 
to the efficiency of the production function’s productivity in this thesis. It is expected that 
the growth rate of output will positively correlate with the Solow Residual (Comin, 2010; 
2017; MRW, 1992). The main analytical framework is presented in the next section.  
 
 
2.7 Production Functions  
 
2.7.1 Derivation of the Modified Cobb-Douglas Production Function  
The Cobb-Douglas production function, which was formulated by Charles Cobb and Paul 
Douglas in the second quarter of the20th century (Cobb and Douglas, 1928)13 known to be 
the most applied production function in literature (Gerchet et al., 2019). Briefly, it shows 
the relationship between inputs in the form of capital and labour, technological advancement 
                                                 
13 See Cobb and Douglas (1928) and Barro, Mankiw and Salai-i-Martin (1992) for detailed discussions of the 
Cobb-Douglas production function 
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and output. It is framed upon the assumptions that it is homogenous of degree one, it has 
unitary elasticity of substitution, constant returns to scale and diminishing marginal returns 
to both capital and labour. An important feature of the Cobb-Douglas function is that it can 
be generalised have n factors of production and becomes linear in logarithms. The 
neoclassical growth model is presented using the standard AK model below:   
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝐴𝑖𝑡  𝑘𝑖𝑡
𝛼                                                                                                               (2.2) 
Where 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is real output per labour and 𝑘𝑡   real capital stock per labour. 𝐴 = 𝐴𝑖𝑡  represents 
total factor productivity (TFP) and  𝛼 , the capital share of income that is assumed to be less 
than 1 (indicating decreasing returns to capital) and  𝑔, the effect of pure technical progress. 
Financial development works through both capital accumulation such that capital per labour 
stock, 𝑘𝑖𝑡 increases and through the level of technology or the social marginal productivity 
of labour, 𝐴𝑖𝑡  or the TFP, which reflects the level of technology and efficiency, is both 
capital and labour-augmenting (Pagano, 1993; Demetriades and Law, 2006).  
 
The effects of financial development on productivity is deemed to be further enhanced with 
the presence of adequately working institutions that produce efficiency levels over and 
above levels that could be obtained from improved financial development alone. This is true 
especially for sub-Saharan African economies that haven’t benefitted much from financial 
development as a result of a general lack of a good institutional environment to promote 
productivity. Financial development enhanced by institutional quality can then be 
incorporated into the production function.  From the AK model, 𝐴, which is TFP, is thus 
decomposed (You and Sarantis, 2013; Demetriades and Law, 2006) into pure technical 
progress or net factor productivity (NFP) and institutional quality linked efficiency gain 
(IQLEG). The production function in equation (2.2)  then becomes: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑒
𝑔𝑡𝑘𝑖𝑡
𝛼                                                                                                                        (2.3)  
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The extended function is given by 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑘𝑖𝑡
𝛼 = (𝑁𝐹𝑃)(𝐼𝑄𝐿𝐸𝐺)𝑘𝑖𝑡
𝛼                                     (2.4) 
𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦 
𝐴𝑖𝑡 evolves as : 𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝐴0𝑒
𝑔𝑡. 𝑃𝑖𝑡
θ                                                                          (2.5)    
 Where 𝑦_𝑖𝑡 = 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑟 = 𝑌𝑖𝑡_ ⁄ 𝐿𝑖𝑡 , 𝑘𝑖𝑡 =
real capital stock per labour = Kit ⁄ Lit , θ = a vector of parameters , g=
effect of technological progress, and α = capital share of income and 𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝜃 is the 
combination of financial development, institutional quality that may influence the efficiency 
of technology. Taking natural logs of both sides results in  
𝑙𝑛 𝐴𝑖𝑡 = ln 𝐴0+ 𝑔. 𝑡 + 𝜃𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑖𝑡                                                                                      (2.6) 
The extended Cobb-Douglas theoretical model thus becomes  
𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐴𝑖 + 𝑔𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖
′𝑃𝑖,𝑡+ 𝛼 ln 𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡   = 1,2, … 21,   𝑡 = 1,2, … ,31   (2.7) 





𝜏 ) 𝜃 = 𝐼𝑄𝐿𝐸𝐺𝑖𝑡
𝜃  =  𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑖𝑡
𝛾𝜃
. 𝐹𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝜏𝜃                                                      (2.8) 
Taking natural logs of both sides 
ln 𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝜃 = 𝛾𝜃 ln 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝜏𝜃 ln𝐹𝐷𝑖𝑡                               (2.9)   
Hence,    ln 𝐴𝑖𝑡 = ln𝐴0 +  𝑔. 𝑡 + 𝛾𝜃 ln 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝜏𝜃 ln 𝐹𝐷𝑖𝑡                                           (2.10) 
The empirical model thus becomes: 
ln 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝐶 + ln𝐴0 +  𝑔. 𝑡 + 𝛼 ln 𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝜃 ln 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝜏𝜃 ln 𝐹𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡   (2.11) 
Thus, based on the extension of the standard neoclassical model, decomposing TFP into a 
component of financial development-institutional quality and pure technical progress, 
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Limitations of the Cobb-Douglas Production Function 
In using the Cobb-Douglas production function, it is important to highlight its limitations 
and the appropriate mitigating measures employed. With respect to its appropriateness for 
measuring the production process, the Cobb-Douglas production function has been 
criticised on many fronts (Keen, Ayres and Standish, 2019; Ayres et al., 2014; 
Bhanumurthy, 2002). According to Bhanumurthy (2002), the empirical applicability of the 
Cobb-Douglas production function has been primarily challenged on (a) the fact that it 
cannot handle a relatively large number of inputs, (b) the assumptions of perfect competition 
in the factor and product markets are restrictive (c) the assumption of constant returns to 
scale and the unrealistic assumption of unitary elasticity of substitution  
 
 With respect to its inability to handle a large number of inputs, the Cobb-Douglas 
production function has been generalised to accommodate more than two inputs (Mankiw, 
Weil and Romer, 1992; Salim, Yao and Chen, 2017; Keen, Ayres and Standish, 2019). 
Secondly, (Bhanumurthy, 2002) addresses the restrictiveness of the assumption of perfect 
completion by stating that this assumption is a non-essential one as it relaxing it does not 
does not affect the function and does not introduce any distortion on its own. Again, the 
application of the CES and VES framework complements the use of the Cobb-Douglas 
production function since the assumptions of constant returns to scale and unitary elasticity 
of substitution (You and Sarantis, 2013)14.  
 
Although the discussion of finance and economic growth in the presence of institutional 
quality has been mainly discussed in the empirical literature on the basis of the Cobb-
                                                 
14 See Bhanumurthy (2002) and Biddle (2012) for a detailed and comprehensive description of the critique of 
the Cobb-Douglas Production function 
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Douglas production function (Fernandez and Tamayo, 2015; Murinde, 2012; Pagano, 1993; 
Levine, 2005), research discussed in determinants of economic growth has successfully 
explored the possibility of other production forms in countries and extended work to reflect 
the more general VES and CES work. This extension of the research into other neoclassical 
production functions is essential to provide a more holistic view of the nature of the possible 
interactions and associations among these variables.  
 
2.7.2 Derivation of the Constant Elasticity of Substitution Production Technology 
(CES) 
This is part of a special class of the production functions and was introduced by Arrow, 
Chenery, Minhas and Solow (1961) and generalized to the n-factor case by Uzawa (1963) 
and McFadden (1963). Kmenta (1967) provided estimation techniques for the generalized 
form of the CES production function. This production technology assumes that s, the 
elasticity of substitution, is constant throughout. The CES production function, like the 
Cobb-Douglas, is homogenous of degree one and therefore has constant returns to scale. 
The average and marginal products in factors K and L are homogeneous of degree zero like 
all linearly homogeneous production functions. This implies that the isoquant for the CES 
production function, which is the marginal rate of technical substitution of capital for labour, 
is convex to the origin. Under the assumption of two inputs, labour and capital, it is of the 
form: 
 𝑌 = 𝐹(𝐾, 𝐿) = 𝐴[𝜔𝐾−𝜌 + (1 − 𝜔)𝐿−𝜌 ]
−1
𝜌                                                             (2.12) 
Where 𝐴 >  0;  0 <  𝜔 <  1; >  −1 and where 𝜌 is the substitution parameter that 
determines the elasticity of substitution 𝜎. 𝜔 is the distribution parameter; for any given 
value of 𝜎 (or 𝜌 ), 𝜔  determines the functional distribution of income. 𝜑 is the returns to 
scale parameter; the elasticity of substitution (𝜎) equals 𝜎 = 1/ (1+𝜌) . When 𝜑 =1 and 𝜌 = 
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0, equation collapses to the Cobb-Douglas production function. The advantages of the CES 
production function include the fact it takes a number of parameters into account, it is more 
general and covers all types of returns as well as taking account of raw materials among its 
inputs.  Given equation (2.12), the CES framework in this research is derived as follows:   
Decomposing TFP, we have equations (2.7) and (2.8). Therefore, the extended CES can be 
written as  
 𝑌 = (𝑁𝐹𝑃)(𝐼𝑄𝐿𝐸𝐺)[𝛿𝐾−𝜌 + (1 − 𝛿)𝐿−𝜌]
−𝜑
𝜌  ,                      (2.13)          
  where, (𝑁𝐹𝑃)(𝐼𝑄𝐿𝐸𝐺) =  𝐴0𝑒
𝑔𝑡. 𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝜃                                                    
 Hence as deduced from the above Cobb-Douglas case,  
𝑌 = 𝐴0𝑒
𝑔𝑡. 𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝜃  [𝛿𝐾−𝜌 + (1 − 𝛿)𝐿−𝜌]
−𝜑
𝜌             (2.14) 
The extended production function per labour is written as 
 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝐴0𝑒
𝑔𝑡. 𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝜃[𝛿𝑘−𝜌 + (1 − 𝛿) ]
−𝜑
𝜌                                (2.15) 
Applying logarithm on both sides will yield the extended CES theoretical model below 






+ (1 − 𝛿)] + 𝑣𝑖,𝑡 𝑖 = 1,2, … 21,   𝑡 = 1,2, … ,31     
(2.16) 
Where 𝑃𝑖,𝑡 is an (𝑇 ×𝑊𝑁 ) dimensional matrix of the log of 𝑊 independent variables and 
𝜃 being the coefficient of the log of W independent variables. 𝜌 is the substitution parameter 
that determines the elasticity of substitution 𝜎. 𝛿 is the distribution parameter; for any given 
value of 𝜎 (or 𝜌 ), 𝛿  determines the functional distribution of income. 𝜑 is the returns to 
scale parameter; the elasticity of substitution (𝜎) is expressed as  𝜎 = 1/(1+𝜌) . When 𝜑 =1 
and 𝜌 = 0, equation collapses to the Cobb-Douglas production function. To derive the 
empirical model,  
Let  𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝜃 = 𝐼𝑁𝑆 ∗ 𝐹𝐷 = IQLEG 
Equation (2.15) becomes  




𝑔𝑡. 𝛾𝜃𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑖𝑡. 𝜏𝜃𝐹𝐷𝑖𝑡  [𝛿𝑘
−𝜌 + (1 − 𝛿) ]
−𝜑
𝜌                              (2.17) 
Applying logarithm on both sides of (2.16) will yield the empirical model (2.18) below:  
𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝑐 + 𝑙𝑛𝐴0 +  𝑔. 𝑡 + 𝛾𝜃 ln(𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑖𝑡) + 𝜏𝜃 ln(𝐹𝐷𝑖𝑡) −
𝜑
𝜌
 ln [𝛿𝑘−𝜌 + (1 − 𝛿) ]         Thus 
equation (2.18) is the basic empirical model that will be estimated. 
 
Testing the CES production function has been severally applied in the literature under 
different contextual settings. Barro, Mankiw and Sala-i-Martin (1992) tested capital 
mobility among growth models and applied the use of the CES and Cobb-Douglas 
production function.  Employing data from Penn World Tables 9.0 and Mankiw et al. (1992) 
for 84 countries, Daniels and Kakar (2017) assumed that aggregate income was determined 
by a normalized CES production function with three factors of production (physical capital, 
human capital and labour) and estimated a normalized CES production function. They 
employed a neoclassical growth model suggesting that the elasticity of substitution was 
weakly significant and below unity for both CES cases (See Klump and Preissler, 2000; 
Masanjala and Papageorgiou, 2004; Klump, McAdam and Willman, 2007).  
 
 
2.7.3 The Variable Elasticity of Substitution Production Technology (VES) 
Unlike the CES production function, the elasticity of substitution in the VES production 
function is assumed to have a linear function of the capital over labour ratio. The VES 
production function includes fixed coefficient models and is more general in function. The 
elasticity of substitution in the VES technology depends on the capital to labour ratio used 
in production, which enables the value to vary along different points of an isoquant. Since 
the capital-labour ratio is directly linked to an economy’s growth rate. The VES form creates 
a link between the elasticity of substitution and economic growth. This implies that a change 
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in the economy’s per capita capital affects the elasticity of substitution between capital and 
labour. This change feeds back into the economy influencing capital accumulation and 
output (Karagiannis, Palivos, and Papageorgiou, 2004).  
 
Following Revankar (1971), the VES production function: 
𝑌 = 𝐴𝐾𝜔𝜑 [𝐿 +  𝜂𝜔𝐾](1−𝜔)𝜑                                                                                   (2.19) 
where  𝜑 is the return to scale parameter. Both 𝜔 and 𝜂 determine the capital share and the 
labour share of income. The elasticity of substitution is derived as 𝜎 = 1 + 𝜂 (
𝐾
𝐿
) Hence 𝜎 
varies linearly with the capital-labour ratio around unity. Output per labour is given as; 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝐴𝑘
𝜔𝜑 [1 +  𝜂𝜔𝑘](1−𝜔)𝜑                                                                                    
If 𝜑 =1 and /or 𝜂  = 0, equation (2.19) collapses to the Cobb-Douglas production function. 
The VES production function becomes an empirical function of the form. Like the CES 
case, the total factor productivity is decomposed into net factor productivity and IQLEG; 
(𝑁𝐹𝑃)(𝐼𝑄𝐿𝐸𝐺) = 𝐴 = 𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝐴0𝑒
𝑔𝑡. 𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝜃                                                           
 Hence, the extended production function per labour is given as 
 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝐴0𝑒
𝑔𝑡. 𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝜃 ∗ 𝑘𝜔𝜑 [1 +  𝜂𝜔𝑘](1−𝜔)𝜑                                              (2.20)      
Applying logarithm on both sides will yield the extended VES theoretical model below 
𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐴𝑖 + 𝑔𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖
′𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜔𝜑𝑘𝑖𝑡 + [(1 − 𝜔)𝜑]𝑙𝑛[1 + (𝜂 ∗ 𝑘𝑖𝑡)] + 𝑣𝑖,𝑡  
𝑖 = 1,2, …21,   𝑡 = 1,2, … ,31                            (2.21)  
Where 𝑃𝑖,𝑡 is an (𝑇 ×𝑊𝑁 ) dimensional matrix of the log of 𝑊 independent variables and 
𝜃 being the coefficient of the log of W independent variables. To derive the empirical model,  
Let  𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝜃 = 𝐼𝑁𝑆 ∗ 𝐹𝐷 = IQLEG 
Equation (2.20) becomes  
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝐴0𝑒
𝑔𝑡. 𝛾𝜃𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑖𝑡. 𝜏𝜃𝐹𝐷𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑘
𝜔𝜑 [1 +  𝜂𝜔𝑘](1−𝜔)𝜑                                       (2.22) 
   
58 
 
Taking the natural log of the VES production function after the decomposition of TFP into 
NFP and IQLEG, the empirical equation obtained is:  
   0ln ln . ln ln ln (1 ) ln 1 *it it it it ity A g t INS FD k k                  (2. 23) 
Thus equation (2. 23) is the basic empirical model that will be estimated.  
 
2.8 Determination of Productivity Levels 
Having derived the extended Cobb-Douglas, CES and VES production functions where TFP 
is decomposed to reflect the contribution of both NFP and IQLEG to productivity and hence 
growth in output, the next section presents the calculations used to estimate the efficiency 
levels from NFP and IQLEG. The goal here is to determine if IQLEG indeed makes a 
contribution to productivity over and above that of pure technical progress. Based on You 
and Sarantis (2013), it is expected that the average contribution of IQLEG (CIQLEG) will 
be positive. This is because a negative CIQLEG will be an indication that financial 
development in an economy with adequately working institutions has an adverse effect on 
productivity and growth. Again, when the average contribution of IQLEG is zero, the 
implication is that, financial development in an economy with adequately working 
institutions has no impact on productivity and growth. A positive CIQLEG is thus desired 
as it confirms the main position made in this thesis that institutional quality works through 
financial development to enhance productivity and economic growth.   
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2.8.1 Net Factor Productivity, Total Factor Productivity and Contribution of 
Institutional Quality Linked Efficiency Gain (CIQLEG) – The Case of the 
Cobb Douglas Production Function 
Given the model of the Cobb Douglas function as  
ln 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝑡 + 𝛼 ln 𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝜃 ln 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝜏𝜃 ln𝐹𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 
The Net Factor Productivity (NFP), Total Factor Productivity (TFP) and Contribution of 
institutional quality and financial development (IQLEG) are derived as follows:  
𝑁𝐹𝑃 𝑖𝑡  = ln 𝑦𝑖𝑡 − ?̂? ln 𝑘𝑖𝑡 −  𝜏?̂? ln 𝐹𝐷𝑖𝑡  −  𝛾?̂? ln 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑖𝑡,                           (2.24) 
𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡   =  ln 𝑦𝑖𝑡 − ?̂? ln 𝑘𝑖𝑡                                                                             (2.25)     
𝐼𝑄𝐿𝐸𝐺𝑖𝑡 = 𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡 − 𝑁𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡 (3.26), respectively, where  𝑖 = 1, 2 denoting before break and 
after break and 𝑡 = 1, 2, … , 31 from 1985 to 2015. For all production function estimations, 
average for each year across the 21 countries are computed to represent the estimated 
NFP it, TFPit  and IQLEGit  The Growth Rate NFP it, TFPit  and IQLEGit are calculated as 
the first difference of the natural logarithms.  
 
 
2.8.2 Net Factor Productivity, Total Factor Productivity and Contribution of 
Institutional Quality Linked Efficiency Gain (CIQLEG) – The Case of the CES 
Production Function 
Given the model of the CES function as  
 0ln ln . ln ln ln 1it it it it ity A g t INS FD k
    

            
The Net Factor Production (NFP), Total Factor Production (TFP) and Contribution of 
institutional quality and financial development (IQLEG) is given as  
 
ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆln ln ln ln 1
ˆ
jit it it it itNFP y INS FD k
   

      
 
 ,                            (2.27) 




ˆ ˆ ˆln ln 1
ˆ
jit it itTFP y k
  

    
 
                                                                   (2.28)  and 
based on equation (2.26) 𝐼𝑄𝐿𝐸𝐺𝑖𝑡 = 𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡 − 𝑁𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡    
 
2.8.3 Net Factor Productivity, Total Factor Productivity and Contribution of 
Institutional Quality Linked Efficiency Gain (IQLEG) – The Case of the VES 
Production Function 
 
Given the model of the VES function as  
   0ln ln . ln ln ln (1 ) ln 1 *it it it it ity A g t INS FD k k                
The Net Factor Production (NFP), Total Factor Production (TFP) and Contribution of 
institutional quality and financial development (IQLEG) is given as  
   ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆln ln ln ln (1 ) ln 1 *jit it it it it itNFP y INS FD k k              ,    (2.29) 
   ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆln ln (1 ) ln 1 *jit it it itTFP y k k                                                       (2.30)   and 
based on and based on equation (2.26) 𝐼𝑄𝐿𝐸𝐺𝑖𝑡 = 𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡 − 𝑁𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡    
respectively where  𝑗 = 1, 2 denoting before break and after break, 𝑖 = 1, 2, … 21 for all the 
21 counties and 𝑡 = 1, 2, … , 31 from 1985 to 2015. All the parameters were estimated from 
non-linear least square regression.  The growth rate of 𝑁𝐹𝑃𝑗𝑡  ,   𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑗𝑡   and  𝐼𝑄𝐿𝐸𝐺𝑗𝑡  are 









 LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.1 Introduction  
This chapter is a review of the relevant empirical research associated the economic growth, 
institutional quality and financial development relationship. From Adam Smith who sought 
to determine the sources of wealth of nations to Robert Solow who revolutionized the 
concept of the sources of growth and introduced what is termed as the Solow residual (which 
sparked a lot of debate and research into the inexplicable aspect of growth and then to 
modern economic theories such as the endogenous growth theories), the basic underlying 
question is ‘what determines economic growth’?   
 
The extant literature, as already stated, is filled with work on the theoretical underpinnings 
of economic growth, finance and the relationship between the two. This review is 
sectionalized as follows: in section one, economic growth is briefly discussed after which 
the Solow growth model is discussed in section two.  Section three reviews the extant 
theoretical studies in financial development and economic growth, financial development, 
capital and economic growth whilst the fourth section investigates the possible role 
institutional quality can play in these relationships as a prelude to the next section, which 
focuses on institutional quality.  The final section attempts to synthesize existing research 
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3.2 Financial Development and Economic Growth: An Empirical Review  
3.2.1 Evidence for the Supply Leading Hypothesis 
 
Support for the finance-growth supply-leading relationship started as far back as the 
Schumpeterian era of the early 1900s (Schumpeter, 1911). Notable among the support base 
was Goldsmith (1969) and McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973).  Over the years, there’s 
been an overwhelming array of literature that points to the fact that the role of finance cannot 
be overlooked in finding the determinants of economic growth. Among these are Neusser 
and Kugler (1998), Levine et al. (2000), Gurley and Shaw (1955; 1960), Levine (1997; 
2003), Christopoulos and Tsionas (2004), Kendall (2012), Baltagi, Demetriades and Law 
(2009) and Demetriades and Hussein (1996).  
 
These studies range from time series to panel cross-country studies.  Again, on the empirical 
side, researchers have shown that a range of financial indicators are robustly and positively 
correlated with economic growth (Christopoulos and Tsionas, 2004; Kendall, 2012; Baltagi, 
Demetriades and Law, 2009; Demetriades and Hussein, 1996; Murinde, 2012; Menyah, 
Nazlioglu and Wolde-Rufael, 2014).  Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1992) investigated the 
effect of financial repression on economic growth while placing emphasis on the notion that 
an economy’s savings and investment decisions geared towards productivity and the 
accumulation of capital mostly intermediated in the financial sector.  
 
Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1992) thus argue that inefficiencies in the sector would pose a 
fundamental risk to effective growth through low efficiency and hence productivity as well 
as encourage the misallocation of savings to investment projects. In their view, although 
many reasons are given for the weaker growth performance of Latin America in the 
literature, policies that systematically repress the financial sector are among the most 
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convincing. They find, in line with theoretical arguments, that there is a systematic inverse 
relation between growth and several measures of financial repression as well as a negative 
relation between growth and inflation rates. Others that have found the supply-leading 
hypothesis plausible include Habibulla and Eng (2006) and Murinde (1994; 2012). More 
recently, Popov (2018), Bijlsma, Kool and Non (2017) and Valickova, Havranek and 
Horváth (2015) have confirmed the supply leading hypothesis   
 
Increasingly, economists are thus associating with the idea that government policies toward 
financial institutions may have an important causal effect on long-run economic growth. 
King and Levine (1993a) identify two contrasting schools of thought where a group 
proposes that financial markets play a major role in economic growth: a second group 
believes that finance only responds passively to other factors that account for the differences 
in growth rates. This view that finance passively responds to other factors that account for 
the differences in growth rates is mainly highlighted by Robinson (1952), Lucas (1988) and 
Stein (1989).  
 
However, there have been findings with mixed results; some of which affirm the demand 
following, bi-directional and no relationship views. Al-Yousif (2002), for instance, found 
that there is an elaborate two-way relationship between finance and growth, finding support 
for the hypothesis by Patrick (1966) as well an evidence of no existing relationship when 
he applied Granger causality on thirty developing countries from 1970 to 1999. De Gregorio 
and Guidotti (1995), Deidda (2006), Gries, Kraft and Meierrieks (2009), Odedokum (1996), 
Hassan, Sanchez and Yu (2011) and Luintel and Khan (1999) had mixed results after 
running tests on a number of countries. Some country and regional level studies have 
similarly yielded mixed results.  
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Abu-Bader and Abu-Qarn (2008) found that there is a bi-directional relationship between 
financial development and growth in Egypt when they use a Vector Error Correction 
methodology on data running from 1960 to 2001. Ang and Mckibbin (2007) ran a time 
series test on data in Malaysia from 1960 to 2001 and discovered a positive relationship 
between financial depth and economic growth but found support for Robinson (1952) that 
higher output leads to higher financial depth in the long run. Choe and Moosa (1999) found 
evidence that supports a supply-leading relationship between finance and growth in Korea, 
whilst Guarigla and Poncet (2007) confirmed the same in China.  
 
Hao (2006) found evidence of finance-led economic growth in China from 1985 to 1999, 
when Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) techniques are applied. Hondroyiannis, 
Lolos and Papapetrou (2005) used VAR models on data that spanned from 1986 to 1999 in 
Greece and supports the existence of a bi-directional relationship between finance and 
growth. To date, there has been no clear consensus in the literature regarding the relationship 
between finance and growth. Although some research has confirmed the existence of two-
way causality between finance and growth, some research has provided opposite 
conclusions. 
 
Kar, Nazliogu and Agir (2011) is inconclusive on the causality between finance and growth 
on MENA countries with the panel causality testing approach in applying data from 1980 
to 2007. Their findings support a country specific approach to determining the finance–
growth relationship. Naceur and Ghazouani (2007) actually find a negative association 
between bank development and economic growth from eleven MENA countries using 
Dynamic Panel Data Models with GMM estimators. Demetriades and Rousseau (2016) 
found that financial depth is no longer a significant determinant of long-run growth by using 
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data from 91 countries between 1971 and 2004, combined with indicators of financial 
liberalization with a measure of financial depth: that is, liquid liabilities less narrow money 
in a series of cross-sectional regressions that follow the King and Levine (1993a) style. They 
further conclude that certain financial reforms have sizeable growth effects, which may be 
positive or negative based on the adequacy of regulation and supervision of banks 
(Odhiambo, 2009; Rioja and Valev, 2004; Rousseau and Vuthipadadorn, 2005). 
 
 With respect to the various paradigms on the relationship between finance and growth, the 
evidence is mixed for SSA. Whilst Atindehou, Gueyie and Amenounve (2005) did not find 
any relationship between finance and growth in 12 SSA countries, Agbestiaf (2004) and 
Ghirmay (2004) support the demand following hypothesis of finance and growth using 
seven and 13 SSA countries, respectively. Evidence collected from Kenya and South Africa 
by Odhiambo (2009) suggests that finance follows economic growth. Finally, Akinboade 
and Kinfack (2014) found evidence to support a bi-directional relationship between finance 
and growth in Botswana using granger cauality analysis. It is important to stress that, 
currently, the relationship between financial development and growth in SSA (just like other 
parts of the world) is largely inclonclusive but seems to sway towards an insignificant one.   
 
Various studies ranging from cross-country analysis, country level, firm level and regional 
level studies as well as studies that apply various time series, cross-sectional and 
longitudinal techniques and analysis have failed to yield a clear path for establishing the 
exact relationship between finance and growth. Objections that have been pointed out in 
finance-growth studies include, firstly, the inherent weaknesses in the measures or 
indicators of financial development and, to some extent, economic growth. Others find fault 
with the category of the data collected. Some advocate running tests with longitudinal data 
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whilst others are inclined towards cross-section and or time-series data. Some studies 
believe this relationship should be conducted at the country level whilst a different group 
are of the opinion that the more countries studied, the better. There is, however, no doubt 
that the bulk of the literature has established a relationship between finance and growth.   
 
It is important to note that analytical foundations of this finance-growth relationship have 
been challenged in the literature (Levine, 2005; Pagano, 1993). Although he subscribes to 
finance–led growth, Levine (2005) criticizes early work by Goldsmith (1969), Shaw (1973) 
and McKinnon (1973). The criticism is based on the lack of analytical foundations in 
explaining the relationship between finance and growth (Eschenbach, 2004; Levine, 2005; 
Moore, 2010).  
 
Levine (2005) had issues with the size of the countries included in Goldsmith’s study and 
the omission of other variables that could affect growth. Levine (2005) lists six problems 
associated with Goldsmith’s work in 1969. These include the fact that the investigation 
involves only 35 countries; and there is a lack of systematic control for other factors that 
could affect growth. The reasons stated therefore make it difficult to conclusively state 
whether the associations with financial development are in terms of the theoretically 
established capital accumulation or productivity growth. 
 
To correct these, Levine (1993) suggests the inclusion of more countries and more controls 
in order to improve predictability. Hence in King and Levine (1993a), which extends 
Goldsmith (1969), the impact that the level of financial development has on long-run 
economic growth, the accumulation of capital and productivity is investigated. This is done 
with seventy-seven economies and for a study period spanning 29 years (1960 to 1989) with 
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other factors that are probably impactful to economic growth are systematically controlled. 
Furthermore, the study by King and Levine (1993a) attempts to differentiate the capital 
accumulation and productivity channels with respect to how financial development affects 
growth.  
 
King and Levine (1993b) construct additional indicators of financial development to 
provide robustness in their work. They use measures of the size of financial intermediaries, 
relative degree to which the central bank and commercial banks allocate credit and credit to 
private enterprises (all expressed as ratios) and realize that the results across the different 
measures of financial development are consistent. Three growth indicators, namely the 
averages of real per capita GDP growth in total factor productivity also called the ‘Solow 
Residual’; and growth in capital stock per person averaged over the same time range, are 
used to examine averaged values of each of the indicators of financial development in order 
to test the existence and strength of any empirical relationship they may have with growth.  
 
Regressions are then estimated over the seventy-seven countries and the other factors that 
could impact long-run growth (such as income per capita, education, political stability, 
indicators of exchange rate, trade, fiscal, and monetary policy) are used to condition the 
regressions. King and Levine (1993b) found from their research and additional robustness 
tests that financial development was able to adequately predict growth in these countries 
and have a positive relationship with growth, which was significant and strong. They 
however do not indicate the factors that influence the level and growth of financial 
development and the right channel through which finance positively impacts growth (La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 2002).  
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The effect of financial development on growth varies according to the income status of 
countries as well as the level or threshold a country has achieved (Law, Azman Saini and 
Ibrahim, 2013; Rioja and Valev, 2004a, 2004b). On the one hand, low income countries do 
not seem to have a significant relationship existing between finance and growth whilst high 
income countries do (see Huang, 2009; Cecchetti and Kharroubi, 2012): on the other hand, 
in a few studies the reverse occurs (Huang and Lin, 2009).  
 
Previous research concentrated on the notion of more finance, more growth; however, in 
the last decade, a lot of the finance growth studies have centred on the more accurate 
proposition of 'better finance, more growth'. This is due to the fact that, when a financial 
system is found in a politically and economically unstable and corrupt society, there is very 
little chance of it succeeding as there are tendencies for political interference and 
misallocation and diversion of credit and other financial assets into unproductive ventures, 
thus rendering them wasteful and ineffective.   
 
Indeed, although the general assumption that strong financial systems reduce transaction 
costs associated with finding the right kind of investment (which in turn promotes growth), 
other studies have stressed the need for moderating factors  claiming that the absence of 
factors such as quality institutions will impede these functions of finance in the growth 
process (Law and Balach, 2015; Demetriades and Law, 2006; Murinde, 2012; Beck, Levine 
and Loayza, 2000; Calderon and Liu, 2003; Beck and Levine, 2004; Chinn and Ito, 2005).  
 
Additional caution has been raised with the measure of the financial development index.  It 
seems that the gauge used for the functional system of finance was inaccurate such that the 
evidence provided was not able to ascertain the direction of causality. In addition, research 
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has failed to determine the specific aspect of the financial system that matters for economic 
growth. Was it the financial market, the non-bank financial intermediaries or a mixture of 
these that were essential for growth? Moderating factors such as quality institutions may 
provide some answers. 
 
This study leans towards the hypothesis that, although the role of finance in growth may be 
supply-leading, this role cannot be effectively impactful in promoting growth should the 
five main institutional categories proposed by Rodrik (2000) (namely property rights 
institutions, regulatory institutions, institutions for macroeconomic stabilisation, institutions 
for social insurance and institutions for conflict management) be inadequate. Hence, these 
institutions are deemed necessary and sufficient for finance to impact growth positively. 
This research seeks to emphasize that, although finance may play a role in economic growth 
in terms of the direction, magnitude or strength and significance of the relationship, there is 
growing evidence that various factors (including institutions, which are generally country 
or region specific) may come into play.  
 
Indeed, the literature largely confirms that countries with sound institutional arrangements 
tend to better realize the effect of finance on growth compared to lowest income countries 
whose institutions are relatively weak.  Law, Azman Saini and Ibrahim (2013) put it this 
way:  'in low-income economies, more finance without sound institutions may not succeed 
in delivering long-run economic development' (p 5374).  
 
Demetriades and Law (2006) and Al-Yousif (2002) both suggest that financial developed 
has larger positive effects on growth where institutional quality is at high levels as is the 
case of middle-income countries.  In SSA, the scale tips towards a high number of low-
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income countries with institutional quality on the low side.  There is a need to dig deeper 
into the possibilities for increased productivity and enhanced growth with 'better finance' 
through higher levels of institutional quality.  
 
3.3  Institutional Quality, Financial Development and Economic Growth    
The need to consider the role played by adequate institutional arrangements in financial 
development and economic growth has been extensively underscored in the literature (La 
Porta et al., 1997; 2000; Milo, 2007; Murinde, 2012). Indeed, the development of a stable 
and trustworthy institutional environment paved the way for all the traditional factors of 
growth to have an effect on or to impact economic performance (Easterly, 2001). Rodrik 
(2000), in his seminal presentation on institutions for high quality growth, maintains the 
need for markets to be supported by non-market institutions in order to perform well and 
SSA markets are no exception (North and Weingast, 1989).  
 
Rodrik (2000) proposes five main institutional factors. These factors include the protection 
of rights of parties involved in a contract; the regulatory environment; the effectiveness of 
social insurance; the macroeconomic stabilisation; institutions for conflict management; and 
extended by democracy (Rodrik, 2000; La Porta et al., 1997; Beck, Levine and Loayza, 
2001). Hence, there is the need for a closer look at these institutional factors with respect to 
financial and economic development in SSA. Glylfason (2004) argues that there is a need 
to consider institutional quality in growth issues since economic policies and institutions 
matter for growth (Rodrik, 2002; Acemoglu et al., 2005; 2008).  
 
 Institutional quality has been named in literature as a determinant of financial development. 
Notable among these are La Porta et al. (1997; 1998), Beck, Demircrug-kunt and Levine 
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(2003), Rajan and Zingales (2003) and Stulz and Williamson (2003). La Porta et al. (1998) 
applied Johnson, Acemoglu and Robinson (2001) settler mortality hypothesis to financial 
development and contributed to the discussion on the legal determinants of financial 
development. Beck, Demicrug-kunt and Levine (2003) addressed how institutions matter 
for financial development by likewise applying the settler mortality hypothesis of Johnson, 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2001) to financial development.  
 
 Mohamed, Siadi and Zakaria (2012) attempt to clarify certain aspects of the concept of 
financial stability, and the role of the central bank in its preservation by attributing the need 
for such research to witness the rapid spread of relatively recent practices such as monitoring 
of micro and macro prudential indicators, in-depth evaluation of conditions in all segments 
of financial markets, the production and dissemination of resistance test and the publication 
of Financial Stability Reports (FSR), which has arisen to attempt to develop a number of 
analytical approaches and tools to assess the exposure of financial systems to actual or 
potential risks. They affirm the role of the central bank in ensuring financial stability.  
 
Addison, Chowdhury and Murshed (2002) posit that financial development is vulnerable to 
social conflict. They observe that conflict reduces the demand for domestic currency as a 
medium of exchange and a store of value. Conflict may lead to poor quality governance, 
including weak regulation of the financial system, thereby undermining the sustainability 
of financial institutions. Conflict therefore reduces the social return to financial 
liberalization and other financial-sector reforms. Using data from 79 countries, they applied 
this to a model that integrates the effects of conflict and financial liberalization. In 
concluding, they found that conflict significantly reduces financial development.  
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In areas of conflict, legislation to protect the public interest is either not forthcoming or it is 
not enforced. Unsound banks are licensed, and unsound lending practices are not restrained. 
They observe that conflict takes many forms and that its intensity varies, often ranging from 
infrequent guerrilla attacks that inflict relatively minor damage on a country’s institutions 
and economy to a full-blown civil war involving protracted and extended fighting together 
with mass population displacement.  
 
Addison, Chowdhury and Murshed (2002) thus regard the effect of conflict on financial 
development in terms of its intensity. They observed that the general expectation was that 
conflict influenced the benefits and effectiveness of financial reforms negatively so that as 
conflicts intensified or became more pronounced, there were marked reductions in the 
effectiveness of reforms. They apply Tobin’s (1969) portfolio-balance model to analyse the 
choices that agents make in holding domestic currency versus alternative stores of value 
(such as precious metals, foreign currency, and other hedges) in conflict-affected countries. 
Addison, Chowdhury and Murshed (2002) found that there is a significant reduction in 
financial development when there is conflict and this reduction is further impacted with 
increasing intensity of conflict. 
 
The literature is scanty in the area of social conflict and financial development and this 
research seeks to investigate the moderating role it plays in the finance-growth nexus as an 
institution since SSA is one region in the world that is plagued by numerous social conflicts. 
Do the presence of these conflicts that range from infrequent guerrilla attacks to serious 
tribal wars, affect the role that institutions play in the economy and perhaps contribute to 
high information and transaction costs, which in turn lowers productivity and hence growth? 
They make the assertion that the international community would need to offer more support 
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to the prevention and resolution of conflict through, better peace-keeping, broad-based 
reconstruction and democratization as their evidence supported the fact that, apart from 
being welcomed as a humanitarian gesture, conflict-reducing measures have a positive 
relationship with economic development.  
 
The positive effects of financial reform will be higher in the presence of complementary 
conflict-reducing measures. This leads in turn to further reductions in the resolution of the 
conflict by dampening the intensity of the conflict. Ultimately, with conflict reducing 
measures, financial reforms benefit the countries undertaking the reforms even more and 
the effectiveness of aid in support of such reforms is pronounced.  Gries and Meir ekes 
(2010) used data between 1984 and 2007 from nineteen SSA countries to find the 
relationship between institutional quality and financial development by reviewing the 
determinants of financial development in SSA. They argue that, although a vast number of 
studies have pointed to a positive relationship between financial development and economic 
growth, studies that concentrate on SSA do not confirm this. They find that SSA, as a region, 
is financially underdeveloped and has a relatively low level of financial openness. 
 
 Indeed, the slow economic growth rates recorded in the region have been repeatedly 
attributed to inadequate levels of financial development and openness.  This, Gries and Meir 
ekes (2010) assert, is evidenced in SSA’s pronounced market segmentation. In their view, 
a relatively insufficient number of financial products, very little financial innovation, a 
deeply fragmented market, large interest rate spreads and a generally large informal sector 
reveals the existence of a relatively high level of financial underdevelopment in SSA.  
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Gries and Meir ekes (2010) controlled for factors such as macroeconomic stability, 
bureaucracy and corruption and categorize these as such; but Rodrik (2000) viewed 
macroeconomic stability as a major institution that is needed for growth. This research 
further considers the stability of macro-economy as a main institutional quality. Indeed, 
financial underdevelopment may lead to low levels of factor accumulation and resource 
allocation may become inefficient, making economic development virtually impossible. 
Gries and Meir ekes (2010) used dynamic panel models in regarding financial development 
level as a function of quality institutions when they had eliminated the potential effects of 
other variables outside the institutional setting.  
 
They use dynamic panel data analysis with a Least Square Dummy Variable estimator and 
take account of the issue of reverse causation. They apply the Granger causality in a panel 
VAR model; and using data from the International Country Risk Guide, they concentrated 
on protection of property rights, corruption and rule of law, political stability, democratic 
accountability and the quality of national bureaucracy. They found evidence to prove that, 
in the face of an underdeveloped financial system, resources allocation is inefficient and 
factors of production are less accumulated: a situation that restricts the level of economic 
development.  
 
A typical example would be when rural communities and households as well as small 
businesses in SSA have access to little or no credit because of low levels of financial 
development; leading to the possibility of having negative implications for economic 
growth and development. They identify a causal link running from past institutional quality 
to present financial development. Their empirical analysis indicates that high levels of 
inflation and ethnic conflict may negatively influence financial development as relevant 
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non-institutional determinants. These two add to the assertion by Rodrik (2000) that 
institutions for conflict management and macroeconomic stabilisation are essential for high 
quality growth: in this case, the growth of financial development.  
 
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) researched the relationship between colonial 
origins and development by exploiting the differences in European mortality rates to 
estimate the effect of institutions on economic performance. They observe, using multiple 
stage least squares regressions that, by controlling for the effect of institutions, the income 
levels of African countries or those closer to the equator are not comparatively lower. Beck 
and Levine (2005) dwelled on the concepts of the law and finance theory, attributing the 
low levels of financial development in certain countries to lack of adequate legal systems 
that enforce private property rights, support private contractual arrangements, and protect 
the legal rights of investors. Savers are consequently more willing to finance firms, and 
financial markets flourish.  
 
Djankov, Mcliesh and Shleifer (2007), using a sample of 129 countries, observed that, when 
the legal system spells out creditor protection rights and there is information sharing 
institutions, private credit to gross domestic product ratios go up. However, creditor 
protection rights are more important in richer countries compared to information sharing 
institutions.  This is because, having analysed legal reforms, they observed that credit rises 
after improvements in creditor rights and in information sharing. Using a joint application 
Bayesian Model Averaging and General-to-Specific methods of 107 countries in a bid to 
produce more reliable findings, Huang (2005) found that the level of financial development 
in a country is primarily determined by its institutional quality, government policies, 
geographic endowments, its income level and cultural characteristics.  
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Huang (2005) further established that that good institutional quality leads to the efficient 
supply of external finance while ill functioning institutions as well as particular cultural 
characteristics mainly form structural impediments to the supply of external finance. Huang 
(2010) investigated the links between political institutions and financial development. 
Dwelling on the fact that most developing countries had taken on institutional reforms 
towards democracies, he found that, especially in lower income countries, when institutional 
quality is improved, financial development increases in the short run. These results are 
consistent with ethnically divided and French legal origin countries.  Ninety (90) non-
transition economies were studied over the period of 1960–99 with five observations per 
country.  
 
Huang (2010) compared more recently developed panel data techniques, including bias-
corrected LSDV and system GMM estimators. For the lower income countries, the positive 
effect of institutional quality on financial development is expected to persist over longer 
horizons. Another finding obtained by Huang when he conducted a “before-and-after” 
analysis with respect to democratization of economies shows that, in general, democratic 
transitions are typically preceded by low financial development, but followed by a short-
run boost in financial development and greater volatility of financial development. The 
findings affirm that institutional innovation has an influence on the supply side of financial 
development.  
 
So far research in the finance development-institutional quality-economic growth context 
has largely focused on legal origins, political stability, macroeconomic stability, contract 
enforcement and property rights institutions either as determinants of financial development 
or joint determinants of growth with financial development. A plethora of studies have, in 
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one way or another, included the institutional environment in the finance–growth debate 
and have largely concluded that, without adequately functioning institutions, financial 
development is not likely to have any significant impact on growth as theory suggests. 
However, borrowing the term from Huang (2005), even within this institutional setting, this 
research proposes that SSA has certain stylized facts that make it unique in its institutional 
setting. By and large, the literature indicates that there’s a relationship that enables the 
financial sector to further influence the growth or development of the economy when 
institutional environments are adequate, especially when the productivity channel of the 
finance-growth relationship is being considered.  
 
Indeed, the region is still battling with very low institutional standards, which include 
various conflicts and virtually non-existent social insurance policies. Adequately 
functioning institutions cannot be underscored in the bid to ensure economic growth 
irrespective of what channel of growth is being considered (Murinde, 2012). This research 
proposes that broadening the measures of institutional quality to include property rights; 
regulatory institutions; institutions for macroeconomic stabilisation; institutions for social 
insurance; and institutions of conflict management in one study is important. This is because 
the literature, to the best of my knowledge does not include the combination of the five 
institutions proposed by Rodrik (2000) as those that facilitate high quality growth. The 
outcome may provide insight into what will work for the SSA region in its bid to use 
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3.4 Linking Financial Development, Institution Quality and Productivity  
Indeed, markets will be marked by high levels of uncertainty and will not function well 
when there is a lack of respect and stability for rules coupled with undefined and unenforced 
property rights and contracts, a situation that will lead to inefficient resource allocation. 
This position has been implied many times in the institutions and growth literature (See 
Fernandez and Tamayo, 2015; Rodrik, 2000; 2002; North and Thomas, 1973; Weingast, 
1997; Hall and Jones, 1999). An example is the study by Hall and Jones (1999) that cite the 
reasons for differences in output per worker, productivity and capital accumulation as being 
directly attributable to differences in government policies and institutions.  
 
Institutions, to a large extent, allow the markets to work as they should. One such market in 
the financial development context is the financial market, which works when intermediaries 
play the all-important role of allocating resources to the most productive use and 
accumulating savings towards higher levels of investment (Goodhart, 2004; King and 
Levine, 1993; Menyah, Nazlioglu and Wolde-Rufael, 2014). The presence of adequate 
institutions in this case allows for the impact of financial development to be over and above 
that which is expected from the workings of an efficient financial system. This is due to the 
fact that the costs of legal enforcement and the typical transaction are reduced. Thus, 
financial markets are able to develop at a relatively faster rate and support real activity in 
economies where regulatory institutions enforce property rights, protect legal rights of 
investors and support private contractual agreements.  
 
The fast and efficient development of financial markets has cost reduction implications with 
respect to transaction costs. When the costs of investing in information are reduced by law 
enforcers, enforcement efficiency is improved. Fernandez and Tamayo, (2015) observe that 
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when it comes to financial contracts, regulating in favour of accounting standards, 
information-sharing schemes and disclosure practices, for example, may actually reduce the 
cost of overseeing bankruptcy procedures and hence improve efficiency. As Pagano and 
Jappelli (1993) show, the presence of adequate institutions would reduce adverse selection 
by the use of an information sharing scheme, as borrowers will adapt to a situation where 
they fully accept the fact that other lenders will have access to creditworthiness. This again, 
reduces transaction costs.  
 
In addition to improving efficiency through such information sharing schemes that reduce 
transaction and information costs, institutions working adequately help in reducing financial 
frictions through their allocative tendencies. Another way of reducing these frictions is 
through risk-sharing. The effect of institutional quality on productivity is important due to 
the efficiency gains realized from them. Various studies on institutional quality and 
productivity have emphasized this. Table 3.1 highlights some of the notable empirical work 
in the literature that attempt to link financial development to productivity and hence growth 
within certain institutional frameworks. 
 
Law, Azman-Saini and Ibrahim (2013) sampled 85 countries between 1980 and 2008 to 
investigate whether differing levels of institutional development has any implication for the 
growth effect of financial development under a Cobb-Douglas framework and concluded 
that economic growth responds differently to financial development indicators when 
considering institutional differences. Economic growth has a much stronger association 
with private sector credit than with liquid liabilities and commercial bank assets. Better 
institutional quality plays a pivotal role in ensuring the ability of financial institutions to 
facilitate efficient borrowing, hence, prevent credit divergence to unproductive investment 
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activities. They found that, for countries with low levels of institutional development, there 
is no significant relationship between financial development (both private sector credit and 
liquid liabilities) and real GDP per capita.  
 
Demetriades and Law (2006) found that, within a Cobb-Douglas production setting, when 
embedded within a sound institutional framework, financial development has larger effects 
on long-run economic development. Their work shows that countries that are poorer stand 
to gain (via direct and large effects) from improvements in institutions when they improve 
institutions than when they pursue financial development on its own.  They however found 
evidence of greater impact of financial development in middle-income countries with 
particularly large impacts where institutional quality is high. Interestingly, from the study, 
a relationship was found that leads from institutional quality to economic development as 
well. These results that emphasize the role of institutional arrangements in the finance-
growth relationship highlight the importance of institutional quality in growth as a whole.  
 
The above findings are in line with early proponents of institutional arrangements in 
financial intermediation such as Law, Azman-Saini and Ibrahim (2013), Arizalla, Cavallo 
and Gallindo (2013), Filippidis and Katrakilidis (2015) and Heil (2017). Although the effect 
of structural breaks and the role of other forms of production technologies are absent, the 
preceding authors all find a strong positive link between finance and growth, and robustly 
so when institutions measured in various forms are present and adequate. Institutional 
quality therefore seems to have a productivity enhancing trait that propels productivity (and 
hence growth) further when introduced to factors that affect growth whether proximate or 
fundamental. In essence, institutions and their arrangement and adequacy reduce transaction 
costs to the barest minimum and help markets function 
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Table 3.1: Review of Some Existing Panel Studies on Financial Development, Institutional Quality and Productivity  






Findings & Conclusion 
Levine and Zervos 
(1998) 
 
47 and other 31 
countries 
1976 to 1993 
Are measures of stock 
market liquidity, size, 
volatility, and integration 
with world capital markets 
robustly correlated with 
current and future rates of 
economic growth, capital 
accumulation, productivity 












Real per capita GDP growth, real 
per capita physical capital stock 
growth, productivity growth, and 
the ratio of private savings to 
GDP, Size-Capitalization, 
Liquidity indicators, International 
integration measures, Bank Credit 
Cross country 
regressions controlling 
for initial income, 
inflation, government, 
social and political 




Stock markets provide different services from 
banks. Stock market size, volatility, and 
international integration are not robustly 
linked with growth. Financial indicators are 
not closely associated with private saving 
rates. Banking development and stock market 
liquidity are both good predictors of economic 
growth, capital accumulation, and 
productivity growth. The other stock market 
indicators do not have a robust link with long-
run growth.  
      
Beck, Levine and 
Loayza (2000)  
63 countries 1960 
to 1995 
 Examines whether the level 
of banking sector 
development exerts a causal 







Real output growth, TFP growth, 
saving ratio, physical capital 
accumulation. Legal origin 
indicators as instruments-  
Arellano and Bover 
(1995) and Blundell 
and Bond (1997) 
GMM, PCSIVE  
Higher levels of banking sector development 
produce faster rates of economic growth and 
total factor productivity growth. Results 
consistent with Schumpeterian view of 
finance and growth:  




17 countries 1880 
to 1997 
Consider relationships 
between finance, growth, 





Broad money over GDP.   
financial depth. initial level of per 
capita income and initial inflation 
rate, dummy variables for legal 





Legal system positively related to financial 
development but not persistent over time. On 
the other hand, stable political variables are 
consistent with larger financial sectors and 
higher conditional rates of economic growth. 
Controlling for inflation and time periods with 
dummy variables in the pre-1929 period, both 
legal and political variables seem to matter 









Cobb-Douglas Institutional improvement on 
financial development, controlling 
for GDP, trade openness, 
aggregate investment, and black-
market premium.  
System GMM 
estimator and LSDV 
estimation 
Positive effect of institutional improvement 
on financial development in the short-run, 
particularly for lower income countries. shed 
light on the strong and robust relationship 
   
82 
 
between institutional quality and economic 
performance. 




Does financial development 
have a larger effect on 
capital accumulation and 
productivity growth in 
developing countries than in 





 Rate of growth of real per capita 
GDP, rate of growth of per capita 
physical capital stock and rate of 
growth of the residual as Five-year 
averaged:  Private Credit, Liquid 
Liabilities Commercial versus 
Central Bank 
GMM, dynamic panel 
techniques to deal with 
the possible 
simultaneity of finance 
and economic growth 
to control for country-
specific effects 
The effects of finance on economic growth 
may vary in different types of countries that 
finance has a strong positive influence on 
productivity growth primarily in more 
developed economies. Conversely, in less 
developed economies, the effect of finance on 
output growth occurs primarily through 
capital accumulation and not productivity.  









Examine the role of 
institutions and human 
development in financial 
development at early stages 
of economic growth    
Investigate any structural 
components of economic 
institutions that impact more 
on financial development 
Cobb-Douglas Decompose institutions 
into economic, political and 
social; and economic institutions 
into quality of government, 
intervention of government, and 




estimator by Arellano 
and Bover (1995), and 
Blundell and Bond 
(1998) for more 
efficient and precise 
estimates. 
A robust empirical relationship from 
institutions (economic and political) to 
financial development. Economic institutions 
are of fundamental for banking sector 
development more in developing countries, 
while political institutions are statistically 
significant in low and lower-middle income 
countries  






industries in 77 
countries from 
1963 to 2003 
Estimates the impact of 
financial development on 
industry-level total factor 
productivity (TFP) growth 
Cobb-Douglas Three measures of TFP, industry-
specific capital and labour 
coefficients, industry-time & 
country-time fixed-effects, 
industry i’s share in country c of 
total value added in manufacturing 
at the beginning of the five-year 
period, Rajan and Ingalls’s 
measure of industry i’s 
dependence on external finance, 
country level financial 
development that varies over time 
Cross Country 
Regressions 
A significant relationship is found between 
financial development and industry-level TFP 
growth when controlling for country-time and 
industry-time fixed effects. The results are 
both statistically and economically 
significant. TFP growth can accelerate up to 
0.6 percent per year, depending on the 
external finance requirement of industries, 
following a one standard deviation increase in 
financial development 
      




Saini and Ibrahim 
(2013)  
 
Examines differences in 
growth effect of financial 
development in countries 
with distinct levels of 





Average years of secondary 
schooling and average growth 
rate, initial real GDP per capita 
and population growth, 
corresponding to two institutions  
Threshold regression 
 
There is a threshold effect in the finance-
growth relationship. However, the impact of 
finance on growth is positive and significant 
only after a certain threshold level of 
institutional development has been attained 












GDP per capita, gross fixed capital 
formation, liquid liabilities, 
private sector credit and domestic 
credit provided by the banking 
sector, all expressed as ratios to 
GDP. Corruption, Rule of Law, 
Bureaucratic Quality, Government 
Repudiation, Risk of 
Expropriation 




Financial development has larger effects on 
GDP per capita when the financial system is 
embedded within a sound institutional 
framework. Moreover, financial development 
is most potent in middle-income countries, 
where its effects are particularly large when 
institutional quality is high. 
      
Balach and Law 
(2015) 
 
4 countries within 







Investigates the effects of 
financial development, 
institutional quality, and 







Real GDP per capita, gross fixed 
capital information, domestic 
credit supported by the banking 
sector is elaborated as ratios to 
GDP, liquidity liability, private 
credit by deposit money banks and 
other financial institutions as 
ratios to GDP. The initial year 
level of average years of 
secondary school enrolment is 
used for the human capital stock 
variable    
Mean group (MG) and 
pooled mean group 
(PMG) estimations 
Efficiency of financial development, 
institutional quality, and human capital in 
statistically determining long-term and short-
term growth. Financial development plays an 
important role in economic performance when 
the financial system is equipped with a good 
institutional framework. Results also reveal 
that institutional quality has a large effect on 
economic performance 
Studies on Finance, Growth and Institutional Quality (Compiled by Author, 2018)  
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3.5 Financial Development, Institutional Quality and Economic Growth in Sub-
Saharan Africa – An Overview 
Having discussed the financial development and institutional quality and the diverse ways 
in which they are proposed to relate with or impact economic growth, it is important to 
briefly reflect on economic growth, financial development and institutional quality in SSA, 
which is the main unit of analysis in this thesis. This sector therefore provides some 
background into the current interrelations between economic growth, institutional quality 
and financial development within the context of the submissions made in this thesis as per 
its objectives.  
 
3.5.1 Economic Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa 
SSA ranks about 10th with respect to the size of its global economy. A notable feature of 
SSA is the fact that, in spite of reported consistent growth rates, the region has, over the last 
three to four decades, been plagued by conflicts, epidemics, political turmoil and major 
economic downturns among others. The sub-Saharan region is diverse with forty-eight 
countries. It has a population estimate of about 1.25 billion, which is growing at an average 
of 2.5% p.a. and a population density of 41.4 per square kilometre. There are various regions 
and sub-regions in the area. SSA has been grouped into four main sub-regions- Eastern 
Africa, Middle Africa, Southern Africa and Western Africa. SSA is described as one of the 
poorest regions in the world (World Bank, 2017) 
 
Although SSA boasts of vast reserves of natural resources, the degree of poverty is high 
relative to other regions in Africa and the world (World Bank, 2017). The income level 
classifications and population sizes for the selected panel as at 2016 are presented in 
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Appendix A.  Due to the lack of adequate data, only 21 out of the 48 nations could be 
included in this research. These include Botswana, Cote d’Ivoire, Congo, Gabon, Ghana, 
The Gambia, Kenya, Madagascar, Mali, Mozambique, Malawi, Niger, Nigeria, Sudan, 
Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Uganda, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The chart 
below (Figure 2.1) shows the GDP per capita of these 21 economies under study between 
1985 and 2015. Interestingly, none of the countries under study can be classified as high 
income. Currently, 25 of the 30 poorest countries with an average income level of 
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3.5.2 Financial Development in Sub-Saharan Africa 
Although the region’s financial development level and depth is relatively much lower 
compared to other regions of the world, private sector credit to GDP, the most widely used 
indicator of financial development levels, has doubled in recent years from its 1995 level. 
According to the IMF (2016) financial development report (FDR) by Mlachila, Cui, Jaded, 
Newark, Radzewicz-Bak, Takebe, Ye, and Zhang (2016), SSA has the potential for levels 
of financial development to grow where its impact and contribution to annual growth will 
be an additional 1.5 percentage points higher than it currently is.  To get a better 
understanding of financial sector development in SSA, a brief review of the composition 
and nature of the financial sector is appropriate.  
 
The SSA financial system, as part of the African financial system (with the exception of 
South Africa), are dominated by traditional banking and informal finance (Allen, Otchere 
and Senbet, 2011). These financial systems having gone through extensive economic 
reforms over the last three decades and have innovatively expanded into the non-bank 
finance with microfinance and stock market operations are becoming relatively more visible 
in the region.  According to Allen, Otchere and Senbet (2011) notable challenges that the 
SSA financial sector faces have to do with liquidity and depth. With respect to depth, 
although financial depth in the form of private credit increased from 10% in 1995 to 21% 
in 2014, the relative level is low compared to other developing regions (see McDonald and 
Schumacher, 2007). This is attributable, in part, to the high number of low-income countries 
in the region. Stock markets in particular face low capitalization and liquidity problems.  
 
Before the global financial crisis of 2008, whilst the rest of the developing world averaged 
32% to 43% (scaled by GDP) in terms of private credit as a ratio of GDP, SSA was 
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averaging a private credit to GDP ratio of 17%. The story is no different for liquid liabilities 
as a percentage of GDP. However, although private sector credit o GDP is relatively lower 
compared to other regions, SSA’s private sector credit to GDP has doubled from its 1995 
position with respect to financial innovation. (World Bank, 2017). The financial 
development indicators generally show low levels for the region. 
 
However, there have been notable feats including capitalization or size expansion and 
trading activity as a result of better regulatory and economic environments in the region 
recently. The make-up of the banking sector in SSA is usually a domination by state-owned 
banks, some public banks and or a few large, most often, foreign banks. However, the 
restructuring and reforms of the banking sector over the last three decades has led to 
privatization of state-owned banks in many SSA countries. Although the region experienced 
a drop-in market capitalization as a result of the financial crisis, the market capitalization of 
some SSA countries continued to improve beyond 2008.  
 
Politically, after gaining independence between the late 1950s and 1970s, the region seemed 
to be ruled by one party governments and the military. These gave rise to many civil and 
ethnic wars. However, with the World Bank’s structural adjustment programs (SAPs) of the 
late 1980s and early 1990s, the region began to evolve into a democratized dispensation 
with country after country conducting general elections often riddled with doubt, complaints 
and conflict. The SAPs saw a shift away from financial repression to financial liberalization 
and often complete changes in the financial structure of these SSA economies. Slowly, the 
sub-Saharan economy became more open in terms of trade, market and the financial system. 
The question then is how has financial development evolved in SSA. What significant 
contribution has the financial sector made to efforts aimed at reducing the volatility of 
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economic growth rates? And, are there additional potential benefits to be made from 
financial development in SSA and how will these benefits be properly harnessed for the 
good of the sub region? The literature provides some answers.  
 
3.5.2 Institutional Quality in Sub-Saharan Africa 
Although SSA countries have made great effort in adopting measures and policies towards 
quick and sustainable economic growth and development, they seem to be inadequate in 
relation to the growth levels attained by the developed nations. These attempts have 
bordered on major reforms including the structural adjustment programs of the late 1980s 
and 1990s that witnessed liberalization of financial systems; trade openness; adopting 
flexible foreign exchange regimes; establishing the framework for increased levels of 
inward foreign direct investments; and democratization of political systems among others, 
which seem not to have yielded desired outcomes for many SSA countries. These changes 
were indeed meant to establish strong and robust economies through that would be growth-
driven and lift the millions in this region out of poverty.  
 
Unfortunately, in as much SSA’s growth rate over the past few years have been 
encouraging, it is not just reflective of the income levels of these nations. It is important to 
consider the degree to which SSA’s institutional environment and quality have played a role 
towards accelerated, sustainable and impactful growth (See Rodrik, Subramanian and 
Trebbi, 2002). Institutional quality measures for SSA over the past two and half to three 
decades are presented in the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) composite risk and 
governance index. This database is one of the most reliable and used proxies of institutional 
quality.  
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Table 2.1 shows the composite index of risk and governance for thirty-two SSA countries. 
This measure of institutional quality shows annual averages of the composite risk rating 
scores based on aggregating the political, financial and economic ratings for each country’s 
overall risk. This dataset has been widely applied in research on institutional quality since 
it was first published by Knack and Keefer (1995). Asiedu (2004; 2006), Demetriades and 
Law (2006), Balach and Law (2015) and Bräutigam and Knack (2004) have employed 
versions of the dataset to measure institutional quality. The composite scores range from 
zero to 100 and are broken into categories from the higher the risk, the less the quality level 
of institutions in a country15.   
 
The quality of institutions in SSA is not encouraging. Nine out of the thirty-two listed 
countries are below the world average quality level of institutions with five being in the 
very high-risk level, which by implication means they fall within the range of countries with 
the lowest quality of institutions. However, a look at the median score of 62.40 indicates 
that about 60% of the countries captured from SSA score below this median with respect to 
the quality of institutions. Congo’s score of 38 is slightly higher than the world lowest of 
35.11.  
 
It is interesting to note that the highest score obtained by a SSA country is 81.35 in Senegal. 
Angola and Gabon follow as second and third for SSA with a scores of 80.69 and 70.77, 
respectively. There is a need to emphasize here that most of the countries that scored high 
marks, and are deemed low risk, are the developed and Western countries. Given that better 
                                                 
15 Whilst the Political Risk Index is based on 100 points, Financial Risk is based on 50 points, and Economic 
Risk on 50 points.  To get the composite index used here, the total points from the three indices are divided 
by two to produce the weights for inclusion in the composite country risk score 
   
91 
 
institutional quality is meant to complement efforts towards economic growth, SSA would 
need to work towards better quality institutions 
 
Table 2.1: Composite Institutional Quality/Risk Index for SSA, 1990-2016    
Country ICRG Average 
Composite Index 
Country ICRG Average 
Composite Index 
Angola 80.69 Malawi 57.35 
Botswana 59.88 Mali 60.42 
Burkina Faso 61.83 Mozambique 69.15 
Cameroon 45.56 Namibia 67.15 
Congo 38.33 Niger 58.69 
Congo, DR 64.79 Nigeria 60.42 
Cote d'Ivoire 67.04 Senegal 81.35 
Ethiopia 69.00 Sierra Leone 57.75 
Gabon 70.77 Somalia 63.88 
Gambia 62.25 South Africa 63.42 
Ghana 60.19 Sudan 49.71 
Guinea 44.13 Tanzania 56.44 
Guinea-Bissau 61.83 Togo 58.79 
Kenya 63.65 Uganda 67.33 
Liberia 59.52 Zambia 69.00 
Madagascar 49.09 Zimbabwe 52.73 
Note: Composite index of risk and governance for thirty-two SSA countries. This measure of institutional 
quality shows annual averages of the composite risk rating scores based on aggregating the political, financial 
and economic ratings for each country’s overall risk. Computed from ICRG Dataset (2018). Very Low Risk 
(80 to 100 points) to Very High Risk (zero to 49.9 points)  
 
In view of the relatively low level of the quality of institutions in SSA, it is important to 
determine if indeed an effort towards improving the institutional quality would be a good 
thing for SSA. Whether institutional quality is a substitute or a complement for the 
fundamental sources of growth (Effiong, 2015; Aron, 2000) that have been attempted by 
countries in the region their importance cannot be over emphasized (Asiedu, 2006; Balach 
and Law, 2015). It is important that various types of institutions are explored, especially 
where they have been proven to propel high quality growth (Rodrik, 2000; 2002). SSA is 
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making strides to develop its financial system and the efficiency with which that happens is 
proposed to be enhanced by adequately working institutions. Institutional quality is being 
hypothesised to work through finance to improve productivity. The institutions proposed by 
Rodrik (2000) are both social and economic and may well provide the answer 
 
It is important to indicate that this research’s goal of investigation the role institutional 
quality and financial development play in SSA’s economic growth ties well into the Agenda 
2063 of the African Union. The Agenda 2063 of the African Union, just like the SDGs, is 
meant to ensure that Africa attains an inclusive and sustainable economic growth and 
development. This new path for sustainable economic growth and development was 
instituted in 2013 and is viewed as ‘the strategic framework’ and the ‘blueprint and master 
plan for transforming Africa into the global powerhouse of the future’ 
(www.au.int/agenda2063/overview). This research ties into some of the priority areas of 
this Agenda with respect to the goal of ensuring quality institutions are in place and there’s 
an expansion of the financial monetary institutions on the continent.  
 
The emphasis on institutional quality is first aimed at putting capable institutions and 
transformative leadership in place. This is enshrined in the priority areas of working towards 
and entrenching democratic values, practices, justice and the rule of law, ensuring stability, 
security and peace in African capital markets as well as ensuring an adequate social 
insurance and social protection to tackle inequality among others 
(www.au.int/agenda2063/goals). These institutions are among the major six portrayed in 
this study (Rodrik, 2000) as promoters of high-quality growth and their inclusion in the 
priority areas of the African continent’s strategic framework for sustained and inclusive 
economic growth is noteworthy. In effect, a well-developed financial system situated within 
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a stable and quality institutional environment is proposed to be an important driver of 
Africa’s growth.  
 
3.6 Studies on Financial Development and Economic Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa 
In a region like SSA, the importance of financial development for growth is evident. 
According to the IMF (2016), some progress has been made with respect to the level and 
growth of financial development in SSA, although this progress may be relatively low. 
Moreover, despite the fact that the level is below benchmark, financial development has 
played a role in reducing growth volatility in SSA and has significantly contributed to 
growth (Sahay et al., 2015). Nyamongo et al. (2012) sampled 36 African countries from 
1980 to 2009 using panel econometric framework analysis to test the relationship between 
finance and economic growth. They conclude that the importance of finance in aiding 
economic growth in these countries is weak (Odhiambo, 2009; Rioja and Valev, 2004; 
Rousseau and Vuthipadadorn, 2012).  
 
Mlachila et al. (2016) note that there is a gradual increase in the share of marketable 
instruments compared to non-marketable debt thus facilitating the establishment of more 
liquid bench marks for future corporate issuances. There has also been an increase in project 
bonds that finance infrastructural investment, and debt instrument maturities have become 
longer on the average. It must be emphasized that in SSA the development of the financial 
sector has occurred through both the financial institutions and the financial markets. Is 
deeper financial development for SSA? Even though the size and effect differ across SSA 
countries, financial development has been associated with high economic growth. Mlachila 
et al. (2016) found that enhancing financial inclusion by reducing borrowing constraints, 
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participation cost and increasing intermediation efficiency reduces volatility of growth and 
increases the impact of finance on productivity and growth (Sahay et al., 2015).  
 
The relationship may tend to be mixed and even insignificant for SSA at times. Batuo, 
Mlambo and Asongu (2018) applied dynamic panel regression techniques and a system 
GMM estimation to 41 African countries between 1985 and 2010 to test the effects of 
financial liberalisation, financial development and economic growth on financial instability 
in Africa. They particularly investigated the impact of financial development on economic 
growth in African countries. They were interested in whether the financial development and 
liberalisation that has occurred in Africa is linked to financial instability as well as wanting 
to ascertain any significant differences in the relationship between financial development 
and financial stability during the pre-liberalisation or post-liberalisation era. Financial 
instability has a positive effect on financial liberalisation meaning the liberalisation process 
tends to increase financial instability. However, it has an inverse effect on economic growth, 
confirming some positions in the literature.  
 
Batuo, Mlambo and Asongu (2018) further found that, although financial development’s 
association with financial instability is positive and significant, its effect on economic 
growth is negative and significant. They however found that the marginal effect of financial 
development on financial instability is positive and more pronounced than that of financial 
liberalisation. Both have a favourable impact on financial instability with the effects of 
financial liberalisation being greater than the effect of financial development, while 
economic growth has an opposite effect. The positive link between financial instability and 
financial liberalisation and development tends to affect the nexus between finance and 
growth by damaging economic growth. The development and efficiency of the financial 
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sector is riddled with continuous financial instability, leading to a lack of confidence from 
investors.  
 
Indeed, the evidence is mixed with respect to the various paradigms on the relationship 
between finance and growth. Additional evidence suggests that, whilst Atindehou, Gueyie 
and Amenounve (2005) did not find any relationship between finance and growth in 12 SSA 
countries, Agbestiaf (2004) and Ghirmay (2004) support the demand-following hypothesis 
of finance and growth using 7 SSA countries and 13 SSA countries, respectively. Evidence 
from Odhiambo (2009) suggests that finace follows economic growth in Kenya and South 
Africa. Finally, Akinboade and Kinfack (2014) found eveidence to support a bi-directional 
relationship between finance and growth in Botswana using granger cauality analysis. 
Futhermore, some studies suggest different relationships at different levels of financial 
development for the same unit of analysis in SSA.  According to Mlachila et al. (2016), the 
impact of finance on growth volatility is SSA is found to be negative and insignificant for 
a certain level of financial development and then beyond a certain threshold of financial 
development, the relationship reverses. 
 
The above studies on SSA do not consider the specific role that finance and institutions play 
in productivity enhancement in the selected panel. Secondly, there’s a possibility for 
problems of misspecification of models in the above studies owing to the fact that the 
possible presence of structural breaks and cross-sectional dependency were not factored into 
designing these tests.  Boamah, Loudon, and Watts (2017) attempt to address these issues 
in SSA by examining structural breaks in the response of equity returns to global factors 
when they investigating the country and industry effects in African equity returns.   
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They explore the proportion of the variability in country index returns that are explained by 
global industry and country factors. By applying the Quandt test for unknown structural 
breaks method and the Bai and Perron (1998) test for structural breaks and variance 
decomposition techniques to investigate the response, Boamah,  Loudon, and Watts (2017) 
focused on 11 African countries between January 1996 and January 2013 within the 
framework of the Cobb-Douglas production function, and observed that there is a presence 
of significant level and regime breaks in the relation between African index returns and the 
global industry factor around the period of the GFC and the AFC.  
 
At the individual country level, using an ARDL bounds testing approach and incorporating 
trend and slope breaks in a trended model as well as a Zivot and Andrews (1992) unit root 
test with breaks, Adu, Marbuah and Tei Mensah (2013) found that, with or without 
structural breaks, whether financial development is good or bad for growth depends on the 
indicator used to proxy for financial development. Uddin, Sjö and Shahbaz (2013) however 
found a relationship between finance and growth in Ghana using a level break in an ARDL 
bounds testing approach over the period of 1971 to 2011. These studies highlight the need 
for structural breaks in studies situated in SSA.  
 
The need to apportion possible reasons for these mixed results in SSA led many economists 
to focus on the institutional framework of SSA and how it contributes to the growth process 
of the region. These mixed results, according to Mlachila et al. (2016), reflect the low levels 
and insufficiency of SSA’s institutional framework. Indeed, the absence of quality 
institutions may have impeded progress in many macroeconomic phenomena. Hence, in line 
with the proponents of the need for good quality institutions, it is important that the required 
level of legal, regulatory, policy, contract enforcement, property rights and other 
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institutional quality frameworks are available in SSA to fully reap the gains from deeper 
levels of financial systems.  Does SSA have the needed adequacy level of institutions for 
the significant benefits expected from them? 
 
3.7  Studies on Institutional Quality, Financial Development and Economic Growth in 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
A portion of the financial development growth literature has institutional quality as a driving 
force for growth to occur optimally. The argument is that when economic institutions are 
adequately working, the distribution of financial resources improves. For instance, Effiong 
(2015), using 21 SSA and OLS and SYS GMM in growth regressions, found that 
institutional quality rather propels growth whilst the interaction between finance and growth 
over the period 1986-2010 does not.   
 
To the extent that there is a better institutional framework such as the protection of property 
and creditor rights; better regulatory frameworks supervision; macroeconomic stabilizing 
institutions; judicial enforcement; private credit to GDP ratios and access have tended to 
increase. Thus, the growth benefits of financial development will be realised. In their view, 
a relatively insufficient number of financial products, very little financial innovation, a 
deeply fragmented market, large interest rate spreads and a generally large informal sector 
reveals the existence of a relatively high level of financial underdevelopment in SSA. 
Effiong (2015) does not however consider the impact of structural beaks and integration on 
the dataset.  
 
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) researched the relationship between colonial 
origins and development by exploiting the differences in European mortality rates to 
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estimate the effect of institutions on economic performance. Using multiple stage least 
squares regressions they observe that, by controlling for the effect of institutions, the income 
levels of African countries or those closer to the equator are not comparatively lower. The 
study, one again does not consider the role of structural breaks and other types of institutions 
that may have an impact of finance and growth.  
 
Non-economic institutions are equally important for the finance-growth relationship in 
regions like SSA. Addison, Chowdhury and Murshed (2002) found that financial 
development is vulnerable to social conflict. They observed that conflict reduces the 
demand for domestic currency as a medium of exchange and a store of value. Conflict leads 
to poor quality governance, including weak regulation of the financial system, thereby 
undermining the sustainability of financial institutions. Conflict therefore reduces the social 
return to financial liberalization and other financial-sector reforms. Using data from 79 
countries, they applied this to a model that integrates the effects of conflict and financial 
liberalization. In concluding, they found that conflict significantly reduces financial 
development. 
 
Not much has been advanced in the area of social conflict and financial development this 
research seeks to investigate the moderating role it plays in the finance growth nexus as an 
institution since SSA is one region in the world that is plagued by numerous social conflicts. 
Does the presence of these conflicts that range from infrequent guerrilla attacks to serious 
tribal wars, affect the role that institutions play in the economy and perhaps contribute to 
high information and transaction costs, which in turn lowers productivity and hence growth? 
They make the assertion that the international community would need to offer more support 
to the prevention and resolution of conflict through better peace-keeping, broad-based 
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reconstruction and democratization since they found evidence to support the fact that, apart 
from being welcomed as a humanitarian gesture, conflict-reducing measures have a positive 
relationship with economic development. 
 
Sub-Saharan African countries have made substantial progress in financial development 
over the past decade, but there is still considerable scope for further development, especially 
compared with other regions. Indeed, until a decade or so ago, the level of financial 
development in a large number of sub-Saharan African countries had actually regressed 
relative to the early 1980s. With the exception of the region’s middle-income countries, 
both financial market depth and institutional development are lower than that of other 
developing regions. The Rodrik (2000) growth-promoting institutional categories, namely 
property rights institutions, regulatory institutions, institutions for macroeconomic 
stabilisation, institutions for social insurance and institutions for conflict management may 
present some answers for SSA to better realize gains from financial development on growth.  
 
3.8 Financial Development, Institutional Quality and Economic Growth in Sub-
Saharan Africa 
In the finance-growth discussion in SSA, institutional quality has been a point of focus in 
studies (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2004; Sahay et al., 2015b; Anayiotos and 
Toroyan, 2009). Gries and Meirrekes (2010) use data between 1984 and 2007 from nineteen 
SSA countries to find the relationship between institutional quality and financial 
development by reviewing the determinants of financial development in SSA. They argue 
that, although a vast number of studies have pointed to a positive relationship between 
financial development and economic growth, studies that concentrate on SSA do not 
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confirm this positive relationship to a large extent. They find that SSA, as a region, is 
financially underdeveloped and has a relatively low level of financial openness.  
 
More recently, Mlachila, Park, and Yabara (2013) show that weak judicial enforcement is 
one of the major impediments to the region’s banking system development. David, 
Mlachila, and Moheeput (2015) show that, in contrast to other developing countries, there 
is a weak link between international integration and financial development in the region, 
and this can be explained by relatively weak institutions in the region. Indeed, in addition 
to the statistics from the WGIs and ICRG composite index, the 2017 Doing Business Report 
ranks the region’s quality of judicial processes index as 6.4 on a scale of 0 to 18. Contract 
enforcement at ranked at 132 on a scale of 0 to 199 whilst the strength of legal rights index 
is 5 on a scale of 0 to 12 hence giving the region an overall institutional quality score of 
47.73 on a scale of 0 to 100.   It is important therefore to pay attention to strengthening the 
institutional framework in SSA to harness optimal benefits of deliberate growth focused 
financial development.  
 
Empirical evidence shows that firms are able to access external finance in countries where 
legal enforcement is stronger (La Porta et al., 1997; Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 
2005), and that better creditor protection increases credit to the private sector (Djankov, 
McLiesh and Shleifer, 2005).  Many SSA countries however record low levels of levels 
contract enforcement (ICRG, 2017). The Doing Business Report in 2019 rates SSA with an 
overall score of 48.14 out of 100 with respect to contract enforcement. More effective legal 
systems allow more flexible and adaptable conflict resolution, increasing firms’ access to 
finance. In countries where the legal system is more effective, financial systems have lower 
interest rate spreads and are more efficient (Laeven and Majnoni, 2005). Indeed, due to low 
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levels of property rights and contracts enforcement in many SSA countries, the financial 
systems often face challenges that produce friction and higher transaction costs hence 
causing a reduction in productivity.  
 
Political stability and democracy ensure that efforts made to improve financial systems are 
positively impacting growth in terms of democracy, well-functioning macroeconomic 
policies on the part of government ensure better efficiency (Bencivenga and Smith, 1992; 
Huybens and Smith, 1999; Roubini and Sala-i-Martin, 1995). SSA’s financial sector 
institutions need sound political institutions and independent central banks to achieve 
efficient financial development (Garriga, 2016). It is vital for SSA governments to allow 
these institutions to function adequately.  
 
In economies where corruption, fraud and other anti-competitive behaviour generally goes 
unpunished or unsanctioned (as happens in many SSA countries), such regulatory 
institutions would be very few- and where they are present, they are not able to enforce 
fairness and equity in the financial system. Institutions for conflict management and social 
insurance need to be strengthened as these tend to impact the financial system. Addison, 
Chowdhury and Murshed (2002) observe that financial development is vulnerable to social 
conflict. Rajan (2006) observes that, at the household level, giving each individual a national 
identification number and creating credit registries where lenders share information about 
their clients’ repayment records would help since all borrowers could then borrow using 
their future access to credit as collateral. SSA has the low levels of such institutions.  
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3.9 Financial development, Institutional Quality and Growth- Studies on the role of 
Alternative Production Functions- The CES and the VES  
 
With respect to the finance-growth literature, a few partly related studies include Alfaro et 
al. (2010) who develop a theoretical framework with CES production technology among 
others.  This CES framework formalizes a mechanism through which FDI may lead to a 
higher growth rate in the host country via backward linkages. Alfaro et al.’s (2010) 
framework rests on a mechanism that ensures efficiency through emphasising the role of 
local financial markets in enabling FDI to promote growth through the creation of backward 
linkages.  Agénor and Canuto (2017) observed interactions between access to finance, 
product innovation, and labour supply, and concluded that, when innovators are backed by 
a policy that is aimed at continuously reducing constraints on access to finance, it may have 
the effect of promoting the production of ideas and improving incentives to invest in skills 
and hence propel growth.   
 
Aghion, Bacchetta and Banerjee (2001) developed a framework for analysing the role of 
financial factors as a source of instability in small, open economies to examine the effects 
of financial liberalization on the stability of the macro economy in the CES framework 
among others. They detected that economies at the intermediate level of financial 
development may rather have destabilizing effects, inducing continuous phases of growth 
with capital inflows followed by collapse with capital flight. Hybuns and Smith (1999) 
presented a monetary growth CES model in which banks and secondary capital markets 
play a crucial allocative function.  
 
With respect to the CES specification and institutional quality, the majority of research is 
based on international trade and agricultural production, which by and large seem to confirm 
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the significance of institutional quality. An example is Álvarez, Barbero, Rodríguez-Pose, 
and Zofío (2018) who use a gravity framework based on constraints within a CES utility 
setting, and their framework assesses the role of institutions for trade, controlling for 
geographical distance, cultural proximity, regional trade agreements, and accounting for 
model economic determinants related to labour cost competitiveness in origin (involving 
productivity and wages), trade costs, sectoral prices, and income shares at destination.  
 
The results from 186 countries over the period of 1996 to 2012 confirm the significance of 
institutional quality to trade (Macchiavello, 2009; Grossman and Helpman, 1991). These 
studies confirm the fact that the finance growth relationship is significant in the context of 
other production technologies, which may provide findings relevant for forecasting and 
policy making. However, there’s a gap with respect to the role of institutions in finance via 
efficiency enhancement in the CES and VES framework 
 
3.10 Research Gaps and Summary of the Literature 
Following a thorough review of the existing literature, there’s ample evidence that SSA has 
not fully exploited the possible productivity gains from growth-promoting institutions such 
as that proposed in Rodrik (2000) as their governments make continuous efforts towards 
effective financial development. Although the role of institutional quality in the finance-
growth relationship  is not  a subject without debate (Tamayo and Fernandez, 2015; Huang, 
2010), the evidence leans heavily towards a significant one (Murinde, 2012; Rodrik, 
Subramanian and Trebbi, 2002; Levine and Beck, 2004; Milo, 2007; Mohamed, Siadi and 
Zakaria, 2012; Law, Azman-Saini and Ibrahim, 2013; Demetriades and Law, 2006; Balach 
and Law, 2015). Institutional quality has been identified as a growth and efficiency-
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promoting source of overall economic growth (Williamson, 2000; Glylfason, 2004; 
Hovenkamp and Coase, 2011; Ugur, 2014; Berhane, 2018; Bass, 2019; Houkonou et al., 
2012; Rodrik, 2000;2002; North, 1991; Boettke and Coyne, 2009).  
 
This efficiency-promoting feature of institutions is mainly through (a) broadening the reach 
of economic analysis beyond traditional markets and are able to capture a more complete 
set of mechanisms by which resources are moved from one place to another (Hovenkamp 
and Coase, 2011; Williamson, 2000), (b) ensuring that information and transaction costs 
associated with economic transactions are reduced by reducing information asymmetry and 
adverse selection (Tamayo and Fernandez, 2015; Coase, 1936; 1984; North, 1990; 1991; 
1995; Grief, 1989; North and Weingast, 1989) and (c)  mediating particular economic 
relationships such as business firms and contractual agreements by serving as governance 
structures (Williamson, 1987; 1996; North, 1995). By so doing, institutions ensure 
predictability and stability are facilitated through higher symmetries in information.  
 
In line with the theory of convergence (Solow, 1956; 1957), SSA has been largely identified 
as the region with considerable growth potential (Ssozi and Asongu, 2016; IMF, 2013; 
World Bank, 2019; Jones, 2002). However, available statistics and evidence suggest that 
SSA is consistently at the bottom of the growth and financial development pyramid (see 
WDIs; WGIs).  Indeed, the SSA region has experienced some the slowest economic growth 
rates compared to other regions in the world, with high poverty levels. Hence, an 
investigation into what may or may not work with respect to economic growth in the sub-
region is imperative. Given the importance of institutions to the growth process, applying 
Rodrik’s (2000) institutions for high quality growth on SSA will contribute to determining 
the institutions that work within the SSA context since previous studies have emphasized 
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other institutions such as rule of law, political stability and corruption. Indeed, the public 
and private institutional frameworks of many African countries are inadequate, weak and 
porous (ICRG, 2017; WGI, 2017; Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi, 2002; Mensah, Bokpin, 
and Boachie-Yiadom, 2018).  
 
In addition, although evidence from global cross-country studies is important, the dearth 
and lack of strength of both macroeconomic and institutional data for many developing 
countries has made it difficult to make robust policy interpretations on SSA countries and 
regions (Aron, 2000; Effiong, 2015). Again, the uneven levels of financial development and 
institutional quality in the world necessitates the use of a sample of countries from a 
geographic region with some similarities in terms of geographic and economic 
characteristics due to the formation of regional and sub-regional integrated bodies (Huang, 
2010; Demetriades & Law, 2006).  The literature reviewed so far points to the fact that the 
institutions proposed by Rodrik (2000) have not been tested in countries from SSA.  The 
decomposition of TFP for this study clearly delineates the actual contribution of institutional 
quality and financial development to higher efficiency. Testing these measures and their 
impact on SSA’s production functions through total factor productivity is therefore 
essential.  
 
Furthermore, the literature on the finance-institution-growth relationship in SSA is even 
more scanty (Mlachila et al., 2016; Addison, Chowhury and Murshed, 2002). This is 
especially evident when such studies incorporate individual and multiple structural breaks 
(Boamah, Loudon and Watts, 2017; Adu, Marbuah and Tei-Mensah, 2013). Africa and by 
extension SSA, is one of the regions that has witnessed many political, economic and 
sociocultural events that have seemingly affected the trajectory of the sub-region’s growth 
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(www.worldbank.org). As stated previously, at the sub-regional level, the 2007/2008 global 
financial crisis did not spare the region of its effects. The Structural Adjustment Programs 
instituted by the World Bank in the 1990s and early 2000s as well as the Ebola crisis in 
West Africa from 2013 to 2016 are events that have the potential to change the structure of 
the economy. At the individual country level, Liberia, Mali, Sudan, Congo and Niger have 
all not been spared their share of political, civil and tribal conflicts and very serious natural 
disasters among other such events (Addison, Chowdhury and Murshed, 2002; Boamah, 
Loudon and Watts, 2017)  
 
Consequently, the need for structural breaks in SSA studies cannot be overemphasized since 
many structure changing events occur in the region. These events, when captured in 
estimations, depict a relatively more realistic situation for finance and growth, and mitigate 
the probability of model misspecification errors and incorrect forecasting and policy 
formulation (Hatemi-J, 2008; Gregory and Hansen, 1996; Im, Lee and Tieslau, 2005 and 
2010; Narayam and Symth, 2010; Westerlund, 2006a; Banerjee and Carrion-i-Silvestre, 
2015; Lee and Strazicich). Presently, the evidence available suggests that this is the first 
study that has attempted to test the relationships and interactions between financial 
development, economic growth and the specific mix of Rodrik’s (2000) institutions whilst 
incorporating the effect of structural breaks.   
 
Finally, a careful study of the literature shows the lack of usage of multiple forms of the 
production function in SSA and indeed beyond SSA studies within the finance-institutions-
growth context. Indeed, most of the existing studies have been premised on the Cobb-
Douglas production function (Law, Azman-Saini and Ibrahim, 2013; Balach and Law; 
2015; Demetriades and Law, 2006; Levine and Zervos, 1998; Filippidis and Katrakilidis, 
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2015; Gerchet et al., 2019; Arizalla, Cavallo and Gallindo, 2013). As simple as the Cobb-
Douglas production function is, it is important to note that it is based on certain assumptions. 
These assumptions, which include constant returns to scale, unitary elasticity of substitution 
and homogeneity of a single degree among others, have been criticised rather heavily in the 
literature (Aryes et al., 2014; Biddle, 2012; Evans, Green, and Murinde, 2000; Østbye, 
2010; Minhas and Solow, 1961; Kmenta, 1967; Barro, Mankiw and Salai-i-Martin, 1992).  
 
A variation in any of the underlying assumptions of the Cobb-Douglas production function 
therefore may provide other insights into, and make room for testing the model under 
seemingly more realistic conditions. Although a few studies on the finance-growth 
relationship have applied the use of the Translog (Evans, Green, and Murinde, 2000; 
Østbye, 2010)  and the CES production functions (Ageno and Canuto, 2017; Aghion, 
Baccetta and Banerjee, 2005; Hybuns and Smith, 1999), employing the Cobb-Douglas, CES 
and VES production specification in the finance-growth study in the presence of structural 
breaks within the SSA framework is important since two alternative forms address some of 
the concerns raised about the Cobb-Douglas form.  
 
 Comparing the outcomes of the Cobb-Douglas, CES and VES production functions 
provides theoretical and empirical insights into to the importance of the elasticity of 
substitution for economic growth models in SSA.  It is against this background that this 
section is dedicated to testing the financial development-institutional quality-economic 
growth relationship using the Constant Elasticity of Substitution and Variable Elasticity of 
Substitution production specifications. The Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) and 
the Variable Elasticity of Substitution (VES) production functions are explored as tools to 
check the robustness of the claims being made in this research. 
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3.11 Research Questions 
Four research questions are derived in accordance with the research gaps identified above. 
Firstly, what effect do market and non-market institutions have on productivity when 
combined with financial development? To address this question, institutional variables are 
incorporated as an important contributory factor to economic growth. Specifically, the 
institutions proposed by Rodrik (2000) to induce high-quality growth are extended by 
including democracy and creating an index of institutional quality, which is interacted with 
financial development to form Institutional Quality Linked Efficiency Gain. Thus, 
productivity levels and efficiency gains associated with Institutional Quality Linked 
Efficiency Gain for an economy can be generated.  
 
Secondly, does the role of institutional quality in enhancing financial development to 
promote growth in SSA based on its uniqueness and relatively low level of economic 
development differ from other regions? To address this question, a panel of 21 SSA 
countries, which has not been previously applied in such a context, is selected. In addition, 
individual countries are tested to complement the results from the panel and highlight 
unique features of these economies within the finance-institutions-growth framework.  
Furthermore, both time series and panel cointegration techniques including Engle and 
Granger (1987), Johansen (1991;1995) and Pedroni (1999; 2004) cointegration estimations 
are employed.  
 
The third research question is that to what extent do historical and future events in the form 
of single and multiple structural breaks impact the role of institutional quality linked 
efficiency gain and productivity in the panel and selected individual SSA countries? Hence, 
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multiple structural breaks are accounted for in the analysis. In particular, a range of both 
time series and panel cointegration analysis that are capable of identifying endogenous 
structural breaks are employed. These methods include the Gregory and Hansen (1996) and 
the Hatemi-J (2008) cointegration tests with structural breaks for the time series estimations 
and the Westerlund (2007a) and Banerjee and Carrion-i-Silvestre (2015) cointegration tests 
with multiple structural breaks for the panel.  
 
The final research question is: what are the similarities and differences in the role played by 
IQLEG on productivity in the panel of SSA within the Cobb-Douglas, CES and VES 
production frameworks? Comparing the efficiency levels generated within the Cobb-
Douglas, CES and VES production framework provides the needed responses to these 
questions and determine the degree of robustness that the CES and VES give to the results 
from the Cobb-Douglas case. In the CES and VES production specifications, non-linear 
least squares estimators are employed to estimate the relationship between financial 
development, institutional quality and economic growth in the 21 SSA countries with and 












RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
4.1 Introduction 
The main goal of this research was to determine whether the institutional setting in SSA 
with respect to the five main institutions proposed by Rodrik (2000) in the presence of 
democracy aides the financial sector in providing services to the real sector and hence 
provide a link to economic growth. Based on the specific objectives outlined in Chapter 
One, this chapter therefore provides the analytical models that underpin this research and 
the steps that have been taken to achieve these objectives. Specifically, it identifies a variety 
of appropriate empirical models derived from investigating the relationship between 
financial development, institutional quality and economic growth in sub-Saharan African 
countries accounting for structural breaks.  
 
This research assumes an epistemological stance where theoretical and empirical 
underpinnings on the finance-institutions-growth nexus are tested (Levine, 2000; Solow, 
1956; 1957). Epistemology is defined as the branch of philosophy that investigates the 
origins, scope, nature, and limitations of knowledge (Boyd et al., 1991; Sosa, 2017). It can 
also be seen as being concerned with possibilities, nature, sources and limitations of 
knowledge in the field of study. In effect, epistemology is focused on what is known to be 
true. Within the finance-growth framework, there’s evidence or existing knowledge that 
there’s a relationship between financial development and economic growth although the 
nature and direction of this relationship varies.    
 
   
111 
 
The fact that this relationship can be depicted through the production function via both the 
allocative and productivity channels of the production function is also existing knowledge 
sourced by making empirical and authoritarian sources the basis for the research process.  
The specific research philosophy adopted within the epistemological worldview of this 
research is positivism. This is due to the properties being applied here such as the 
explanatory, cause and effect approach used, the application of secondary observed and 
measured quantitative data, and the use of statistical applications to test extensions to 
existing theories (Dudovskiy, 2018; Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2012)   
 
The research is embedded in the framework of the Solow (1956, 1957) neoclassical growth 
model as presented by Barro and Salai-i-Martin (2004). The study extends the methodology 
of You and Sarantis (2013) by decomposing TFP into pure technical progress (NFP) and 
institutional quality linked efficiency gain (IQLEG) in depicting how the presence and 
quality of institutions contribute to an increase in efficiency levels and hence to increasing 
productivity and growth over and above productivity gains from pure technical progress. 
By generating efficiency levels attributable to IQLEG and NFP within the Cobb-Douglas, 
CES and VES production functions, the claim of additional efficiency gains linked to 
IQLEG is investigated. The rationale for setting the study in the Solow (1956) growth 
framework is that it is the modern reference point of all growth studies (Demetriades and 
Law, 2006; Law and Balach, 2015). The scope of the research is a group of sub-Saharan 
African countries and involves the 21 (out of 49) countries that are listed on the website of 
the World Bank due to data availability.  
 
To estimate the models, panel data estimation techniques, which allow for both cross-
section and time series variations in all variables, are adopted. The advantages of using 
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panel data are that it adds more power to the test and is able to capture both group and 
individual effects. It is typically more efficient, has more variability and tends to generate 
more information that time series or cross-sectional data. The advantage of applying time 
series techniques is that the uniqueness of each country is made evident. Unsystematic 
information peculiar to each country is thus generated for decision making (Wooldridge, 
2016).  
 
A plethora of econometric techniques and tests have been employed in finance-growth 
studies at both the theoretical and empirical levels (Levine, 2005; Murinde, 2012; Tamayo 
and Fenandez, 2015; Bist, 2018). Huang (2005) employs Bayesian Model Averaging and 
General to- specific approaches are jointly applied in studying the determinants of cross-
country differences in financial development in 64 countries. Levine and Zervos (1998) 
applied cross-country regressions on 47 countries to determine whether measures of stock 
market liquidity, size, volatility, and integration with world capital markets robustly 
correlated with current and future rates of economic growth, capital accumulation, 
productivity improvements, and saving rates (See also Arizalla, Cavallo and Gallindo, 2013; 
Bordo and Raussaeu, 2006)  
 
Beck, Levine and Loaza (2000) in a bid to understand cross –country cross-country 
differences in both the level and growth rate of total factor productivity, examines whether 
the level of banking sector development exerts a causal impact on real per capita GDP 
growth, capital per capita growth, productivity per capita growth and private saving rates. 
They apply Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1997) GMM. Many more 
studies have applied various GMM specifications in determining the relationship between 
finance, growth and institutions. Huang (2010), tests the effect of political institutional 
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improvement on financial development by applying a System GMM estimator and a LSDV 
estimator in a panel of 90 developed and developing countries from 1960–1999. Filippidis 
and Katrakilidis (2015) studied 52 developing economies, 16 of which were from SSA with 
data from 1985 to 2008 (See also Greene, 2008; Rioja and Valev, 2003). The advantages 
associated with applying the above include the fact that they are dynamic panel techniques 
that mitigate the known problems of heterogeneity and endogeneity of the traditional 
techniques and study the dynamics of adjustment (Baltagi, 2009). 
 
However, it is important to note that although the above cross-country regressions and 
dynamic models tend to ignore the integration properties of these series (Bist, 2018; 
Christopoulos and Tsionas, 2004). The importance or advantage of applying both 
integration and dynamic models in such macroeconomic analysis is that integration 
properties that tend to depict structural long run equilibrium properties in the relationship 
between variables. The use panel and time series cointegration techniques along with 
dynamic panel and time series long-run estimations ensures that all properties of the series 
are adequately accounted for in modelling possible relationships (Gries, Kraft and 
Meirrieks, 2008; Menyah, Nazliogu and Wolde-Rufael, 2014; Deluvaite and Sineiviciene, 
2014). In this study, both integrated and dynamic properties are explored with the 
econometric tools applied. 
 
Two categories of panel cointegration estimators are used to determine possible long-run 
associations to determine the relationship between finance, growth, capital and institutional 
quality in the 21 SSA countries under study. The first does not involve any structural breaks 
whilst the second category does. With respect to the various forms of the production 
function, whilst estimations involving the Cobb-Douglas specification are conducted using 
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cointegration techniques, the CES and VES specifications are estimated with panel non-
linear least squares estimators due to their non-linearity and in line with You and Sarantis 
(2013).  
 
It is commonly assumed that disturbances in panel data models are cross-sectionally 
independent, especially when the cross-section dimension (𝑁) is large. There is, however, 
considerable evidence that cross-sectional dependence is often present in panel regression 
settings. Ignoring cross-sectional dependence in estimation can have serious consequences, 
with unaccounted for residual dependence resulting in estimator efficiency loss, bias and 
invalid test statistics (Westerlund, 2006a; Banerjee and Carrion-i-Silvestre, 2015; Banerjee 
and Carrion-i-Silvestre, 2017; Pesaran, 2007) emphasize the importance of accounting for 
cross-sectional dependency in panel studies. Four different cross-sectional dependency tests 
are performed in this study along with unit root and cointegration tests that incorporate and 
account for cross-sectional dependency. These tests are discussed later in this Chapter.  
 
Studies have shown that the effect of structural breaks cannot be ignored when studying 
data over time. When breaks are ignored in tests, we lose power (Lee and Stratizicich, 2001; 
Im, Lee and Tieslau, 2005; 2010; Carrion-i-Silvestre, del Barrio-Castro and López-Bazo, 
2005). Indeed, Perron (1989; 1994) among others, point out the need to include structural 
breaks in unit root tests to avoid the risk of misspecification in the trend function. This may 
lead to a bias in the standard unit root tests, which may tend to render a series non-stationary, 
although the series may actually be stationary.  
 
Tests may be inconsistent when structural breaks are ignored (Lee, Huang and Shin, 1997). 
Furthermore, Lee and Strazicich (2001) established that not allowing for breaks under the 
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null can lead to serious size distortions and spurious rejections under the null. With respect 
to cointegration tests, the advantages of structural breaks in tests are that, unlike the 
conventional tests, they have more power and allow users to consider the possibility of 
cointegrating when the cointegrating model has shifted once or more at an unknown point. 
It is therefore imperative that, for this study, the effects of structural breaks are considered 
in reaching conclusions (Westerlund, 2006a; Gregory and Hansen, 1996). 
 
4.2 Data  
4.2.1 An Overview of the Data 
A panel of observations for these 21 countries makes up the data set for the period 1985-
2015.  Extending Demetriades and Law (2006), annual data on real GDP per capita, capital 
stock, the cumulative institutional quality index created from Rodrik’s (2000) set of 
institutions and sourced from the International Country Risk Guide and the World 
Governance Indicators (WGI) and an index of financial development constructed from 
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) are used. The financial development index 
constructed included the liquid liabilities, private sector credit, M2 and domestic credit from 
the banking sector, all expressed as ratios to GDP collected from the World Development 
Indicators (WDI).  
 
The financial development index created followed and extended Menyah, Nazlioglu, and 
Wolde-Rufael (2014). The capital stock measure was obtained from the Penn World tables 
9.0 (PWT 9.0).  However, the time frame for this data set is from 1985 to 2015 due to the 
availability of data. The 21 countries used in the research are Togo, Burkina Faso, Cote 
d’Ivoire, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Senegal, Nigeria, Mali, Niger, Kenya, Sudan, Uganda, 
United Republic Tanzania, Gabon, Congo Republic, Botswana, Mozambique, Zambia, 
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Zimbabwe, South Africa, Malawi and Madagascar. Although the choice of the 21 countries 
is due to data availability, it is interesting to know that they come from the west, eastern, 
central and southern parts of SSA. This is an advantage to the research in terms of the 
representativeness of the sample.  
 
4.2.2 Variable Measurement   
Economic Growth 
Economic growth is the dependent variable and the measure used is Gross Domestic Product 
per capita (GDPPC). It is measured as gross domestic product (GDP) divided by midyear 
population. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy 
plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It 
is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion 
and degradation of natural resources. Data are in constant 2010 U.S. dollars. It is aggregated 
using a weighted average method and was sourced from the WDI (2018). It is expected that 
GDP will have a positive relationship with all the independent variables, namely financial 
development, institutional quality and capital.  
 
Capital Stock  
Built up from investment data by asset, this factor of production is made up of estimated 
information for four assets: structures (including residential and non-residential); machinery 
(including computers, communication equipment and other machinery); transport 
equipment; and other assets (including software, other intellectual property products, and 
cultivated assets). The capital detail file includes information on investment at current 
national prices (the 𝐼𝑐 variables), the investment deflator (𝐼𝑝), the current-cost net capital 
stock (𝐾𝑐), the capital stock deflator (𝐾𝑝) and capital consumption at current prices (𝐷𝑐). 
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The relationship is given as: Investment at constant national prices for asset 𝑎: 𝐼𝑎𝑡 =
𝐼𝑐𝑎𝑡/𝐼𝑝𝑎𝑡 Capital stock at constant national prices for asset 𝑎: 𝐾𝑎𝑡 = (1 − 𝛿𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑡)𝐾𝑎𝑡−1 +
𝐼𝑎𝑡 Current-cost net capital stock: 𝐾𝑐𝑎𝑡 = 𝐾𝑝𝑎𝑡 × 𝐾𝑎𝑡  Depreciation rate of asset: 𝛿𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑡 =
𝐷𝑐𝑎𝑡/𝐾𝑐𝑎𝑡 . Theoretically, the capital stock is expected to have a positive relationship with 
GDPPC and is sourced from the PWT 9.0. 
 
Financial Development 
A composite indicator of financial development is constructed in order to capture both the 
reach (size) and depth of financial sector development in SSA (See Gries, Kraft and 
Meierrieks, 2009; Menyah, Nazlioglu, and Wolde-Rufael, 2014; Huang, 2010). Indeed, 
there are various proxies for financial sector development making it a very highly 
multidimensional indicator. In order to capture these, Gries, Kraft and Meierrieks (2009) 
used Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to construct a measure for financial 
development. Huang (2010) and Menyah, Nazlioglu, and Wolde-Rufael (2014) do the same 
to construct a suitable measure for financial sector development.  Principal Component 
Analysis (PCA) is commonly employed to reduce data sets to lower dimensions while 
retaining as much information of the original sets as possible (Kumbhakar and Mavrotas, 
2005; Ang and McKibbin, 2007).  
 
The use of PCA tends to mitigate the adverse effects of the multidimensional nature of 
financial sector development measures and proxies. These different measures usually have 
close interrelations between them resulting in higher correlations among them. These can 
cause or lead to some redundancy of information and may result in incidences of 
multicollinearity, which can lead to misleading inferences and conclusions (Huang, 2010; 
Menyah, Nazlioglu, and Wolde-Rufael, 2014). Huang (2010) and Gries, Kraft and 
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Meierrieks (2009) use PCA to construct an aggregate measure of financial development. 
Focusing on data from financial intermediary development, they construct a measure that is 
based on three widely used indicators of financial intermediary development.  
 
In this thesis, the measure constructed is based on four widely used indicators of financial 
development (Menyah, Nazlioglu, and Wolde-Rufael, 2014). These are liquid liabilities 
calculated as the liquid liabilities of banks; and non-bank financial intermediaries (currency 
plus demand and interest-bearing liabilities) as a ratio of GDP. Liquid liabilities are also 
known as broad money, or M3. They are the sum of currency and deposits in the central 
bank (M0), plus transferable deposits and electronic currency (M1), plus time and savings 
deposits, foreign currency transferable deposits, certificates of deposit, and securities 
repurchase agreements (M2), plus travellers’ cheques, foreign currency time deposits, 
commercial paper, and shares of mutual funds or market funds held by residents. It measures 
the size, relative to the economy, of financial intermediaries including three types of 
financial institutions: the central bank, deposit money banks, and other financial institutions.  
 
The second is private credit defined as the credit issued to the private sector by banks and 
other financial intermediaries divided by GDP, excluding the credit issued to government, 
government agencies, and public enterprises, as well as the credit issued by the monetary 
authority and development banks. This captures general financial intermediary activities 
provided to the private sector. Private credit by deposit money banks and other financial 
institutions to GDP is a common measure of financial development and is an indicator of 
financial depth and access. 
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The third is Commercial-Central Bank, which measures the ratio of commercial bank assets 
over the sum of commercial bank and central bank assets. It can be defined as deposit money 
bank assets to deposit money bank assets and central bank assets (%).  It is the total assets 
held by deposit money banks as a share of sum of the deposit money bank and Central Bank 
claims on the domestic non-financial real sector. Assets include claims on the domestic real 
non-financial sector, which includes central, state and local governments, non-financial 
public enterprises and the private sector. Deposit money banks comprise commercial banks 
and other financial institutions that accept transferable deposits, such as demand deposits.  
It proxies the advantages of financial intermediaries in channelling savings to investment, 
monitoring firms, exerting corporate governance, and undertaking risk management relative 
to the central bank.  
 
The fourth, which is applied in Menyah, Nazlioglu, and Wolde-Rufael (2014), is M2 to 
GDP. Broad money is the sum of currency outside banks; demand deposits other than those 
of the central government; the time, savings, and foreign currency deposits of resident 
sectors other than the central government; bank and traveller’s cheques; and other securities 
such as certificates of deposit and commercial paper. All the indicators for financial 
development are weighted averages.  
 
The first principal component is adopted for the measure of financial sector development 
(FD)16. The data for these indicators was obtained from the World Bank, Global Financial 
Development Database (2016). As already stated, the banking sector dominates the financial 
sector in SSA and hence these indicators are expected to sufficiently reflect the 
                                                 
16 Based on the eigenvalues, the first principal component was broad money. Broad money dominated the first 
component which exhibited 99.7% of the initial variance.  The first component thus possessed 99.7% of fitting 
characteristics and provided a significant amount of information on financial development. The Kaiser-Meyer-
Olk (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy was 1.000 for each variable and 1.000 for the complete model.   
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developments and characteristics of the financial sector of SSA countries. This constructed 
index is termed FD and is expected to have a positive relationship with GDPPC.   
 
 Institutional Quality Measures 
Property Rights Institutions are legal frameworks aimed at reducing the consequence of 
asymmetric information (adverse selection and moral hazard) and asymmetric bargaining 
power with respect to minority versus majority controlling shareholders, monopoly versus 
consumers (Fernandez and Tamayo, 2015). The aggregate measure for Law and Order from 
the 2017 version of the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) is used to measure the 
strength of property rights institutions. Although the law and order indicator is a single 
component, its two elements are assessed separately, with each element being scored from 
zero to six points with six being the best score. To assess the “Law” element, the strength 
and impartiality of the legal system are considered, while the “Order” element is an 
assessment of popular observance of the law.   
 
Regulatory Institutions are those that regulate the conduct in goods, services, labour, assets, 
and financial markets (WGI, 2018).  The institutional strength and quality of the 
bureaucracy is another shock absorber that tends to minimize revisions of policy when 
governments change. Therefore, high points are given to countries where the bureaucracy 
has the strength and expertise to govern without drastic changes in policy or interruptions 
in government services. In these low-risk countries, the bureaucracy tends to be somewhat 
autonomous from political pressure and to have an established mechanism for recruitment 
and training. Countries that lack the cushioning effect of a strong bureaucracy receive low 
points because a change in government tends to be traumatic in terms of policy formulation 
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and day-to-day administrative functions. Sourced from the ICRG, it is measured between 0 
and 4 and is weighted.  
 
Institutions for Macroeconomic Stabilisation are the fiscal and monetary institutions that 
perform stabilizing functions; monetary policy through the resulting level and predictability 
of inflation; and fiscal policy through the reduction of public deficit (Rodrik, 2000; 
Fernandez and Tamayo, 2015). It is measured by the budget balance as a percentage of 
GDP. The estimated central government budget balance (including grants) for a given year 
in the national currency is expressed as a percentage of the estimated GDP for that year in 
the national currency. The risk points are then assigned as 10 from 4% plus to 0 when the 
balance as a percentage of GDP is -30 and below. It is sourced from the ICGR (2017) and 
is calculated as a weighted average 
 
Institutions for Social Insurance are defined as comprising of programs that reduce the 
adverse effect and impact of economic shocks on individuals and families (Rodrik, 2000; 
World Bank, 2016). Social insurance programs are as a result of institutions set up to 
establish and coordinate publicly provided or mandated insurance schemes against old age, 
disability, death of the main household provider, maternity leave and sickness cash benefits, 
and social-health insurance. Beneficiaries of these benefits and services are those who have 
usually made contributions to an insurance scheme since these programs are contributory.  
 
The Atlas of Social Protection - Indicators of Resilience and Equity (ASPIRE): performance 
indicators from the World Bank’s data base will provide the indicators for this measure. The 
research adopts the public spending on all social assistance programs (PSOSAP) as the most 
appropriate measure or indicator of the extent and strength of institutions for social 
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insurance. Here it is not just the social insurance indicators that are being examined but an 
extension is made to include all social assistance programs (SIAP), which includes social 
insurance (World Bank, 2016). In view of the fact that all social assistance programs were 
included, it was more appropriate to create a dummy variable to represent social insurance 
such that, during the period under review, if any of these economies undertook any such 
program, it was represented by 1 and zero otherwise.   
 
Institutions for Conflict Management are those that reduce social conflict, which is harmful 
since it leads to misallocation of resources by diverting resources from economically 
productive activities and breeding uncertainty, which ends up discouraging productive 
activities. Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism, which is assigned values 
between 0 (weak) to 4 (strong) is an assessment of political violence in the country and its 
actual or potential impact on governance.  
 
The highest rating is given to those countries where there is no armed or civil opposition to 
the government and the government does not indulge in arbitrary violence, direct or indirect, 
against its own people. The lowest rating is given to a country embroiled in an on-going 
civil war. The risk rating assigned is the sum of three subcomponents, each with a maximum 
score of four points and a minimum score of 0 points. A score of 4 points equates to very 
low risk and a score of 0 points to very high risk. It is sourced from the ICRG (2017). 
 
As democracy is deemed the base institution upon which these five institutions propel high-
quality growth, democracy is included as one of the institutional quality variables asserted 
by Rodrik to induce high quality growth. To measure the quality of democracy in these 
countries, data on Democratic accountability, which is a measure of democracy and civil 
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liberty valued between 0 (weak) to 6 (strong) is used. This is a measure of how responsive 
government is to its people on the basis that the less responsive it is, the more likely it is 
that the government will fall, peacefully in a democratic society, but possibly violently in a 
non-democratic one.  
 
 The points in this component are awarded on the basis of the type of governance enjoyed 
by the country in question. The highest number of risk points (lowest risk) is assigned to 
Alternating Democracies, while the lowest number of risk points (highest risk) is assigned 
to Autarchies.  To obtain the measure of institutional quality (INS), all six measures are 
rescaled and added to establish uniformity in the index created. Table 4.1 provides a 
summary of all the variables discussed and used in the econometric estimations.  
 




GDPPC Per Capita GDP WDI (2017) 
Gross domestic product 
divided by midyear 
population 
FD Financial Development WDI/AUTHOR 
This is the created measure 
of financial development 
obtained from PCA   
INS Institutional Quality 
ICRG (2017) 
This is created measure of 
institutional quality obtained 
by adding all five 
institutional quality 




Linked Efficiency Gain 
AUTHOR 
The interaction between the 
constructed index of 
institutional quality and the 
financial development index 
    
CKPP Capital Stock PWT 9.0 
The relative price of the 
capital stock is built up from 
investment data by asset 
Note: Summary of indicators used in analysis of data. All variables were logged  
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4.3 Empirical Methodology 
With the goal of exploring and establishing country specific relationships and associations 
between variables being tested, time series estimations are conducted. It is important to note 
that panel and time series unit root and stationarity tests with and without structural breaks 
were conducted to determine the suitability of cointegration among variables (in the case of 
panel estimations) and for each country (in the case of time series estimations). In 
establishing cointegration, the adjustment coefficients as well as cointegration coefficients 
were determined to establish both long-run and short-run causality, whilst long-run 
elasticities were determined. Finally, these elasticities and structural breaks were used to 
estimate production functions to determine the contribution of IQLEG to the growth process 
in all specifications of the production function under study in this thesis. Having 
decomposed the TFP into NFP and IQLEG, the estimation techniques are discussed below.   
 
4.3.1 Production Functions 
Upon establishing significant long-run associations among the variables under study, 
production functions are estimated to ascertain the contribution of IQLEG to productivity 
and productivity growth. The levels of NFP and TFP are determined and used to calculate 
the contribution of IQLEG in the Cobb-Douglas production function as well as the CES and 
VES functions. These estimations are conducted at both the time series and panel levels 
when there are no structural breaks and after structural breaks are incorporated.  
 
To justify the main assertion being made in this research, the contribution of IQLEG to 
productivity and hence growth should be greater than zero. An efficiency calculation of zero 
for IQLEG would imply that TFP is equal to NFP, which would implicitly mean that 
financial development and institutional quality do not have any effect on productivity. In 
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the same manner, a negative IQLEG efficiency will indicate a harmful effect of IQLEG on 
productivity. Based on the extension of the theoretical Cobb-Douglas, CES and VES 
production functions derived in Chapter Two, Section 2.7, where, TFP is decomposed to 
have both NFP and IQLEG. The corresponding empirical equations are (2.11), (2.18) and 
(2.23) for the Cobb-Douglas, CES and VES production functions, respectively. The 
efficiency level estimation techniques are highlighted in Chapter Two, Section 2.8. The next 
section presents a discussion of the econometric tools applied in the thesis to estimate the 
extended production functions.  
 
4.3.2 Test for Cross-sectional Dependence 
It is commonly assumed that disturbances in panel data models are cross-sectionally 
independent, especially when the cross-section dimension (𝑁) is large. There is, however, 
considerable evidence that cross-sectional dependence is often present in panel regression 
settings. Ignoring cross-sectional dependence in estimation can have serious consequences, 
with unaccounted for residual dependence resulting in estimator efficiency loss and invalid 
test statistics. The cross-section test used for the study were Breusch-Pagan (1980) LM, 
Pesaran (2004) scaled LM, Baltagi, Feng, and Kao (2012) bias-corrected scaled LM and 
Pesaran (2004) CD. 17The general null hypothesis of no cross-section dependence may be 
stated in terms of the correlations (𝜌𝑖𝑗) between the disturbances in different cross-section 
units: 𝐻0: 𝜌𝑖𝑗 = 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝜇𝑖𝑡, 𝜇𝑗𝑡) = 0              (4.1) 
 
 
                                                 
17 For a complete and thorough discussion of the cross-sectional dependency tests in this thesis, refer to 
Breusch and Pagan (1980), Pesaran (2004) and Baltagi, Feng, and Kao (2012)  
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 Breusch-Pagan LM 
The most well-known cross-section dependence diagnostic is the Breusch-Pagan (1980) 
Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test statistic. In a seemingly unrelated regressions context, 
Breusch and Pagan show that, under the null hypothesis in Equation (4.1), a LM statistic for 







𝐼=1   (4.2)  
where the ?̂?𝑖𝑗 are the correlation coefficients obtained from the residuals of the model as 
described above. The asymptotic 𝑋2 distribution is obtained for N fixed as  𝑇𝑖𝑗 → ∞ for all 
(i , j ), and follows from a normality assumption on the errors.  
 
Pesaran Scaled LM 
It is well known that the standard Breusch-Pagan LM test statistic is not appropriate for 
testing in large N settings. To address this shortcoming, Pesaran (2004) proposes a 







1) →  𝑁(0 , 1)                                                                                     (4.3) 
which is asymptotically standard normal as first 𝑇𝑖𝑗 → ∞ and then  𝑁 → ∞. Pesaran notes 
one shortcoming of the scaled LM, which is that 𝐸(𝑇𝑖𝑗?̂?𝑖𝑗
2 − 1)  is not centered at zero for 
finite, so that the statistic is likely to exhibit size distortion for small 𝑇𝑖𝑗, and that the 
distortion will worsen for larger N. 
 
Pesaran CD  
To address the size distortion of LM and  𝐿𝑀𝑆 , Pesaran (2004) proposes an alternative 
statistic based on the average of the pairwise correlation coefficients ?̂?𝑖𝑗:  




2 − 1) →𝑁𝑗=𝑖+1
𝑁−1
𝐼=1  𝑁(0 , 1)                             (4.4) 
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which is asymptotically standard normal for 𝑇𝑖𝑗 → ∞  and 𝑁 → ∞ in any order. 𝑘  is the 
number of regressors. Further, Pesaran points out that, for a wide array of panel data models, 
the mean of CD is exactly equal to zero for all  𝑇𝑖𝑗 > 𝑘 + 1   and all N, so that the CD test 
is likely to have good properties for both N and  𝑇𝑖𝑗 small, and he provides Monte Carlo 
evidence to support this claim 
 
Bias Corrected Scaled LM Test 
Due to incorrect centering with large 𝑁 in the Pesaran CD and Breush Pagan tests, Batalgi, 
Fenn and Kao design a test and derive the asymptotic distribution of the 𝐿𝑀 statistic under 
the null as  (𝑁, 𝑇) → ∞ . The proposed bias corrected 𝐿𝑀 test is  
𝐿𝑀𝐵𝐶 = 𝐿𝑀𝐵𝐶 − 
𝑁
2(𝑇−1)










 𝑁(0 , 1)                                                                                                                    (4.5) 
 
Given that cross-sectional dependency exists in the data, it is important that estimators and 
tests applied in this research accommodate and mitigate the potential unwanted effects of 
CSD. The tests and estimators applied therefore have such advantages built into them. With 
respect to the nonlinear least square regression estimations, the Driscoll and Kraay 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) robust standard errors are applied 
to counter the effects of CSD (Hoechle, 2007).  
 
The Driscoll and Kraay (1998), extend the work of Newey and West (1987) by building 
standard errors that are heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC). This 
means that the standard errors are robust against autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity in 
the data. In addition, the Driscoll and Kraay robust standard errors are able to address cross-
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sectional dependency in panel data (Hoechle, 2007; Vogelsang, 2011; Bilgili et al., 2017).  
Driscoll and Kraay (1998) multiply the residuals by the independent variables use, strike 
their averages, the use the averaged values in a weighted HAC estimator to obtain standard 
errors. These standard errors have proven to be robust to cross sectional dependence for 
both linear and non-linear models (Hoechle, 2007). These standard errors by Driscoll and 
Kraay are preferable to other robust standard errors such as Huber White standard errors or 
Newey West standard errors.  
 
4.3.3 Time Series Unit Root Tests without Structural Breaks 
Theoretically, for cointegration to be applied in any analysis, it is required that all the 
variables in the cointegrating models be integrated of order one.  To confirm these integral 
properties of gross domestic product per capita, financial development, institutional quality 
and capital stock gain across all 21 countries, both panel and time series unit root and 
stationarity tests were employed to ascertain the stationary properties of the variables under 
investigation. The first set of unit root tests were conducted without any structural breaks. 
The power of the unit root and cointegration tests improves in a panel compared to time 
series and cross-sectional data (Narayan and Smyth, 2008; Christopoulos and Tsionas, 
2004). The unit root tests applied in this study are thus performed at both the panel and 
individual level. In testing for the unit root each variable per country, times series unit root 
used were Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and the Phillips-Perron (PP) tests18.  
 
  
                                                 
18 See Said and Dickey (1984) and Philips and Perron (1988) for details of the ADF and PP unit root tests, 
respectively. 
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 The Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) Test 
The standard DF test is estimated by expressing the time series variable in an 𝐴𝑅(1) as 
shown below:  
𝑦𝑡 = 𝜌𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝑥𝑡
′ 𝛿 + 𝜖𝑡,           (4.6) 
where 𝑥𝑡, are optional exogenous regressors, which may consist of constant, or a constant 
and trend, ρ and δ are parameters to be estimated, and the ∈𝑡 are assumed to be white noise. 
Then after subtracting 𝑦𝑡−1 from both sides of the equation, the equation becomes:  
   ∆𝑦𝑡 = 𝛼𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝑥𝑡
′ 𝛿 + 𝜖𝑡                                  (4.7) 
where 𝛼 =  𝜌 − 1. The null and alternative hypotheses may be written as, 𝐻0: 𝛼 =
 0  and  𝐻1: 𝛼 <  0. Using the conventional t-statistic, the test statistic for α:  
𝑡𝛼 = ?̂? (𝑠𝑒(?̂?⁄ )) (4.8)  
where 𝛼 ̂is the estimate of α, and se (?̂?) is the coefficient standard error. where 𝛼 =  𝜌 − 1. 
where ?̂?is the estimate of α, and se (?̂?) is the coefficient standard error. Dickey and Fuller 
(1979) show that, under the null hypothesis of a unit root, the critical value is generated by 
MacKinnon (1991, 1996).  However, if the series is not an AR (1) model and correlated at 
its lags then the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test is preferred. The ADF correct the 
correlations of the series with its lags by adding p lagged difference terms of the variable 𝑦 
to the right-hand side of the test regression: 
∆𝑦𝑡 = 𝛼𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝑥𝑡
′𝛿 + 𝛽1∆𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝛽2∆𝑦𝑡−2 +⋯+ 𝛽𝑝∆𝑦𝑡−𝑝 + 𝑣𝑡                   (4.9) 
  
The Phillips-Perron (PP) Test 
Phillips-Perron (PP) unit root test is a unit roots test that control series with higher 
correlation when testing for a unit root. The PP test is based on the statistic: 
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                      (4.10) 
where ?̂? is the estimate, and  𝑡𝛼 the t-ratio of α,  𝑠𝑒(?̂?) is coefficient standard error, and δ 
is the standard error of the test regression. In addition, 𝛾0 is a consistent estimate of the error 
variance calculated as (𝑇 − 𝑘)𝑠2 𝑇⁄ , where k is the number of regressors. The remaining 
term, ƒ0, is an estimator of the residual spectrum at frequency zero.   
 
4.3.4 Time Series Unit Root Tests with Structural Breaks 
 
The Im, Lee and Tieslau Unit Root Test with Structural Breaks 
The unit root test involving structural breaks adopted for this research is the LM unit root 
test by Im, Lee and Tieslau (2010) tests with both trend and level shifts (ILT, 2010) 
henceforth. They suggest an LM-based unit root test for panel data that allows for breaks in 
both the level and trend of the series under investigation. This LM unit root test is based on 
the univariate LM unit root test.  The major advantages in adopting the ILT 2010 tests are 
that, firstly, the set-back from nuisance parameters are avoided as the asymptotic 
distribution of Lagrange Multiplier test as it is an extension of the test proposed by Amsler 
and Lee (1995) who showed that, due to the invariance property of LM, tests do not depend 
on the size or location of any level shifts and, thus, are free of nuisance parameters even 
when a finite number of dummy variables for level shifts are included in the LM unit root 
testing regression. As such, unlike the Dickey Fuller based unit root tests, it is unnecessary 
to simulate critical values for the test at all possible break-point locations (ILT, 2010).   
 
Secondly, this test is above the ILT (2005) test because, apart from levels, it provides for 
breaks in trends. Thirdly, there is invalidity of the LM test when there are breaks in the trend 
for both level and regime shifts.  They therefore adopt a simple transformation approach 
with relevant asymptotic results in order to obtain a modified test statistic whose asymptotic 
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distribution depends on neither the size nor the location of trend-shifts. They adopted a 
univariate LM-type unit root test that depends only on the number of breaks, not the size or 
location. Thus, although the ILT tests are valid for level shifts, their transformed panel LM 
unit root test offers the distinct advantage of being invariant to nuisance parameters.    
Fourthly, a key feature of ILT (2010) statistics is that, since test statistics do not depend on 
the location of breaks, there is no need for mean and variance values for different locations 
of breaks. Finally, to control for cross-correlations, ILT (2010) adopt the method suggested 
by Choi (2006) who generalized the de-meaning procedure and proposed a two-way error 
components model as a means of controlling for cross-correlations in the panel, although it 
might be too restrictive for the case of heterogeneous panels. In conducting the test, the 
dataset is first logged.  
 
Additionally, the need to use ILT (2010) is that it makes use of properties from tests such 
as Amsler and Lee (1995) and Schmidt and Philips (1992), which are commonly suited for 
unit root tests involving structural breaks. The unit root test results allow us to decide if 
some countries need to be dropped in the time series tests as theoretically, cointegration 
cannot be used if some countries have series that are not integrated of some order. The LM 
unit root test statistic is defined by: 
?̃? = 𝑡 − 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑛𝑢𝑙𝑙 ℎ𝑦𝑝𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑠 𝜙 = 0                    (4.11) 
To correct from serially correlated and heterogeneously distributed innovations, we include 
the terms ∆?̃?𝑡−𝑗, 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑘 to correct for serial correlation in the usual augmented type 
tests: 
∆𝑦𝑡 = 𝛿𝑖
′∆𝑍𝑡 +  𝜙?̃?𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝑑𝑗
𝑘
𝑗=1  ∆?̃? 𝑡−𝑗 + 𝑒𝑖,   𝑖 = 1,…𝑁                                 (4.12) 






𝑖=1                                                                                                        (4.13) 
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Note that 𝑉𝑖(𝑟) is defined as the weak limit of partial sum residual process ?̃?𝑡  in the model. 
 
The Lee and Strazicich Unit Root Test with a Level Break 
The Lee and Strazicich (2004) unit root test is applied in this research. The data generating 
process (DGP) based on the unobserved components model is given by:  
  𝑦𝑡 = 𝛿
′𝑍𝑡 + 𝑋𝑡 ,      𝑋𝑡 = 𝛽𝑋𝑡−1 + 𝑡                                                                   (4.14) 
where 𝑍𝑡 contains exogenous variables, 𝑋𝑡 is the variable of interest (𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐶,
𝑙𝑛𝐼𝑁𝑆, 𝑙𝑛𝐹𝐷 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑙𝑛𝐶𝐾𝑃𝑃) . The unit root null hypothesis is described by 𝛽 = 1. If 𝑍𝑡 =
[1, 𝑡]′, then the DGP is the same as that shown in the no break LM unit root test of Schmidt 
and Phillips (SP, 1992).  
 
The unit root null hypothesis is described by ∅= 0 and the LM t-test statistic is given by: 
 ?̃?= t-statistic testing the null hypothesis ∅= 0.                                       
To correct for autocorrelated errors, augmented terms ∆?̃?𝑡−𝑗 , 𝑗 = 1,… , 𝑘 are included as in 
the standard ADF test. Ng and Perron (1995) suggest utilizing a general to specific 
procedure to determine the optimal number of 𝑘 augmented terms. The location of the break 
(TB) is determined by searching all possible break points for the minimum (i.e., the most 
negative) unit root test t-test statistic as follows: 
𝐼𝑛𝑓 ?̃?(?̃?) =  𝐼𝑛𝑓𝜆?̃?(𝜆),   where 𝜆 = 𝑇𝐵 𝑇⁄                                                          (4.15) 
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4.3.5 Panel Unit Root Tests without Structural Breaks 
The panel test combines all 21 cross-sections over the thirty-one-year period in order to take 
advantage of increased power for the test.  These include commonly used Levin, Lin and 
Chu (LLC) t* (2002) test, Im, Pesaran and Shin (IPS) W-stat (2003) test, ADF - Fisher Chi-
square (1999) test, Philips Peron (PP) - Fisher Chi-square (1987) test and the Breitung t-
Test (2000). While the LLC (2002) and Breitung (2000) tests have a null of unit root and 
assume common unit root processes, the IPS (2003), ADF (1999) and PP (1999) tests have 
a null of unit root and assume individual unit root processes. The tests are run for each 
variable across all 21 countries.  The LLC (2002) test, although designed to address the 
issue of cross-sectional dependence and heteroscedasticity, has the limitation of being 
restrictive in its hypothesis: a limitation that the IPS (2003) test claims to have improved 
upon by being viewed as a more generalized test and is argued to be a more powerful test 
than the LLC (2000) test.  
 
Although both the IPS (2003) test and the LLC (2000) test have identical null hypotheses, 
each has its own alternative hypothesis. The LLC (2000) tests are based on pooled 
regressions, which are based on homogeneity of the autoregressive parameter (although 
there is heterogeneity in the error variances and the serial correlation structure of the errors). 
Data is not pooled in the IPS (2003) test, which is an asymptotic test, and is a combination 
of different independent tests rather based on heterogeneity of the autoregressive parameter. 
Unlike the Fisher tests, the IPS (2003) tests are non-parametric. Both the Fisher (1999) and 
IPS (2003) tests aim at combining the significance of different independent tests.  
 
According to Maddala and Wu (1999), the distribution of the t-bar statistic involves the 
mean and variance of the t-statistics used. IPS (2003) computes this for the ADF (1999) test 
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statistic for different values of the number of lags used and different sample sizes. However, 
these tables are valid only if the ADF (1999) test is used for the unit root tests. If the length 
of the time series for the different samples is different, there is a problem using the tables 
prepared by IPS (2003). The Fisher test, which is the exact test, does not have any such 
limitations. It can be used with any unit root test; and even if the ADF (1999) test is used, 
the choice of the lag length for each sample can be separately determined.  
 
In addition, there is no restriction of the sample sizes for different samples (they can vary 
according to availability of the data). The asymptotic validity of the tests depends on 
different conditions. Whilst the IPS (2003) test’s asymptotic results depend on N going to 
infinity, the Fisher (1999) test’s asymptotic results depend on T going to infinity. It is 
important to note that the Fisher (1999) test is based on combining the significance levels 
of the different tests, and the IPS (2003) test is based on combining the test statistics. Which 
is better is the question. Both the Fisher (1999) test and IPS (2003) test are based on 
combining independent tests.  
 
The Breitung (2000) test considers a panel version of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) 
unit root test that restrict α to be identical across cross-sectional units, but allows the lag 
order for the first difference terms to vary across cross-sectional units. Given the model  




it i it it it j it i it
j
y y y x

    

       where, 1      
The null hypothesis of unit roots then becomes 0 : 0H    and the alternative, 1 : 1H    
The panel unit root test for the null hypothesis proposed by Breitung (2000) is to reject the 
null for the small values of the following statistic  
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                                                  (4.17) 
The subscript 𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑁 = 𝑛 indexes the 21 countries while 𝑡 = 1, . . . , 𝑇 indexes the 31 
years period (1985 to 2015) and 𝑦 is the variable of interest (𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐶,
𝑙𝑛𝐼𝑁𝑆, 𝑙𝑛𝐹𝐷 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑙𝑛𝐶𝐾𝑃𝑃). The difference between the Levin, Lin, and Chu (2002) test 
and the Breitung (2000) test is that the former requires bias correction factors to correct for 
cross-sectionally heterogeneous variances to allow for efficient pooled OLS estimation, 
while the latter achieves the same result by appropriate variable transformations. 
 
One of the drawbacks of the Breitung (2000) and Levin, Lin, and Chu (2002) test is that it 
is restricted to be identical across countries under both the null and alternative hypotheses. 
The t-bar test proposed by Im, Pesaran, and Shin (2003) has the advantage over the Breitung 
(2000) test in that it does not assume that all countries converge towards the equilibrium 
value at the same speed under the alternative hypothesis and thus is less restrictive. There 
are two stages in constructing the 𝑡 − 𝑏𝑎𝑟 test statistic. First, calculate the average of the 
individual ADF t-statistics for each of the countries in the sample. Second, calculate the 
















                                                                       (4.18) 
Where ˆiT  is the OLS estimator of  i  and  
1
T T T T TM I    












which is the standard deviation of the error term  
 
The subscript 𝑖 = 1, . . . , 𝑁 indexes the 21 countries while 𝑡 = 1, . . . , 𝑇 indexes the 31 years 
period (1985 to 2015). A potential problem with the 𝑡 − 𝑏𝑎𝑟 test is that when there is cross-
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sectional dependence in the disturbances, the test is no longer applicable. However, Im, 
Pesaran and Shin (2003) suggest that, in the presence of cross-sectional dependence, the 
data can be adjusted by demeaning and that the standardized demeaned 𝑡 − 𝑏𝑎𝑟 statistic 
converges to the standard normal in the limit. Luintel (2001) suggests that the demeaning 
procedure dramatically reduces cross-sectional dependence, even when the observed data 
are highly correlated.  
 
4.3.6 Panel Stationarity Test with Structural Breaks 
Both unit root and stationarity tests have the sole aim of establishing whether a series is 
stationary or not. The reversal of the null and alternative hypothesis allows all possible 
scenarios to be considered. Hence, stationarity test versions of unit root tests with structural 
breaks are conducted. These are the Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt and Shin (KPSS) 
(1992) panel stationarity test by Hadri (2000) extended by Carrion-i-Silvestre, del Barrio-
Castro and López-Bazo (2005b) with two level breaks in the trend function. Indeed, it is 
argued that, in the testing of economic problems, the null of stationarity proves to be more 
natural than the null of a unit root. Hence, as is typical, there has to be strong evidence 
against trend stationarity to conclude in favour of the non-stationarity of the panel (Bai and 
Ng, 2004; Carrion-i-Silvestre, Barrio-Castro and Lopez-Bazo, 2005). 
 
The Carrion-i-Silvestre, Barrio-Castro and Lopez-Bazo (2005) test is designed as a 
stationarity test that takes multiple structural breaks into account. The test, which is based 
on the univariate KPSS test developed by Hadri (2000), is a generalization of existing  
proposals in the field of stationarity testing in the presence of structural breaks. However, 
the KPSS test has a limiting distribution that is affected by the presence of structural breaks. 
The Carrion-i-Silvestre, Barrio-Castro and Lopez-Bazo (2005) approach, in its generality, 
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allows for the structural changes to shift the mean and/or the trend of the individual time 
series. Another advantage of this test is the fact that each individual in the panel can have a 
different number of breaks located at different dates. These truly allow testing individual 
effects in the panel. 
 
In this test, the option of two-level breaks in the trend function is chosen. Carrion-i-
Silvestre, Barrio-Castro and Lopez-Bazo (2005) allows each time series to have different 
numbers of breaks located at different dates. Where the estimate of the dates of the breaks 
computed from: 
.1 .
.1 . .1 .,...,
( ,..., ) arg min ( ,..., )i i
i ib b mi
i i i i
b b m b b mT T
T T SSR T T                           (4.19) 
Given the null hypothesis of stationarity, the test statistic for the testing for the stationarity 
with the estimated break is defined as 




















   represent the individual means and variances of 
the long-run residual respectfully. ( )Z   has a standard normal distribution.  
 
4.3.7 Time Series Cointegration Tests without Structural Breaks 
The Johansen Cointegration Test 
VAR-based cointegration tests using the methodology developed in Johansen (1991, 1995) 
performed using a Group object or an estimated VAR object. Consider a VAR of order p: 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝐴1𝑦𝑡−1 +⋯+ 𝐴𝑝𝑦𝑡−𝑝 + 𝐵𝑥𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡                (4.21) 
where 𝑦𝑡 is a k‑vector of non-stationary I (1) variables (𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐶,
𝑙𝑛𝐼𝑁𝑆, 𝑙𝑛𝐹𝐷 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑙𝑛𝐶𝐾𝑃𝑃),  𝑥𝑡 is a d-vector of deterministic variables, and 𝜖𝑡 is a vector 
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of innovations. We may rewrite this VAR as, 
∆𝑦𝑡 = П𝑦𝑡−1 + ∑ Г𝑖∆𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝐵𝑥𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡
𝑝−1
𝑡=1                 (4.22) 
where: 
 П = ∑ 𝐴𝑖 − 𝐼,
𝑝
𝑖=1  Г𝑖 = −∑ 𝐴𝑗
𝑝
𝑗=𝑖+1     (4.23) 
Granger’s representation theorem asserts that, if the coefficient matrix П has reduced rank 
< 𝑘 , then there exist 𝑘 x 𝑟 matrices α and β each with rank r such that П = 𝛼𝛽′and 𝛽′𝑦𝑡 is 
I (0). r is the number of cointegrating relations (the cointegrating rank) and each column of 
β is the cointegrating vector. As explained below, the elements of α are known as the 
adjustment parameters in the VEC model. Johansen’s method is to estimate the П matrix 
from an unrestricted VAR and to test whether we can reject the restrictions implied by the 
reduced rank of П. 
 
The Engle-Granger Cointegration Test 
The Engle-Granger (1987) residual-based test for cointegration are simply unit root test 
applied to the residuals obtained from cointegrating equation. The Engle-Granger test uses 
a parametric, augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) regression of the form 
∆?̂?1𝑡 = (𝜌 − 1)𝑢1𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛿𝑗∆𝑢1𝑡−𝑗 + 𝑣𝑡
𝑝
𝑗=1                  (4.24) 
Where, 𝑢 is the residuals obtained from the cointegrating equation. The number of lagged 
differences p should increase to infinity with the (zero-lag) sample size T but at a rate slower 
than 𝑇1 3⁄ . 
 
The Engle-Granger employed two standard ADF test statistics, one based on the t-statistic 
for testing the null hypothesis of nonstationarity (𝜌 = 1) and the other based directly on the 
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             (4.26) 
where 𝑠𝑒(?̂?) is the usual OLS estimator of the standard error of the estimated ?̂? 
𝑠𝑒(?̂?) = 𝑠𝑣(∑ 𝑢1𝑡−1
2
𝑡 )
−1 2⁄             (4.27) 
 
 
4.3.8 Time Series Cointegration Tests with Structural Breaks  
Gregory and Hansen Cointegration Test with One Structural Break 
To test the null hypothesis of no cointegration Gregory and Hansen (1996) used standard 
methods that are residual based with a candidate cointegration relation that is estimated by 
Ordinary Least Squares. Adopting a more realistic approach of unknown break points, 
Gregory and Hansen (1996) used ADF t-Test and Phillips test. The Phillips test statistics 
can be defined as: 
       *ˆ( ) ( 1)rZ n                                                                    (4.28) 




















                       (4.29)  
Where 
*ˆ
r , is given 


























                                                       (4.30) 
The Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) statistic is calculated by regressing the residuals (
t̂e  upon 1t̂e  , and 1t̂e  ,…, t̂ Ke  ) for some suitably chosen lag truncation K . The ADF 
statistic is the t-statistic for the regressor  1t̂e  , is denoted as; 
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        1ˆ( ) ( )tADF tstat e                                                               (4.31) 
These test statistics are now standard tools for the analysis of cointegrating regressions 
without regime shifts. The statistics of interest, however, are the smallest values of the above 
statistics, across all values of T  . The smallest values are examined since small values of 
the test statistics constitute evidence against the null hypothesis. These test statistics 
are (𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐶, 𝑙𝑛𝐼𝑁𝑆, 𝑙𝑛𝐹𝐷 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑙𝑛𝐶𝐾𝑃𝑃) 






             (4.32)  






                                                    (4.33) 






                                                  (4.34) 
 
Hatemi-J Cointegration with Two Structural Breaks 
In estimating for structural breaks in intercept and the slope coefficients, Hatemi-J (2008) 
for two structural breaks was adopted. To test the null hypothesis of no cointegration, the 
modified ADF test extended from Gregory and Hansen (1996) is calculated by the 
corresponding t-test for the slope of  1tu    in a regression of tu  on 1tu  , 1tu  , . . . , t ku 
, where tu  signifies the estimated error term. The 𝑍𝑎 and 𝑍𝑡   (both modified) test statistics 
are based on the calculation of the bias-corrected first-order serial correlation coefficient 
























.                                                                  (4.35) 
where w(·) is a function providing kernel weights meeting the standard conditions for 
spectral density estimators, B (itself a function of n) is the bandwidth number satisfying the 
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conditions B  and 5/ (1)B n O , and ˆ( )j  is an autocovariance function. The 
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                                                                    (4.36) 
where ̂  is the OLS estimate of the effect (without intercept) of 1tu   on tu . The  𝑍𝑎 and  
𝑍1 test statistics are defined as 
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 
   is the long-run variance estimate of the residuals 
of a regression of tu  on 1tu  . These three test statistics have nonstandard distributions. It 
should be mentioned that the asymptotic distribution of the ADF test statistic is identical to 
the distribution of the tZ  statistic. The applicable test statistics are the smallest values of 
these three tests across all values for 1  and 2 , with 1 1(0.15,0.70)T   and
2 2 1(0.15 ,0.85)T   . The idea behind choosing the smallest value for each test statistic 
is that the smallest value represents the empirical evidence against the null hypothesis. 





















                                                                                       (4.40) 
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Where (0.15 ,0.85 )T n n . The idea to truncate the data by 15% on each side follows the 
foot-steps of Gregory and Hansen (1996). Based on the same logic, the distance between 
the two regime shifts is allowed to be at least 15%. 
 
4.3.9 Panel Cointegration without Structural Breaks 
Upon establishing the presence of panel unit root in variables, it is important to test whether 
there exists a long-run equilibrium relationship between the variables. Panel cointegration 
techniques are first conducted using the panel cointegration methodology developed by 
Pedroni (1999) and Westerlund (2005)19.  Cointegration refers to a linear combination of 
nonstationary variables implying that their stochastic trends must be linked as a long-run 
equilibrium. Cointegration becomes expedient and necessary when, in econometric 
estimations, two or more series that are integrated of order one have a linear combination, 
which is integrated of order zero. The problem of spurious regression is thus eliminated 
hence establishing the fact that there is a long-run relationship among variables. 
Cointegration between two series implies a particular kind of model, called an error 
correction model, for the short-term dynamics with an adjustment factor for long-run 
disequilibrium situations. 
 
 Pedroni Residual Based Panel Cointegration  
The Pedroni (1999) methodology allows one to test for the presence of long-run equilibria 
in multivariate panels while permitting the dynamic and even the long-run cointegrating 
vectors to be heterogeneous across individual members (Apergis, Filippidis and 
Economidou, 2007).  Pedroni (1999; 2004) derive the asymptotic distributions and explores 
                                                 
19 Results from the Westerlund (2007) cointegration test not indicated in this thesis which is also residual 
based and an extension of the Pedroni (1999) test confirm the Pedroni (1999; 2004) and Westerlund (2005) 
tests. 
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the small sample performances of seven different statistics: the panel v-statistic, panel rho-
statistic, panel PP-statistic (nonparametric), panel ADF-statistic (parametric), group rho-
statistic, group PP-statistic (nonparametric) and group ADF-statistic (parametric).  
 
The Pedroni (1999; 2004) test has the advantage of firstly, allowing the testing of for 
cointegration in heterogenous and multivariate panels unlike previous test. Secondly, the 
test is constructed to remove common time effects before performing the tests. Hence it 
tackles and mitigates the possible adverse effects to cross-sectional dependency. Secondly, 
the Pedroni panel cointegration test is suited for any data set since it contains both 
parametric and non-parametric estimators. The test permits the dynamic and long run 
cointegrating vectors to be heterogenous across individual members of the panel. In effect, 
the test is appropriate for heterogeneous dynamics, endogenous regressors, fixed effects, 
and individual-specific deterministic trends. The Pedroni equations that serve as test 
statistics are as follows: 
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 And where the residuals ?̂?𝑖,𝑡, ?̂?𝑖,𝑡
∗  and ?̂?𝑖,𝑡 are obtained from the regression below: 
?̂?𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛾𝑖?̂?𝑖,𝑡−1+ ?̂?𝑖,𝑡, ?̂?𝑖,𝑡   =  𝛾𝑖?̂?𝑖,𝑡−1+∑ 𝛾𝑖,𝑘∆ ?̂?𝑖,𝑡−𝑘 + ?̂?𝑖,𝑡
∗ ,
𝑘𝑖
𝑘=1   
∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡=∑ ?̂?𝑚𝑖
𝑀
𝑚=1 ∆𝑥𝑚𝑖,𝑡 + ?̂?𝑖,𝑡                                                                           (4.43) 
 
It is important to note that the Pedroni tests investigate whether there is cointegration or not, 
but does not provide an estimate for the long-run. This is done in a second step, where Panel 
FMOLS (Philips and Hansen, 1990) and OLS are estimated to determine elasticities in the 
long-run. For the cointegration result (first step), stationary variables do not play a role, as 
they cannot include the same stochastic trend as I (1) variables, by definition. However, as 
in practice, where the need arises, stationary variables can be considered in the estimation 
of the cointegration elasticities as they assist in obtaining more efficient estimates of the 
long-run parameters.  
 
Westerlund (2005) Panel Cointegration Test 
This residual-based test is based on a model with an AR parameter, which is the same or 
either a panel specific over the panels. All panels have unique slope parameters in this model 
with panel -specific cointegrating vectors. The panel-specific-AR test statistic is used to test 
the null hypothesis of no cointegration against the alternative hypothesis that some panels 
are cointegrated. The same-AR test statistic is used to test the null hypothesis of no 
cointegration against the alternative hypothesis that all the panels are cointegrated.  The VR 
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test statistics test the null hypothesis is no cointegration against an alternative that all panels 
are cointegrated. The panel-specific AR test statistic is given by 




𝑖=1                    (4.44) 
The same-AR test statistic is given by  






𝑖=1       (4.45) 
Where 𝐸𝑖?̂? = ∑ 𝑒𝑖?̂?
𝑡
𝑗=1 , 𝑅?̂? = ∑ 𝑒𝑖𝑡
2̂𝑇
𝑡=1  and 𝑒𝑖?̂? are residuals from the panel-data regression 
model being used. After the relevant standardization, the asymptotic distribution of the 
Westerlund (2005) test statistics converges to the standard normal distribution N(0,1)20. The 
Westerlund (2005) cointegration test allows for an even higher degree of heterogeneity in 
the panel as well as capable of accommodating a large presence of cross-sectional 
dependency. In view of the strong cross-sectional dependency identified in the data, these 
tests are suited to detect any form of cointegration among the variables.  
 
4.3.10 Panel Cointegration with Structural Breaks 
Several tests have been developed that can automatically take into account one or more than 
one structural break. In this study, the Westerlund (2006a) and Banerjee and Carrion-i-
Silvestre (2015) panel cointegration with structural breaks were employed to analyse the 
cointegration with structural breaks in panels. Whilst the Gregory and Hansen (1996) test 
and Hatemi-J (2008) are conducted on a panel, they generate individual country results. The 
Westerlund (2006a) test produces results for the entire panel whilst indicating break dates 
for individual countries. The Banerjee and Carrion-i-Silvestre (2015) test however generates 
results for both the panel and the individual countries.  
                                                 
20 For details and in-depth analyses of cointegration tests, see Westerlund (2005) and Pedroni (1999; 2004) 
  




The set of data used allows the Gregory and Hansen test to shift for the intercept and shift 
for the intercept with trend whilst the Hatemi-J (2008) considers two shifts in both the 
intercept and cointegrating vector. Both the Gregory and Hansen (1996) test and the Hatemi-
J (2008) test help to determine the stability of the dataset and associated models. The 
assumption of time invariance for the cointegration vector is therefore overcome with these 
tests.  
  
Whilst the Westerlund (2006a) cointegration test has no nuisance parameters under its null 
and has small size distortions with reasonable power, it is invariant with respect to the 
number of breaks and location of breakpoints. This invariance renders the test convenient 
as there is no need to compute different critical values for all possible patterns of break 
points. In addition, the Westerlund (2006a) test allows cross-sectional dependence and does 
not impose any common-factor restrictions. The Banerjee and Carrion-i-Silvestre (2015) 
has the advantage of allowing cointegration at both the panel and individual levels with 
structural breaks. It allows users to avoid possible misspecification errors by taking proper 
account of the presence of structural breaks unlike the Pedroni (1999) test, which it is based 
on. Furthermore, the test allows for dependence among cross-sectional units of the panel 
and goes further to carry out a common factor test.  
 
Although the Westerlund (2006a) test addresses the issue of cross-sectional dependence it 
does not build a cross-sectional dependency test that highlights the common factors into the 
test. An important advantage of the Banerjee and Carrion-i-Silvestre (2015) test is that tests 
for cross-sectional dependence are incorporated and factored into cointegration estimations 
where relevant. Furthermore, the test is based on the Pedroni (1999, 2004) cointegration 
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test, which makes it consistent with the panel cointegration test without breaks.  Again, 
whilst the Westerlund (2006a) test allows for multiple structural breaks in the level and 
trend, the Banerjee and Carrion-i- Silvestre (2015) test extends the level and trend breaks 
and accounts for multiple regime shifts as well.   
 
One issue with both the Westerlund (2006a) cointegration test and the Banerjee and Carrion-
i-Silvestre Cointegration test is that they only generate individual country break dates. As 
such, to find a plausible estimate for the entire panel, the modal break estimate (s) from the 
Banerjee and Carrion-i-Silvestre test is adopted. Then a Chow test by Chow (1960) to 
ascertain the presence of a break in those years is conducted (Park, 2011). Given that the 
Chow test provides evidence of breaks in those years, they are incorporated as the estimated 
panel break locations.  
 
The Westerlund Panel LM Test with Multiple Structural Breaks 
The panel LM test of Westerlund (2006a) is used to test for cointegration between the 
variables (Narayan and Smyth, 2008; Narayan, 2010). Given the empirical model as:   
ln 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝑍𝑖𝑡
ˊ 𝜆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼 ln 𝐶𝐾𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝜃 ln 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝜏𝜃 ln 𝐹𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡               (4.46) 
Consider the multidimensional time-series variable yit, which is observable for 𝑖 =
 1, . . . , 𝑁 cross-sectional and 𝑡 =  1, . . . , 𝑇 time-series observations. The data generating 
process (DGP) for 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is given by the following system of equations 
𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝑍𝑖𝑡
ˊ 𝜆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 ln 𝐶𝐾𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝜌𝑖 ln 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝜓𝑖 ln 𝐹𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 
𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡                                                                                                               (4.47) 
𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝑟𝑖𝑡−1 + ∅𝑖𝑢𝑖𝑡                                                                                                         (4.48) 
Where, the index 𝑗 = 1, . . . , 𝑀𝑖 + 1 is used to denote the structural breaks. There can be at 
most Mi such breaks, or 𝑀𝑖 + 1 regimes, that are located at the dates Ti1, . . . ,𝑇𝑖𝑀𝑗 , where 
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𝑇𝑖0 = 1 and 𝑇𝑖𝑀+1 = 𝑇. Furthermore, the initial value of 𝑟𝑖𝑡 is assumed to be zero, which 
entails no loss of generality as long as 𝑍𝑖𝑡 includes an individual-specific intercept. 
 
Westerlund (2006a) determines the break points endogenously using the Bai and Perron 
(2003) technique, which globally minimizes the sum of squared residuals to obtain the 
location of breaks; 
       𝑇?̂? = 𝑎𝑟𝑔 min
𝑇𝑖
∑ ∑ (𝑦𝑖𝑡 − 𝑧𝑖𝑡





𝑗=1                                        (4.49) 
where 𝑇?̂? = (𝑇𝑖1̂, . . . , 𝑇𝑖𝑀𝑖
̂ )′is the vector of estimated break points, 𝛾𝑖𝑗 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛽?̂? are the 
estimates of the cointegration parameters based on the partition 𝑇?̂? = (𝑇𝑖1̂, . . . , 𝑇𝑖𝑀𝑖
̂ )′ and τ is 
a trimming parameter such that 𝜆𝑖𝑗 − 𝜆𝑖𝑗−1 >  𝜏, which imposes a minimum length for each 
subsample at 0.15𝑇. Because the minimization is taken over all possible partitions of 
permissible length, the break-point estimators are said to be global minimizers. The 
minimization of the sum of squared errors is performed iteratively as suggested by Bai and 
Perron (2003) by using the Schwartz Bayesian criterion. The maximum number of 
allowable breaks is set at three. 
 
The null hypothesis that all the countries variables are cointegrated is therefore: 
𝐻0: ∅𝑖 = 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑁,   
Against 
 𝐻1: ∅𝑖 ≠ 0 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑁1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 ∅𝑖 = 0 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖 = 𝑁1 + 1,… ,𝑁 
In words, the hypothesis can be stated as:  
𝐻0: Cointegration that allows for structural breaks in both level and trend of 
panels between FD, IQ and EG in SSA 
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𝐻1: No cointegration that allows for structural breaks in both level and trend of 
panels FD, IQ and EG in SSA 
This formulation of the alternative hypothesis allows ∅𝑖 to differ across the cross-sectional 
units, and is more general than the homogenous alternative hypothesis that ∅𝑖 = ∅ ≠ 0 for 
all i, which is implicit in the testing approach of McCoskey and Kao (1998). The panel LM 
test statistic is defined as follows 
𝑍(𝑀) ≡∑ ∑ ∑ (𝑇𝑖𝑗 − 𝑇𝑖𝑗−1)
−2𝜔𝑖1.2
−2 𝑆𝑖𝑡









The Banerjee and Carrion-i-Silvestre Panel Cointegration with Structural Breaks and 
Cross-sectional Dependency 
 
It is important to consider the fact that political, economic and often social integration 
among countries within a region or sub-region is likely to yield a certain degree of 
interdependency among countries in the SSA region. Acknowledging and investigating the 
possible existence of certain interdependencies as well as controlling such cross-sectional 
dependency helps in avoiding bias in the panel unit root and cointegration tests (Westerlund, 
2007; Pesaran, 2007; Fang and Chang, 2016; Salim, Yao and Chen, 2017). 
 
To determine such cross-sectional dependencies and account for them in subsequent 
models, four tests are applied. The first is the Breusch and Pagan (1980) Lagrange multiplier 
(LM) test. The second is the Pesaran (2004) cross-sectional dependence test. The Pesaran 
(2004) scaled LM test and the Bias-Corrected scaled LM test by Baltagi, Feng and Kao 
(2012) are the third and fourth tests, respectively. Each of these tests has a unique role it 
plays as a test. For example, the Breusch and Pagan (1980) Lagrange multiplier (LM) test 
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is appropriate for a smaller number of cross-sectional units (n) and a long period of time (T) 
whilst the Pesaran CD test is used even when N is large. 
 
Since cross-sectional dependence might be a possibility, in addition to the panel unit root 
tests performed without structural breaks such as the LL, IPS and Breitung, to account for 
both cross-sectional dependence and structural breaks in the panel unit root test, the Carrion-
i-Silvestre, Barrio-Castro and Lopez-Bazo (2005) test, which accounts for both cross-
sectional dependence and multiple structural breaks is conducted to establish the order of 
integration of the variables whilst capturing any occurrences that could have impacted them 
significantly in the region. 
 
The panel statistics, namely the pseudo t-ratio statistic ˆ
ˆ( )
tNT
Z   and normalised bias statistic 
ˆ
ˆ( )NTZ  were given in Banerjee and Carrion-i-Silvestre (2015) as: 
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Where ˆˆ ( )i i   and 
ˆ( )
i i
t   are the estimated coefficient from estimated residuals.  Given an 
unknown break point, the 1
1




Z N t 


   statistic is then computed for each break 
point using the idiosyncratic disturbance terms and estimate the break point as the argument 
that minimizes the sequence of standardized ( )
e
tNT
Z   statistics. Thus, the test statistic that 
is used to test the null hypothesis of non-cointegration for the idiosyncratic disturbance term 
is given by 
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e  is the long-run variance estimate of the residuals. If the moments again 
depend on the specification of the deterministic term, the estimated break date denoted ˆbT
is given by: 





















        (4.53) 
The break date is then used to compute MQ tests for the common factors, which is given as: 
( ) ( ) 1d dc cMQ q T v q   
             (4.54) 
for the case of no change in the trend and  
( , ) ( , ) 1d dc cMQ q T v q               (4.56) 
 for the case of a change in the trend. 𝑞  is the number of common stochastic trends, 
𝜆 representing the change in trend and ( , )dcv q   representing be the smallest eigenvalue.   
 
4.3.11 Error Correction and Long-run Elasticities for Individual Countries 
 Error Correction Term (ECT)  
An error correction (EC) model is a restricted VAR designed for use with nonstationary 
series that are known to be cointegrated. The cointegration term is known as the error 
correction term since the deviation from long-run equilibrium is corrected gradually through 
a series of partial short-run adjustments. Engle-Granger (1987) two-step procedure was used 
to estimate the error correction model and derive the error correction term. The cointegration 
vectors were estimated using OLS and FMOLS estimators for each country that was 
cointegrated. The estimations were conducted firstly without structural breaks and then with 
structural breaks (See Engle and Granger, 1987 for details). 
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4.3.12 Panel Error Correction Model and Long-run Elasticities  
Pooled OLS and Pooled FMOLS  
For both the no structural break and structural break cases, a panel pooled OLS estimation 
and a pooled FMOLS estimation as outlined by Phillips and Moon (1999) were employed. 
The pooled FMOLS is a straightforward extension of the standard Phillips and Hansen 
estimator that produces asymptotically unbiased, normally distributed coefficient estimates. 
Both estimators were estimated with the option of accounting for cross-sectional 
dependence. Given estimates of the average long-run covariances,  ?̂? and ?̂? , the modified 
dependent variable and serial correlation correction terms may be defined as 
?̅?𝑖𝑡
+ = ?̅?𝑖𝑡 − ?̂?12?̂?22
−1?̂?2       (4.57) and 
?̂?12
+ = ?̂?12 − ?̂?12?̂?22
−1?̂?22       (4.58) 
where ?̅?𝑖𝑡  and 𝑋𝑖𝑡  are the corresponding data purged of the individual deterministic trends 
(pooled with heterogenous effect), and ?̂?1.2 is the long-run average variance of  
𝑢1 𝑖𝑡conditional on 𝑢2 𝑖𝑡. In the leading case of individual specific intercepts, 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑦𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖 
and  𝑋𝑖𝑡 = 𝑋𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖 are the demeaned variables. The pooled FMOLS estimator is then given 
by: 









𝑖=1      (4.59) 
It is worth noting the pooled estimator simply sums across cross-sections separately in the 
numerator and denominator. In estimating the pooled FMOLS, Mark and Sul (2003) 
propose a sandwich form of this estimator, which allows for heterogeneous variances: 
?̂?𝐹𝑃 = ?̂?𝐹𝑃
−1 . ?̂?𝐹𝑃  . ?̂?𝐹𝑃












𝑖=1                 (4.61)   
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and the long-run variance estimates ?̂?1.2𝑖 = ?̂?11 𝑖 − ?̂?12𝑖?̂?22𝑖
−1 ?̂?21𝑖 are computed for each 
cross-section. Note that degree-of-freedom corrections may be applied to the ?̂?1.2 and ?̂?1.2𝑖 
for comparability with standard regression standard error of the regression estimators. 
 
Dynamic Fixed Effects 
The dynamic fixed effects (DFE) estimator, like the pooled mean group (PMG) estimator, 
restricts the coefficients of the cointegrating vector to be equal across all panels. The fixed 
effects (FE) model further restricts the speed of adjustment coefficient and the short-run 
coefficients to be equal. Given a model 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛿10𝑖𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿20𝑖𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜆20𝑖𝑦𝑖𝑡−1𝜇𝑖 + 𝑖𝑡              (4.62) 
Where 𝑝, refers to each regressor,  𝑖 refers to the number of countries and 𝑡 refers to time 
(31). The Dynamic Fixed Effect allows panel-specific intercepts. An allowance for 
intragroup correlation in the calculation of standard errors is made with the cluster or entity 
∆𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝜙𝑖(𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝛿10𝑖𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿20𝑖𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑡−1) + 𝛿11𝑖Δ𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿21𝑖Δ𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑖𝑡        (4.63) 
 where 𝜙𝑖is the speed of adjustment and 𝛿10𝑖 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛿20𝑖 represent the long-run coefficient of 
the regressors while 𝛿11𝑖 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛿21𝑖 represent the short-run coefficient of the regressors. The 
Dynamic Fixed Effect model is used to estimate the adjustment factor for the panel. 
 
4.4 Conclusion 
The research is embedded in the framework of the Solow (1956; 1957) neoclassical growth 
model and extends the methodology of You and Sarantis (2013) by decomposing TFP into 
pure technical progress (NFP) and institutional quality linked efficiency gain (IQLEG) in 
depicting how the presence and quality of institutions contribute to an increase in efficiency 
levels and hence to increasing productivity and growth over and above productivity gains 
   
154 
 
from pure technical progress. The rationale for setting the study in the Solow (1956) growth 
framework is that it is the modern reference point of all growth studies (Demetriades and 
Law, 2006; Law and Balach, 2015). The scope of the research is a group of sub-Saharan 
African countries and involves the 21 (out of 49) countries that are listed on the website of 
the World Bank due to data availability.  
 
Within the confines of the Cobb-Douglas specification, individual country and panel 
cointegration techniques and dynamic models that account for cross-sectional dependency 
and multiple structural breaks are used to examine the possible existence of long-run 
relationships. Alternative production specifications in the form of the CES and VES are also 
employed in the presence of structural breaks in non-linear least square estimations to 
provide robustness and complement the use of the Cobb-Douglas specification when certain 
assumptions are relaxed. All three production functions are estimated and the contribution 
of IQLEG is calculated. The methodological contributions and advantages associated with 
the tools applied in this thesis have been acknowledged and discussed in this and previous 











FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT, INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY AND ECONOMIC 
GROWTH IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA - A COINTEGRATION ANALYSIS   
5.1 Introduction  
This chapter focuses on investigating the role of institutional factors in the finance-growth 
relationship using a panel of 21 SSA countries between 1985 and 2015 at both the panel and 
individual country levels. Using panel cointegration techniques, the goal is to establish a 
long-run relationship between finance and growth within the framework of productivity in 
the Cobb-Douglas production function. The role of the econometric estimator used in 
determining the finance-growth relationship has been discussed in the literature (Murinde, 
2012; Levine, 2005; Tamayo and Ferdinand, 2015: Bijlsma, Kool, and Non, 2018). These 
techniques have been proposed to have an impact on the outcomes of the relationship. 
 
 Both the finance-growth and the finance-institutions-growth literature have been tested 
with a diverse array of tools. These as earlier discussed in the methodology chapter, include 
cross country regressions (Arizalla, Cavallo and Gallindo, 2013), GMM estimators, LSDV 
estimators and many others (See Huang, 2010; Filippidis and Katrakilidis, 2015). These 
estimators although valid and dynamic, often tend to ignore the integrated properties of the 
dataset given the fact that they spun different time periods (Bist, 2018; Gries, Kraft and 
Meierrieks, 2008; Hyun, 2010).  
 
Ignoring the integrated properties of variables can result in spurious parameter estimates 
(Wooldridge, 2013). To address this shortcoming, mitigative measure includes differencing 
the variables under study. However, differencing variables limits the information of the 
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series. A more appropriate option is to use cointegration, which is a technique used to find 
a possible long run relationship between level panel and time series processes (Jalil and 
Rao, 2019). This study adopted the use of unit root and cointegration techniques to depict 
all forms of integration in the underlying structure of the data as this tends to impact the 
kind of associations between variables.   
 
The results for this study show that, at the panel level, even in the presence of adequately 
working institutions, financial development is not associated with economic growth in the 
long-run. However, a study of the individual countries shows that some countries in the sub-
region have cointegration relationships among financial development, institutional quality, 
capital stock and economic growth. In these countries, the results indicate that the system is 
able to adjust itself back to equilibrium in the event of destabilisation. The evidence also 
shows that, with the exception of Zimbabwe, IQLEG contributes positively on the average 
to total factor productivity for these countries.     
 
This chapter is organized as follows: a summary of the empirical methodology applied in 
this chapter is provided in the next section. The fourth section entails estimations followed 
by the presentation and analysis of the findings for the panel and the time series estimations 
in that order. The last section concludes and recommends ways in which the research could 
be extended and conducted in the future. 
 
5.2   Empirical Methodology 
5.2.1 Data  
As indicated in Chapter Four, Section 4.2, GDPPC from the WDI (2017), CKPP from the 
PWT 9.0, FD from the WDI (2017) and an institutional quality index with measures from 
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the World Bank’s ASPIRE database and the ICRG (2017) formed the data used in this 
thesis. The construction of the index and the measurement of variables are as described in 
Section 4.2.2 of Chapter Four. A comprehensive description of the source of the data can 
be found in Appendix D 
 
5.2.2 Econometric Techniques 
The Production Function 
Based on the derivation of the production function in Chapter 2, Section 2.7.1 the empirical 
model for the Cobb-Douglas production function applied in estimating the relationship 
between institutional quality, financial development and economic growth for the panel of 
21 countries used in the study ranged from 1985 to 2015was derived for the panel as    
ln 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝐶 + ln𝐴0 +  𝑔. 𝑡 + 𝛼 ln 𝐶𝐾𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝜃 ln 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝜏𝜃 ln𝐹𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 (5.1) 
The time series version therefore is given as  
ln 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐶𝑡 = 𝐶 + ln𝐴0 +  𝑔. 𝑡 + 𝛼 ln CKPP𝑡 + 𝛾𝜃 ln 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑡 + 𝜏𝜃 ln 𝐹𝐷𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡       (5.2) 
 
The derivation of the productivity levels within the panel for the Cobb-Douglas framework 
is given as:   
𝑁𝐹𝑃𝑡  = ln 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐶𝑡 − ?̂? ln 𝐶𝐾𝑃𝑃𝑡 −  𝜏?̂? ln 𝐹𝐷𝑡  −  𝛾?̂? ln 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑡,                              (5.3) 
𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑡   =  ln 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐶𝑡 − ?̂? ln 𝐶𝐾𝑃𝑃𝑡                                                                     (5.4)     
𝐼𝑄𝐿𝐸𝐺𝑡 = 𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑡 − 𝑁𝐹𝑃𝑡                                                                                                         (5.5), 
respectively, where  𝑖 = 1, 2 denotes the individual country units and 𝑡 = 1, 2, … , 31 from 
1985 to 2015. The average for each year across the 21 countries is computed to represent 
the estimated the pooled time observation for the panel. As previously indicated, it is 
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expected that the average CIQLEG is greater than 0. A brief discussion of the econometric 
tools used in this chapter follows.  
 
Panel Univariate Cross-Sectional Dependency Test 
An important point to practically consider in dealing with panel data, in addition to is the 
issue of cross-sectional dependence in the units of the panel. Ignoring CSD of errors may 
yield adverse outcomes such as misleading inferences and inconsistent estimators 
depending gravity of CSD. Cross sectional independence may not be the case when 
practically looking at relationships especially for a region that has created some common 
bodies for specific policy goals (See Bai and Ng, 2004; Westerlund, 2007; Salim, Yao and 
Chen, 2017; Camarero, Gómez and Tamarit, 2014; Pesaran, 2007).  
 
Following Salim, Yao and Chen (2017), panel univariate cross-sectional dependence tests 
are conducted to ascertain the presence of cross-sectional dependence. The tests applied in 
this vein include the Breush Pagan (1980) Lagrange Multiplier test, the Pesaran (2004) 
scaled LM test, the Pesaran (2004) cross-sectional dependence (CD) test and the Bias-
Corrected scaled LM test by Baltagi, Feng and Kao (2012). Upon determining the presence 
of CSD in the series, they need to be addressed by the application of integrated models that 
are robust enough to capture these interdependencies and correlations and mitigate their 
possible adverse effects. The panel cointegration tests adopted in this chapter have been 
constructed with properties that mitigate the effects of cross-sectional dependence.   
 
 Unit Root Tests 
Theoretically, for cointegration to be applied in any analysis, it is required that all the 
variables in the cointegrating models be integrated of order one.  To confirm these integral 
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properties of gross domestic product per capita, financial development, institutional quality 
and capital stock across all 21 countries, both panel and time series unit root and stationarity 
tests were employed to ascertain the stationary properties of the variables under 
investigation.  
 
To determine the integrated properties of the series, unit root tests are conducted for each 
variable per country and as a panel. Three time series unit root tests are applied. These are 
the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test by Said and Dickey (1984) and the Phillips-Perron 
(PP) test by Phillips and Perron (1988). The corresponding panel unit root tests, also 
discussed in include the commonly applied Im, Pesaran and Shin (IPS) W-stat (2003) test, 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square (1999) test, Philips Peron (PP) - Fisher Chi-square (1987) test and 
the Breitung t-Test (2000). Sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 of Chapter Five contains a discussion 
of these tests and the corresponding test statistics for each test.  
 
Cointegration Tests 
For the time series estimations, the countries whose variables exhibit unit root properties 
are individually used to test for cointegration among variables. The VAR-based 
cointegration tests using the methodology developed in Johansen (1991, 1995) and the 
residual based Engle and Granger (1987) cointegration tests were applied in the time series 
framework whilst the Pedroni (1999, 2004) and Westerlund (2005) panel cointegration tests 
were conducted to determine the existence of long run relationships between the variables 
in the production function. Sections 4.3.7 and 4.3.9 of Chapter Four contains a discussion 
of these tests, the rational for employing them in this research and the corresponding test 
statistics for each test.  
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Cointegration Relationship and Speed of Adjustment 
As discussed in Sections 4.3.11 and 4.3.12 of Chapter Four, upon establishing evidence of 
cointegration, for both the panel and the individual countries that provide evidence of 
cointegration, the cointegration vectors are then determined as a second step, where Panel 
FMOLS (Philips and Hansen, 1990) and pooled OLS are estimated to determine elasticities 
in the long-run. Next, the adjustment factor for the model is estimated by specifying a panel 
(and where applicable, a time series) ECM for FD, INS, CKPP and GDPPC.  Having 
estimated, significant long run parameters at both the panel and time series levels, the 
production function is estimated and the TFP derived to determine the efficiency gains 
attributable to IQLEG 
 
5.3 Results and Findings  
5.3.1 Descriptive Statistics 
The variables used in finding a relationship between financial development, institutions and 
economic growth are presented in descriptive statistics from the 21 sub-Saharan African 
countries that have all the available relevant variables. Table 5.1 presents initial descriptive 
statistics from the available data covering the 21 sub-Saharan African countries. In view of 
the fact that all the variables are logged, the description is on the logged variables. Due to 
the low levels of data collection in some SSA countries, the number of observations is based 
on available institutional variables of interest for the data spanning 1985 to 2015 since the 
econometric approach being adopted requires the use of a balanced panel dataset. 
 
The number of observations for each variable in the panel is 651. There are quite a number 
of observations that are negative for institutional quality and, by extension, institutional 
quality linked efficiency gains as well as capital per person. The negative values are quite 
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typical given the fact that SSA is the region in question. The reported mean for capital per 
person of 1.231 is low compared to that of LGDPPC and LFD.  LINS and LFD are all 
negatively skewed whilst LGDPPC and LCKPP are positively skewed but only moderately. 
The LINS variable recorded a skewness of -2.032 indicating a high skew to the left whilst 
LFD is moderately skewed to the left. Interestingly LCKPP is fairly normal with skewness 
values of 0.155.   
 
Table 5.1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable     Obs    Mean 
 Std.   
Dev. 
Skewness Kurtosis      Min      Max 
LGDPPC 651 6.8952 0.9926 0.8256 3.0076 4.8801 9.3962 
LFD 651 4.1878 0.4655 -0.7320 4.1263 2.4800 5.2722 
LINS 651 3.0105 0.2660 -2.0323 9.1026 1.3429 3.4246 
LCKPP 651 1.2314 1.1162 0.1551 2.9163 -1.1576 4.2484 
Note:  This table shows a summary statistic of the log of GDPPC, FD, INS and CKPP the entire panel of 21 
SSA countries over the 31-year period. For Kurtosis, negative values indicate platykurtic and 
positive values reflect leptokurtic.  The LGDPPC and LFD are moderately skewed. LCKPP is normal 
  
With respect to kurtosis, LGDPPC and LCKPP were the closest to normality in terms of the 
shape of the distribution of the sample since they were closest to 3. LINS recorded the 
highest measure of kurtosis with a value of 9.102 exhibiting leptokurtic distribution of the 
sample. With respect to the LINS, Mali produced estimates with the highest number of 
negatives. The variable with the highest range was LGDPPC whilst institutional quality 
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5.3.2 Cross-sectional Dependence Tests Results 
All four tests for cross-sectional dependence strongly reject the null hypothesis of cross-
sectional independence. The Breusch-Pagan LM, Pesaran scaled LM, Bias-corrected scaled 
LM and the Pesaran CD tests strongly suggest evidence of non-spatial cross-sectional 
dependence for all variables at all levels of significance. The results from Table 5.2 lend 
credence to the argument that the financial systems and economies of countries in the SSA 
region have underlying interdependencies.  
 










LGDPPC 2916.822*** 131.0547*** 130.705*** 22.366*** 
LCKPP 3578.980*** 163.365*** 163.015*** 54.282*** 
LFD 2467.349*** 109.123*** 108.773*** 40.441*** 
LINS 1412.670*** 57.660*** 57.310*** 17.245*** 
Null hypothesis is cross-sectional independence. Tests are conducted following the fixed effect estimation 





These spatial CSD based on the use of different countries, and non-spatial dependencies21 
that often highlight some common factors among cross-sections, may be as a result of many 
factors some of which are that these economies have formed unions and sub-regional bodies 
for effective and specific policy making and effective trade relations among others 
(Sarafidis and Wangsbeek, 2012; Bai and Ng, 2004; Bailey, Holly and Pesaran, 2016). An 
example is the West African Monetary Union that cuts across all countries in the West 
                                                 
21 According to Sarafidis and Wangsbeek (2012), non-spatial dependence assumes presence of unobserved 
common components in the disturbances which are linear combinations of a fixed number of factors while 
spatial dependencies assume the unobserved common component in the disturbance are spatially (locally) 
correlated (See also Batalgi and Pesara, 2007; Bilgili et al., 2017) 
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African region. There are various bodies of the sort in East and Southern Africa. Common 
policy agenda often imply that reforms in one country are likely to have an impact in another 
country over the years. As already stated above, the panel models address the challenges 
associated with cross-sectional dependence. 
 
 
5.3.3 Unit Root Testing Results 
Time Series Unit Root Results 
It is a fact that individual countries may have specific features that may not be systematic. 
To provide some insight into the individual country relationship between finance, 
institutional quality and economic growth, the results for the univariate estimations are 
discussed in this section. The results of the univariate unit root tests shown on Table 5.3, 
Panels A and B indicate that 10 out of the 21 countries exhibited I (1) properties at the 5% 
level of significance for all variables except capital that exhibited I (1) properties at 10% 
level of significance for Kenya, Madagascar and Malawi (Table 5.3 -Panels A and B).  
 
Although the results for unit root at level showed that all variables were not stationary, the 
test, when conducted on the first difference of the variables, showed that Botswana, Cote 
d’Ivoire, Gabon, Ghana, Niger, Sudan, Senegal, Uganda and South Africa were not 
stationary. As such, in line with cointegration theory that requires variables to be integrated 
of the first order, all these countries had to be dropped from the cointegration estimations 
(Westerlund, 2006a; Narayan and Smyth, 2008). Hence, cointegration was conducted for 
Gambia, Kenya, Madagascar, Mali, Malawi, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe. 
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Table 5.3: Panel A: Individual Unit Root Tests  
Country LGDPPC LFDI LINS LCKPP 
 ADF PP ADF PP ADF PP ADF PP 



































































































































































































































































































































































Notes:  Unit root results for level variables in each country. Optimal lag in square brackets [  ] for ADF test. PP tests the automatic bandwidth - Newey West.  
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Table 5.3 Panel B: Unit Root Tests Differenced Data 
Country DLGDPPC DLFDI DLINS DLCKPP 
 ADF PP ADF PP ADF PP ADF PP 
Botswana -4.621[0] *** -4.594 ***   -4.879[0] *** 
 
 -4.856 *** 
 








Cote d’Ivoire -3.620[0] **  -3.658 **   -3.644[0] ***  -3.655*** 
 























































































































































































































Notes: Unit root results for the first difference of variables in each country.  Optimal lag in square brackets [ ] for ADF test. PP tests the automatic 
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Panel Unit Root Test Results 
The results of the panel unit root test presented in Table 5.4 indicate that all variables 
exhibit I (1) properties. There is evidence of unit root for all variables in the panel at 
the 5% significance level. The results indicate that when taken as a panel, LGDPPC, 
LFD, LINS and LCKPPC are not stationary at level but become stationary when their 
first differences are taken. Table 5.4 is a presentation of the results of the panel unit 
root tests.  All variables are therefore taken as being integrated of order one. This 
condition of variables possessing I (1) properties in all the tests theoretically allows for 
panel cointegration estimation. 
 
Table 5.4: Panel Unit Root Tests 
  ADF - Fisher 
Chi-square 
(1999) 













LGDDPC 29.8961 38.6969 1.9895 2.9606 -0.1249 
(0.9192) (0.6168) (0.9767) (0.9985) (0.4503) 
∆LGDPPC 149.311*** 477.161*** -8.4802*** -4.2727*** -6.1769*** 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
LINS 29.2009 25.7276*** -1.4253 -0.6179 -1.2099 
(0.9773) (0.0001) (0.923) (0.2683) (0.1132) 
∆LINS 207.591*** 669.400*** -12.0400*** -14.101*** -12.912*** 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
LFD 30.8007 21.9946 -1.1749 -1.1104 -1.2239 
(0.1105) (0.8992) (0.8800) (0.1334) (0.1105) 
∆LFD -176.751*** 262.310*** -10.1400*** -9.0682*** -10.680*** 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
LCKPP 27.6047 40.9728 4. 1464 8.64375 1.2849 
(0.9575) (0.516) (1.0000) (1.0000) (0.9006) 
∆LCKPP 55.5972* 78.2210*** -1.8385** -3.4371*** -1.6545** 
(0.0779) (0.0006) (0.0330) (0.0003) (0.0490) 
Notes: Panel unit root testing results. Trend assumption: Deterministic intercept and trend; 
User-specified lag length: 1; Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel. 
(***), (**) and (*) denote rejection at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively 
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5.3.4 Cointegration Testing Results 
Individual Country Results 
Estimates from the Engle-Granger cointegration test presented on Table 5.5 shows that 
five out of the ten countries had variables that were cointegrated. These include Gambia 
and Madagascar at the 5% level of significance; Mali and Nigeria at the 10% level of 
significance and Tanzania at 1% significance level.  The results for the Johannsen 
cointegration tests presented in Table 5.5 indicate that, whilst eight out of the ten 
countries have variables that are cointegrated at the 5% level of significance, two 
countries (Kenya and Zimbabwe) depict cointegration at 10% level of significance 
based on the MacKinnon (1990; 2010) probability values (Cheung and Lai, 1993). The 
eight countries include Gambia, Mali, Madagascar, Malawi, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, 
Tanzania and Zambia.   
 
Using the Trace statistics, Gambia and Tanzania had two cointegrating and three 
cointegrating equations, respectively. All the rest had only one cointegration equation. 
The Maximum Eigenvalue statistics indicated that Gambia, Tanzania and Madagascar 
had two cointegration equations whilst Mali, Malawi, Sierra Leone, Nigeria and 
Zambia have one cointegration relationship. Hence, for the individual estimations, the 
results showed that, out of 21 SSA countries, about a third rejected the null of no 
cointegration when TFP was decomposed to include an enhanced financial 
development measure called IQLEG.  These results are in line with the findings of Abu-
Bader and Abu-Qarn (2008), Ang and Mckibbin (2007), Choe and Moosa (1999) and 
Odedokum (1996).  
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Table 5.5: Time Series Cointegration Testing Results 
Country 
Johansen Engle-Granger 









Gambia  77.5153***  0.0024 2  33.7554**  0.0313 2 -4.938** 
Kenya  70.8148** 0.0116 1 30.9549* 0.0688 2       -2.714 
Madagascar 86.6986*** 0.0002 2 44.7245*** 0.0009 2 -4.855** 
Mali 64.0730** 0.0481 1 36.0533** 0.0156 1 -4.623** 
Malawi 69.6722** 0.0150 1 34.2848** 0.0267 1 -3.639 
Nigeria 82.2223*** 0.0007 2 40.4811*** 0.0038 1 -3.499 
Sierra 
Leone 
70.4624** 0.0126 1 42.9532*** 0.0016 1 -2.670 
Tanzania 96.318*** 0.0000 3 39.5329*** 0.0052 3 -3.764 
Zambia 75.5469*** 0.0038 1 36.0509** 0.0157 1 -3.055 
Zimbabwe 60.7774* 0.0887 1 29.9820* 0.0891 1 -2.417 
Note: This table presents the results of individual country cointegration tests: (***), (**) and (*) denote rejection at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
The Engle-Granger critical values from MacKinnon (1990, 2010) are -5.289 for 1%, -4.483 for 5% and -4.095 for 10%. P-values in the Johansen 
 tests indicate the presence of cointegration.  
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Panel Cointegration Tests Results 
The results of the Pedroni (1999, 2004) panel cointegration test conducted (Table 5.6) 
support the hypothesis that there is no cointegration between the variables. More 
importantly, these results do not support the Rodrik (2000) hypothesis regarding institutions 
for high quality growth. There is rather an indication that financial development does not 
have a long-run association with economic growth in the selected SSA countries. The result 
further shows that, even when enhanced by institutional quality, financial development is 
still not cointegrated with growth within the framework of enhancing the efficiency and 
productivity of factors of production and hence growth. Indeed, based on the results from 
five out of the seven Pedroni (1999) statistics, there is no significant association between 
per capita gross domestic product, financial development, institutional quality and capital 
in the selected countries.   
 
 
Table 5.6: Pedroni (1999, 2004) Panel Cointegration Test 
Test   Statistic Probability 
Panel v-Statistic 0.6284 0.2649 
Panel rho-Statistic 1.7295 0.9581 
Panel PP-Statistic -0.4158 0.3388 
Panel ADF-Statistic -0.1777 0.4295 
Group rho-Statistic  2.8299 0.9977 
Group PP-Statistic -2.4498 0.0071 
Group ADF-Statistic -1.8161 0.0347 
Trend assumption: Deterministic intercept and trend; User-specified lag length: 1; Newey 
-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel. (***), (**) and (*) denote 
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Westerlund Cointegration Test Results 
In line with the school of thought that finds no relationship between finance and growth, the 
Westerlund (2005) cointegration test results presented on Table 5.7 provide further support 
for the hypothesis that there is no cointegration between finance and growth even when 
conditioned on institutional quality for the 21 African countries when taken as a panel. The 




Table 5.7: Westerlund (2005) Cointegration Test Results 
  Statistic          p-value 
Panel-specific-AR -0.448 0.3271 
Same-AR -0.3238 0.3731 
Trend assumption: Deterministic intercept and trend. Trend assumption:  
 (***), (**) and (*) denote rejection at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively 
 
The panel results support the findings of Menyah, Nazlioglu and Wolde-Rufael (2014) and 
conflicts with the findings of Akinci, Akinci and Yilmaz (2014) for OECD member 
countries from 1980-2011. The assertion by Murindhe (2012) on institutional factors that, 
although banks play the special role as financial intermediaries and information processors, 
their incentives, capacity and efficiency to carry out their function are subject to the rules 
that govern and shape the interactions among banks, borrowers and other players in the 
market place, would be questioned based on the results.  
 
The results neither support nor uphold Rodrik’s (2000) hypothesis that the institutions used 
in the model are institutions for high quality growth. The non-association between the 
variables in the long-run can be assessed from the peculiar characteristics associated with 
the geographic region the panel comes from. SSA is marked by many structure changing 
events including wars, political instability, natural disasters, disease outbreaks and 
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economic booms and dooms among others. Perhaps, neglecting the effect of these events in 
estimations may have an impact on the outcomes.  
 
These results for the entire panel of 21 countries therefore, bring the issue of structural 
breaks into question. The need to test for panel cointegration with the same data and 
variables in the presence of structural breaks cannot be overemphasized. With respect to the 
overall objective of the thesis, the results indicate that the panel of variables, namely 
financial development, institutional quality and capital stock, are not cointegrated with 
economic growth as measured by GDP per capita for the 21 sub-Saharan African countries 
between 1985 and 2015 in the Cobb-Douglas production framework based on the Solow 
(1956) model. Hence, the hypothesis of finance catalysing the growth of the economy 
through productivity when enhanced by adequately working institutions, is not supported.  
 
Indeed, the assertion by Robinson (1952), Lucas (1988) and Stein (1989) that finance and 
growth have no significant relationship is supported. This finding is in line with Shan and 
Morris (2002) who found no association between finance and growth in 19 OECD nations 
and China. Boulila and Trabelsi (2004) do not find any associations between finance and 
growth in MENA countries as well as Nyamongo, Misati, Kipyegon and Ndirangu (2012) 
who found very weak evidence in support of the finance-growth relationship in a sample of 
36 African countries.   
 
Comparing this result further to the school of thought in the literature that a well-developed 
financial sector is a key feature of economic growth, is not supported. Given that the 
presence of cointegration implies a long-run association and relationship among variables, 
the expectation was that these SSA countries would demonstrate such a positive association 
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among the production function variables and enhance efficiency. It is important to note that, 
although broad consensus among economists has been reached on the positive relationship 
between a country’s level of financial development and its rate of economic growth, there 
is less consensus on explaining the high degree of variance in financial development across 
countries (Haber, 2008).  
 
5.3.4 Cointegration Regression Coefficients and Error Correction  
The results from the individual country cointegration estimations provide support for the 
lack of a significant panel cointegration relationship among the variables. This is because 
11 out of the 21 countries did not provide evidence of cointegration among variables. The 
10 countries that found cointegration among variables are thus estimated for the 
cointegration long-run relationships among variables with both an OLS and a FMOLS 
estimator. Table 5.8 provides details of the existing relationships between variables in 
Gambia, Kenya, Madagascar, Mali, Malawi, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe.  
 
Time Series Cointegration Relationship 
Results from the OLS and FMOLS estimators presented in Table 5.8 indicate that, for 
Nigeria, Kenya and Zambia, all parameters are highly statistically significant in line with 
theoretical predictions from the Solow Neoclassical growth model and empirical findings 
of Demetriades and Law (2006), Rodrik (2000) and Levine (2005) among others. The 
results from the FMOLS estimator for Tanzania show that all variables are statistically 
significant. The financial development indicator was not significant in Madagascar and 
Gambia for the FMOLS estimator.  
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With respect to the institutional quality measure, no significant relationship was found for 
Sierra Leone, Malawi and Gambia for both estimators while the OLS results further 
indicated that institutional quality was not significantly associated with growth in 
Zimbabwe, Tanzania and Mali. Capital was found to be insignificant under the FMOLS 
estimator in Mali and Zimbabwe. It is interesting to note that, for every country and in 
applying both estimators, the coefficient of technological progress, which is the time trend, 
is positive and highly statistically significant, although the magnitudes of the parameters are 
relatively small.  
 
In contrast to theoretical predictions, financial development in Kenya, Nigeria and 
Zimbabwe had a negative but significant relationship with economic growth. This is in line 
with the findings of Bezemera, Grydakib and Zhanga (2014), Rousseau and Wachtel (2011) 
and Ketteni, Mamuneas, Stengos and Savvides (2007). Reasons attributed for such findings 
include the possibility of changing the focus of credit away from non-financial business and 
towards real estate asset markets, accumulated short-run effects of financial crises and the 
vanishing effect of financial development when the relationship is possibly non-linear 
(Arcand, Berkes and Panizza, 2015; Ketteni et al., 2007). Valickova, Havranek, and 
Horvath (2015) attribute the negative or insignificant effect of financial development on 
growth to a phenomenon that started in the 1990s as a possible of increasing sophistication 
of financial systems, which in turn increased the risks of adverse effects.  
 
For Kenya and Gambia, institutional quality was found to have a negative but statistically 
significant relationship with growth. These findings are in line with Kandi (2009) and Olson 
(1992; 1996). The negative and statistically significant coefficient indicates deterioration in 
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institutional quality, a situation that may provide opportunities for connected businesses 
from the politically elite and interest groups who have motivation to lobby the government 
in solely their favour, affecting the state effectiveness to deal with market failure and 
potentially adversely affect economic prosperity. The Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) 
and the Bayesian Information Criterion are used to select the best model for each country. 
The results indicated that the OLS estimator was the better model for Gambia, Kenya, 
Madagascar, Mali and Zambia. The FMOLS estimator was thus the better model for 
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Table 5.8: Time Series Cointegration Regression for Cointegrated Variables  
Country 
OLS FMOLS 











0.1918** 0.0  -0.1914*** 0.0045*** -2.8170 0.1412 -0.0957 -0.1987*** 0.0048*** -2.7577 
(0.0927) (0.1550) (0.0162) (0.0004) -2.6320 (0.0922) (0.1405) (0.0143) (0.0004) -2.5975 
[2.0700] [0.0825] [-11.8517] [11.4673]  [1.5308] [-0.6816] [-13.8772] [12.7940]  
Kenya 
-0.4903*** -0.3098*** 0.2601*** 0.0048*** -3.3245 -0.5069*** -0.3927*** 0.2355*** 0.0050*** -2.9166 
(0.1118) (0.0988) (0.0450) (0.0003) -3.1394 (0.1465) (0.1292) (0.0586) (0.0004) -2.7565 
[-4.3840] [-3.1364] [5.7871] [16.2354]  [-3.4599] [-3.0400] [4.0219] [12.7683]  
Madagascar 
0.0526 0.2697*** -0.2022*** 0.0026*** -3.8096 0.1264 0.2890*** -0.2304*** 0.0024*** -3.1854 
(0.0936) (0.0680) (0.0377) (0.0002) -3.6245 (0.0940) (0.0669) (0.0392) (0.0002) -3.0252 
[0.5621] [3.9644] [-5.3617] [11.3169]  [1.3448] [4.3206] [-5.8823] [10.5382]  
Mali 
0.6847*** 0.0962 0.0463 0.0016*** -3.4915 0.7836*** 0.1643** 0.0136 0.0012*** -3.0121 
(0.1275) (0.0681) (0.0327) (0.0003) -3.3064 (0.1316) (0.0710) (0.0339) (0.0003) -2.8519 
[5.3686] [1.4135] [1.4160] [4.6817]  [5.9539] [2.3151] [0.4000] [3.6335]  
Malawi 
0.3672*** -0.0295 0.1595*** 0.0022*** -2.5398 0.4133*** -0.0020 0.1628*** 0.0021*** -2.5864 
(0.1055) (0.0904) (0.0391) (0.0002) -2.3548 (0.0846) (0.0732) (0.0312) (0.0002) -2.4262 
[3.4805] [-0.3263] 4.0805 [9.7503]  [4.8883] [-0.0278] [5.2246] [11.4854]  
Nigeria 
-0.2821*** 0.3743*** 0.2534*** 0.0036*** -2.3252 -0.2932** 0.4829*** 0.2612*** 0.0035*** -2.4877 
(0.1241) (0.1116) (0.0263) (0.0003) -2.1402 (0.1330) (0.1228) (0.0283) (0.0004) -2.3275 
[-2.2724] [3.3523] 9.6339 [11.1219]  [-2.2053] [3.9310] [9.2334] [9.8178]  
Sierra Leone 
0.1677*** 0.0896 -0.0975*** 0.0026*** -1.4552 0.2349*** 0.0425 -0.0853*** 0.0025*** -1.9343 
(0.0582) (0.0917) (0.0238) (0.0001) -1.2702 (0.0678) (0.1074) (0.0295) (0.0001) -1.7742 
[2.8817] [0.9773] [-4.0941] [31.2040]  [3.4640] [0.3955] [-2.8896] [26.2199]  
Tanzania 
0.7216*** 0.1249 0.1640*** 0.0013*** -3.1490 0.7061*** 0.1446*** 0.1842*** 0.0013*** -3.2326 
(0.0945) (0.0767) (0.0260) (0.0001) -2.9640 (0.0816) (0.0619) (0.0235) (0.0001) -3.0724 
[7.6396] [1.6296] [6.3025] [10.4137]  [8.6499] [2.3367] [7.8450] [11.8268]  
 
Zambia 
0.2692*** -0.4038*** 0.1568*** 0.0035*** -2.9167 0.2810*** -0.4497*** 0.1831*** 0.0035*** -2.6935 
(0.0251) (0.0970) (0.0292) (0.0002) -2.7316 (0.0257) (0.0992) (0.0298) (0.0002) -2.5333 
[10.7045] [-4.1635] [5.3682] [22.4675]   [10.9420] [-4.5352] [6.1480] [22.1607]   
Zimbabwe 
-0.9314*** -0.3783 0.2800** 0.0060*** -0.0153 -0.7548* -0.1396 0.2251 0.0053*** -1.2154 
(0.2744) (0.2426) (0.1233) (0.0009) 0.1698 (0.4220) (0.3728) (0.1904) (0.0013) -1.0552 
[-3.3937] [-1.5592] [2.2709] [6.9657]  [-1.7888] [-0.3745] [1.1820] [3.9866]  
Notes: Individual cointegration relationships.  (***), (**) and (*) denote rejection at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively, HAC Newey-West st. errors in ( ) and t-statistics in [ ]




Error Correction Term 
The error correction term for all ten countries that are found to have a cointegrating 
relationship provide support for a long-run equilibrium relationship (Table 5.9). All the nine 
countries show that, in the long-run, the speed of adjustment for variables towards 
equilibrium is negative, less than one and significant. The country with the highest 
adjustment factor was Gambia, which shows that 89.6% of disequilibrium in the system is 
corrected within a year. Madagascar followed with a high speed of adjustment of 86.9%.  
The lowest error correction term is for Zimbabwe, which shows that only 37.6% of 
disequilibrium is corrected within a year at the 5% level of significance. The error correction 
modelling therefore supports the notion of convergence for variables to reach the 
equilibrium point in the long-run, albeit at different speeds (Westerlund and Edgerton, 2008; 
Maysami and Koh, 2003). 
 
Table 5.9 Speed of Adjustment for Individual Countries 
Country ECT T-Statistic Country ECT T-Statistic 
Gambia -0.896*** -4.94 Nigeria -0.395*** -3.50 
Kenya -0.410** -2.71 Sierra Leone - 0.395** -2. 67 
Madagascar -0.869*** -4.62 Tanzania -0.647*** -3.05 
Mali -0.572*** -3.64 Zambia -0.481*** -3.05 
Malawi - 0.590*** -3.50 Zimbabwe -0.376** -2.42 
Note: ****, ** and * denote statistic significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. ECT refers to Error 








5.3.5 The Cobb-Douglas Production Function-TFP, NFP and Contribution of 
IQLEG to Productivity for Individual Countries  
To establish the role of IQLEG in contributing to higher productivity levels over that 
attributable to pure technical progress, the Cobb-Douglas production function in each 
country whose variables are cointegrated is estimated. The levels of productivity due to 
institutional quality linked efficiency gain (CIQLEG), technical progress (NFP) and total 
factor productivity (TFP) are calculated based on the coefficients from the regression in 
Table 5.9. The results for three countries, Mali, Tanzania and Zimbabwe are presented in 
Table 5.10- Panels A, B and C and Figures 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3. The remaining tables and graphs 
can be found in Appendix C. The choice of these three countries is as a result of randomly 
selecting one country whose variables were found to be cointegrated from the western, 
eastern and southern parts of SSA.   
 
TFP, NFP and Contribution of IQLEG to Productivity in Mali 
 
Table 5.10 Panel A reports the levels and growth rates of TFP, NFP and IQLEG. The 
contribution of IQLEG is further depicted in Figure 5.1.  The level of IQLEG in TFP was 
about 50.98%. This contribution of IQLEG to TFP is relatively consistent throughout the 
period under study for Mali with the highest contribution in terms of magnitude being in 
2014 followed by 2007. The contribution of IQLEG to total factor productivity increased 
steadily from 1997 to 2015.  However, the contribution dropped during the 1989 to 2000 
period after which it started rising consistently until 2013 when it fell marginally in 2014 
and 2015.  
  




Table 5.10 Panel A: Productivity Estimations for Mali 
Levels of NFP, TFP and CIQLEG  Growth Rates of NFP, TFP and CIQLEG 
Year TFPMLI NFPMLI IQLEGMLI   Year GTFPMLI GNFPMLI GIQLEGMLI 
1985 6.1806 3.1087 3.0719  1985 na na na 
1986 6.1874 3.0718 3.1157  1986 0.0068 -0.037 0.0438 
1987 6.1685 3.0348 3.1337  1987 -0.0189 -0.0369 0.0180 
1988 6.2224 3.1174 3.1050  1988 0.0539 0.0826 -0.0287 
1989 6.2442 3.1607 3.0836  1989 0.0218 0.0433 -0.0215 
1990 6.1964 3.0685 3.1279  1990 -0.0478 -0.0922 0.0443 
1991 6.2823 3.145 3.1373  1991 0.0859 0.0765 0.0094 
1992 6.2221 3.0713 3.1507  1992 -0.0603 -0.0737 0.0134 
1993 6.2215 3.0418 3.1797  1993 -0.0006 -0.0295 0.0289 
1994 6.2271 3.0973 3.1298  1994 0.0056 0.0555 -0.0499 
1995 6.2040 3.0862 3.1178  1995 -0.0231 -0.0111 -0.0120 
1996 6.2398 3.0608 3.1791  1996 0.0358 -0.0255 0.0613 
1997 6.2598 3.0840 3.1758  1997 0.0200 0.0232 -0.0033 
1998 6.3060 3.1255 3.1805  1998 0.0462 0.0415 0.0046 
1999 6.3338 3.1346 3.1991  1999 0.0278 0.0091 0.0187 
2000 6.3044 3.0884 3.2160  2000 -0.0294 -0.0462 0.0168 
2001 6.4172 3.2097 3.2075  2001 0.1128 0.1213 -0.0084 
2002 6.417 3.1611 3.2559  2002 -0.0002 -0.0485 0.0483 
2003 6.4723 3.1629 3.3094  2003 0.0553 0.0018 0.0535 
2004 6.4543 3.1399 3.3144  2004 -0.0181 -0.0231 0.0050 
2005 6.4828 3.1477 3.3351  2005 0.0285 0.0078 0.0207 
2006 6.4902 3.1322 3.3581  2006 0.0074 -0.0155 0.0229 
2007 6.4865 3.1044 3.3821  2007 -0.0038 -0.0278 0.0240 
2008 6.4954 3.1411 3.3543  2008 0.0089 0.0367 -0.0278 
2009 6.5036 3.153 3.3506  2009 0.0082 0.0119 -0.0038 
2010 6.5185 3.1692 3.3493  2010 0.0149 0.0161 -0.0012 
2011 6.5114 3.1496 3.3618  2011 -0.0072 -0.0196 0.0124 
2012 6.4742 3.0971 3.3771  2012 -0.0372 -0.0525 0.0153 
2013 6.4672 3.0807 3.3865  2013 -0.007 -0.0164 0.0095 
2014 6.5045 3.1128 3.3917  2014 0.0374 0.0322 0.0052 
2015 6.5315 3.1305 3.4010  2015 0.027 0.0177 0.0093 
Mean 
rate 
6.3557 3.1158 3.2399   
Mean 
rate 
0.0117 0.0007 0.011 
Note: NFP: net factor productivity (technical progress); TFP: total factor productivity; CIQLEG: Contribution 
of institutional quality linked efficiency gain to total factor productivity. All series are in natural logarithm. 
Note: GNFP: growth rate of net factor productivity (technical progress); GTFP: growth rate of total factor 








The highest contribution to the growth of TFP occurred in 1986 with the lowest occurring 
in 1994.  On the average, net factor productivity (NFP) was quite steady and remained above 
6 for most of the years. Generally, the productivity growth was positive over the period 
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TFP, NFP and Contribution of IQLEG to Productivity in Tanzania 
 
The levels and growth rates are further depicted in Figure 5.2, which indicates the 
contribution of IQLEG to TFP. IQLEG for Tanzania contributed steadily to TFP in the 
period under study. From 1985 to 2015 the contribution of IQLEG to TFP rose and increased 
on the average. The highest contribution in terms of magnitude occurred in 2009 whilst the 
lowest was in 1986. IQLEG contributed on average to 56.29% of TFP whilst NFP accounted 
for the rest. 
 
IQLEGMLI 




Table 5.10 Panel B: Productivity Estimations for Tanzania 
Levels of NFP, TFP and CIQLEG  Growth Rates of NFP, TFP and CIQLEG 
Year TFPTZA NFPTZA IQLEGTZA   Year GTFPTZA GNFPTZA GIQLEGTZA 
1985 5.6585 2.4425 3.2161  1985 na na na 
1986 5.7650 2.6349 3.1300  1986 0.1064 0.1925 -0.0861 
1987 5.8266 2.6846 3.1419  1987 0.0616 0.0497 0.0119 
1988 5.8761 2.6774 3.1987  1988 0.0495 -0.0073 0.0568 
1989 5.9184 2.6044 3.3140  1989 0.0423 -0.0730 0.1153 
1990 5.9613 2.6472 3.3141  1990 0.0429 0.0428 0.0001 
1991 5.9654 2.6750 3.2904  1991 0.0041 0.0278 -0.0237 
1992 5.9514 2.6304 3.3210  1992 -0.0140 -0.0445 0.0306 
1993 5.9408 2.6230 3.3178  1993 -0.0106 -0.0074 -0.0032 
1994 5.9348 2.5942 3.3406  1994 -0.0060 -0.0288 0.0228 
1995 5.9551 2.6109 3.3442  1995 0.0203 0.0167 0.0036 
1996 5.9873 2.6974 3.2900  1996 0.0322 0.0864 -0.0542 
1997 5.9950 2.7030 3.2920  1997 0.0077 0.0056 0.0021 
1998 5.9980 2.6469 3.3510  1998 0.0029 -0.0561 0.0590 
1999 6.0107 2.6352 3.3755  1999 0.0128 -0.0117 0.0245 
2000 6.0258 2.6510 3.3748  2000 0.0151 0.0158 -0.0007 
2001 6.0510 2.6486 3.4024  2001 0.0252 -0.0024 0.0276 
2002 6.0851 2.6302 3.4549  2002 0.0341 -0.0183 0.0525 
2003 6.1103 2.6076 3.5027  2003 0.0252 -0.0226 0.0478 
2004 6.1365 2.6217 3.5148  2004 0.0262 0.0140 0.0121 
2005 6.1576 2.6630 3.4946  2005 0.0211 0.0414 -0.0202 
2006 6.1543 2.6522 3.5021  2006 -0.0033 -0.0108 0.0076 
2007 6.1855 2.6519 3.5336  2007 0.0312 -0.0003 0.0315 
2008 6.1875 2.6356 3.5520  2008 0.0020 -0.0163 0.0183 
2009 6.1841 2.6347 3.5494  2009 -0.0034 -0.0008 -0.0026 
2010 6.1922 2.6386 3.5535  2010 0.0080 0.0039 0.0041 
2011 6.1995 2.6396 3.5599  2011 0.0074 0.0009 0.0064 
2012 6.2068 2.6508 3.5559  2012 0.0073 0.0113 -0.0040 
2013 6.2336 2.6900 3.5436  2013 0.0269 0.0392 -0.0123 
2014 6.2572 2.7048 3.5525  2014 0.0236 0.0148 0.0089 
2015 6.2817 2.7235 3.5582  2015 0.0245 0.0187 0.0057 
Mean 
rate 
6.0449 2.6436 3.4014   
Mean 
rate 
0.0208 0.0094 0.0114 
Note: NFP: net factor productivity (technical progress); TFP: total factor productivity; CIQLEG: Contribution 
of institutional quality linked efficiency gain to total factor productivity. All series are in natural logarithm. 
Note: GNFP: growth rate of net factor productivity (technical progress); GTFP: growth rate of total factor 
productivity; GIQLEG: growth rate of contribution of institutional quality linked efficiency gain  
 
 




With respect to the growth rate of TFP, IQLEG accounted for about 54.81% of the growth.  
Although the contribution of IQLEG to TFP growth was negative in certain years, the 
overall contribution was positive in Tanzania over the period. These outputs show that, 
overall, the institutional quality in Tanzania was important for finance-led productivity over 
the period.  
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TFP, NFP and Contribution of IQLEG to Productivity in Zimbabwe 
 
The results for Zimbabwe presented in Table 5.10 Panel C shows the levels, contribution 
and growth rates of IQLEG to TFP. The contribution of IQLEG is further depicted in Figure 
5.3.  Interestingly, the average contribution of IQLEG to TFP was negative with an average 








Table 5.10 Panel C: Productivity Estimations for Zimbabwe 
Levels of NFP, TFP and CIQLEG  
Growth Rates of NFP, TFP and 
CIQLEG 
Year TFPZWE NFPZWE IQLEGZWE   Year TFPZWE NFPZWE IQLEGZWE 
1985 7.0403 10.7816 -3.7414  1985 na na na 
1986 7.0166 10.7486 -3.7319  1986 -0.0236 -0.0331 0.0094 
1987 6.9855 10.7499 -3.7644  1987 -0.0311 0.0014 -0.0325 
1988 7.0154 10.8107 -3.7952  1988 0.0300 0.0607 -0.0308 
1989 7.0250 10.8942 -3.8692  1989 0.0096 0.0835 -0.0739 
1990 7.0412 10.7936 -3.7524  1990 0.0162 -0.1006 0.1168 
1991 7.0510 10.7593 -3.7084  1991 0.0098 -0.0342 0.0440 
1992 6.9132 10.6343 -3.7210  1992 -0.1378 -0.1251 -0.0127 
1993 6.8738 10.6496 -3.7758  1993 -0.0395 0.0153 -0.0548 
1994 6.9081 10.6578 -3.7497  1994 0.0343 0.0083 0.0261 
1995 6.8489 10.5957 -3.7468  1995 -0.0592 -0.0622 0.0030 
1996 6.8844 10.5618 -3.6774  1996 0.0356 -0.0338 0.0694 
1997 7.0036 10.7053 -3.7017  1997 0.1192 0.1435 -0.0243 
1998 7.0856 10.7047 -3.6191  1998 0.0820 -0.0006 0.0826 
1999 7.1161 10.6125 -3.4964  1999 0.0304 -0.0922 0.1227 
2000 7.1081 10.6264 -3.5183  2000 -0.0080 0.0140 -0.0220 
2001 7.1399 10.7787 -3.6388  2001 0.0318 0.1523 -0.1205 
2002 7.0577 11.0231 -3.9653  2002 -0.0821 0.2444 -0.3265 
2003 6.8796 10.7048 -3.8252  2003 -0.1781 -0.3182 0.1401 
2004 6.8299 10.5332 -3.7033  2004 -0.0497 -0.1716 0.1219 
2005 6.7774 10.3663 -3.5889  2005 -0.0525 -0.1669 0.1144 
2006 6.6901 10.3823 -3.6922  2006 -0.0873 0.0160 -0.1033 
2007 6.5982 10.3766 -3.7784  2007 -0.0919 -0.0057 -0.0862 
2008 6.3416 10.1871 -3.8455  2008 -0.2566 -0.1895 -0.0671 
2009 6.3767 10.2852 -3.9085  2009 0.0351 0.0981 -0.0630 
2010 6.3773 10.3699 -3.9926  2010 0.0006 0.0847 -0.0841 
2011 6.3124 10.3572 -4.0448  2011 -0.0649 -0.0127 -0.0522 
2012 6.4317 10.5430 -4.1113  2012 0.1193 0.1858 -0.0665 
2013 6.4618 10.6344 -4.1727  2013 0.0301 0.0914 -0.0614 
2014 6.4559 10.6723 -4.2165  2014 -0.0059 0.0379 -0.0438 
2015 6.4457 10.7131 -4.2675  2015 -0.0102 0.0408 -0.0510 
Mean 
rate 
6.8094 10.6198 -3.8103   
Mean 
rate 
-0.0198 -0.0023      -0.0175 
Note: NFP: net factor productivity (technical progress); TFP: total factor productivity; CIQLEG: Contribution 
of institutional quality linked efficiency gain to total factor productivity. All series are in natural logarithm. 
Note: GNFP: growth rate of net factor productivity (technical progress); GTFP: growth rate of total factor 
productivity; GIQLEG: growth rate of contribution of institutional quality linked efficiency gain 
 




 not surprising considering the fact that Zimbabwe has persistently experienced 
hyperinflation together with other weak macroeconomic indicators and unstable political 
environment. Within the period, Zimbabwe became a dollarised economy with persistent 
devaluations of its currency (ww.worldbank.org). Indeed, the results from the cointegration 
regressions showed a significant but negative relationship between growth and financial 
development. Overall, the growth rate of TFP, NFP and IQLEG were all negative. Figure 
5.3 shows that the contribution of IQLEG is indeed negative as the graph reveals that NFP 
is higher than TFP. 
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5.4 Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to explore the role played by institutional factors in the finance-
growth relationship by estimating the Cobb-Douglas production function using panel and 
IQLEGZWE 




time series cointegration analyses. Twenty-one SSA countries were tested between 1985 
and 2015 at both the panel and individual country levels. Using time series and panel 
cointegration techniques, the research was aimed at establishing a long-run relationship 
between finance and growth. The research was also purposed to determine the long-run 
elasticities and the speed of adjustment within the framework of productivity in the Cobb-
Douglas production function. The role of institutional quality was examined at both the 
individual country and panel levels.  
 
With the time series study, 10 out of the 21 countries were tested based on the unit root 
properties of variables. The results confirmed the theoretical foundations of a relationship 
between productivity and financial development when institutional quality improves. All 
the 10 SSA countries provided support to establish a long-run causal relationship between 
financial development, institutional quality and economic growth. However, with respect to 
the contribution of IQLEG to higher efficiency levels, the evidence shows the deteriorating 
role of financial development and institutional quality in Zimbabwe when the Cobb-
Douglas production function was estimated. The remaining 9 countries depicted average 
contributions to IQLEG that is positive.    
 
With respect to the panel estimations however, financial development does not seem to have 
a significant association with economic growth in the selected SSA countries. This result 
contrasts the findings of Fernández and Tamayo (2015), Gries, Kraft and Meierrieks (2009), 
Baltagi, Demetriades and Law (2009), Cavallo et al, (2017), Kendall (2012) and King and 
Levine (1993a). Indeed, based on the definition of financial development by Levine (2005), 
at the panel level, the results do not direct policy makers to the need for better and more 




finance to ensure the economic goal of improving living standards as measure by economic 
growth and development.  
 
The fact that, even when finance is conditioned on adequately working institutions, there is 
still no relationship at the panel level is significantly important. Interestingly, at the 
individual country level, eight countries provide proof of cointegration between economic 
growth, financial development, capital stock and institutional quality. Based on the 10 
countries used, the time series results are in agreement with the relationship between finance 
and growth school of thought (Levine, Loayza and Beck, 2000; Pagano, 1993; Demetriades 
and Law, 2006).  
 
Regarding the role institutional quality is meant to play, that is, reducing the transaction 
costs and subsequent risks associated with allocating resources and enhancing efficiency 
through TFP, the results are contrary to Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2004), Djankov, 
McLeish and Shleifer (2007) as well as Anayiotos and Toroyan (2009) to mention a few 
who support the notion that institutions have a positive effect on finance, which then 
translates into higher and better growth. The results support the findings of Gries, Kraft and 
Meierrieks (2010) and Menyah, Nazlioglu and Wolde-Rufael (2014) that financial 
development and economic growth do not share a significant long-run relationship for most 
of the countries taken from SSA even in the presence of institutions. These results contrast 
both the theoretical and empirical school of thought that the variations in the performance 
and development of the financial markets across countries is mainly due to the strength of 
a country’s institutions (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Osili and Paulson, 2008; Levine, Loayza 
and Beck, 2000, 2000).  




Firstly, there is a possibility that the structure of the financial systems in each of these 
countries may be organized differently. Another reason could be the fact that the type of 
institutions applied in tests could be different from others both in measure and content. 
Thirdly, it is possible that the absence of structural breaks in the dataset and model could 
adversely impact the true outcomes of the study. Since the countries involved, and indeed 
the SSA region as a whole, witnessed many unanticipated and unplanned events that can be 
identified as structure-changing for their economies (civil wars, ethnic conflicts, political 
instability and regime changes, democratization, financial and economic liberalization and 
natural disasters among others), it is important to include the effect of these events in 
modelling the relations and associations among variables. 
 
From a sub-regional policy perspective, seeking to make financial development more 
effective by solely concentrating on institutional environment may not yield the desired 
results. Although it is necessary for SSA, fundamental determinants of growth such as the 
development of the financial system and adequately working institutions may need to be 
viewed in line with historical and possible future events in order to fully glean the benefits 
of growth for the sub-region as whole. With regards to policy on a country by country basis, 
some countries (e.g. Senegal) may need to pay attention to the quality of the financial system 
through adequately working institutions such as those proposed by Rodrik (2000) to 










INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY IN THE FINANCE-GROWTH NEXUS IN SUB-
SAHARAN AFRICA - A COINTEGRATION ANALYSIS WITH STRUCTURAL 
BREAKS  
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter is an investigation into the finance, institutions and growth relationship in the 
presence of structural breaks and cross-sectional dependency. Panel and individual country 
cointegration analyses with endogenously determined single and multiple unknown level, 
trend and regime structural breaks are estimated for financial development, institutional 
quality, capital and economic growth. Cross sectional dependency is incorporated into 
modelling the cointegration relationship at a deeper level by estimating and accounting for 
common factors in panel estimations. The Cobb-Douglas production function with 
structural breaks is estimated and the productivity levels estimated. (You and Sarantis, 2013; 
Banerjee and Carrion-i-Silvestre, 2015; Gregory and Hansen, 1996; Hatemi-J, 2008). The 
goal here is to determine whether IQLEG contributes to productivity higher productivity 
levels over and above that of pure technical when structural breaks are considered for the 
panel of 21 SSA countries and for some individual countries.   
 
The results of the tests reveal that, at the panel level, with the inclusion of structural breaks 
in the level and trend of the data, the null of non-cointegration cannot be rejected. However, 
upon taking cross-sectional dependence into account, the results change to establish the 
presence of cointegration with both a level break and a regime shift. However, tests applied 
to the individual countries provide evidence for cointegration in only four out of ten 




countries with a level, trend and regime shift and six out of ten countries when the regime 
shift is increased to two. Apart from evidence of long-run relationships among economic 
growth, financial development, institutional quality and capital stock, the research 
confirmed that the level of productivity for the panel increases with IQLEG making 
significant contributions to TFP in SSA over the period.    
 
The rest of the chapter is sectionalized as follows: the analytical model and a brief empirical 
methodology will be discussed. The next section entails estimations followed by the 
presentation and analysis of the findings. The last section will conclude and recommend 
ways in which the research could be extended and conducted in the future. 
 
6.2 Empirical Methodology -Summary  
Based on the empirical methodology discussed in Chapter Four, this section presents a 
summary of the analytical tools and techniques used to estimate the main analytical 
framework, which is the Cobb-Douglas production function with TFP decomposed into 
NFP and IQLEG. The extension to the previous chapter is the incorporation of structural 
breaks and cross-sectional dependency. In the presence of structural breaks, the models to 
be estimated are stated below:   
Model 1: Constant, time trend with change in level  
𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜇𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖
′𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡   𝑖 = 1,2, … ,𝑁 and  𝑡 = 1,2,3, … , 𝑇  (panel data) 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝜇 + 𝛽𝑡 + 𝛼𝐷𝑡 + 𝛿
′𝑋𝑡 + 𝑒𝑡 𝑡 = 1,2,3,… , 𝑇        (time series) 
  




Model 2: Constant, time trend with change in both level and regime  
𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜇𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖𝐷𝑚,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖
′𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖
′𝑋𝑖,𝑡𝐷𝑚,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡   𝑖 = 1,2, … ,𝑁,  𝑚 = 1,2  and    𝑡 =
1,2,3, … , 𝑇   (panel data) 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝜇 + 𝛽𝑡 + 𝛼𝐷𝑚,𝑡 + 𝛿
′𝑋𝑡 + 𝛾𝑋𝑡𝐷𝑚,𝑡 + 𝑒𝑡 𝑡 = 1,2,3,… , 𝑇        (time series) 
Where 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is the dependent variable for each 𝑖 at time 𝑡 (𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐶); 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 is an 
(𝑇 × 3𝑁 ) dimensional matrix of 3 independent variables (𝑙𝑛𝐼𝑁𝑆, 𝑙𝑛𝐹𝐷 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑙𝑛𝐶𝐾𝑃𝑃), 𝜇 
is the intercept term, 𝛿 is the slopes of (𝑇 × 3𝑁 ) dimensional matrix of 3 independent 
variables, 𝛾 the slope of the shift in the coefficient vector and t represents the time index. 𝑚 
is the number of breaks, 𝐷𝑖,𝑡 are dummy variables with 𝜏 being the break point are defined 
as  𝐷𝑖,𝑡 = {
0 𝑖𝑓 𝑡 ≤ 𝜏
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑡 > 𝜏
  
Based on the estimation of these models, the contribution of IQLEG to TFP will be 
determined at the panel and time series levels by calculating the relevant efficiency level as 
discussed in Section 2.8 of Chapter Two. A summary of the econometric analyses used is 
provided next. 
 
6.2.1 Unit Root and Stationarity Tests 
Time Series Unit Root Tests with a Structural Break 
Both the individual and panel unit root tests and stationarity tests are conducted to ascertain 
the presence of unit roots in the series appropriately cater to the possibility of cross-sectional 
dependence and structural breaks. For the individual countries, the already performed panel 
IPS (2003) panel unit root test was constructed to partially address the issue of cross-
sectional dependence. Secondly, the ILT (2010) test with a break in level has the property 




to address cross-sectional dependence and the Lee and Strazicich (2004) unit root tests with 
one structural break in the level of the series is conducted (Salim, Yao and Chen, 2017). At 
the panel level, the Carrion-i-Silvestre, Barrio-Castro and Lopez-Bazo (2005) test, which is 
adjusted for cross-sectional dependence. This test is general enough to allow for the 
structural changes to shift the level and the trend of the individual time series. In this test, 
the option of two-level breaks in the trend function is adopted. 
 
6.2.2 Stability Tests 
To establish the need to include structural breaks in the model, the strategies used by 
Westerlund (2006a), Narayan (2010), You and Sarantis (2012) and Banerjee and Carrion-i-
Silvestre (2015) to test for evidence of parameter instability are adopted. First, the Gregory 
and Hansen (1996) test for a structural change in the cointegration relationship was used to 
test for parameter instability with one structural break that affects the level of the model. 
Then the Engle-Granger ADF t-ratio from the previous section without breaks was 
compared to the ADF t-ratio and Zt statistic from the Gregory and Hansen test. These tests 
provide a unit by unit analysis of the need to allow for the inclusion of structural breaks in 
the cointegration analysis. The results from the two tests were then compared to the Sup-F 
instability and Mean-F statistics of Hansen (1992). Having established the presence of 
parameter instability, conducting the cointegration tests that include structural breaks was 
justified.   
 
6.2.3 Cointegration Tests with Structural Breaks 
 
Time Series Cointegration tests with Structural Breaks conducted are the Gregory and 
Hansen (1996) tests involved a break in the level, level with trend and a full structural break 




(option C/T/S). The Hatemi-J (2008) test involves cointegration in the with two regime 
shifts.  Two panel cointegration tests are conducted. The first is the Westerlund (2006a) 
with the panel LM test a level break and a level and trend break. Next, the Banerjee and 
Carrion-i-Silvestre (2015) cointegration test which accounts for both structural breaks and 
cross-sectional dependence was employed.  
 
Two model specifications were used. The first was the model with a time trend and a change 
in level but stable cointegrating vector and the second, the model with a time trend and 
change in both level and cointegrating vector (the slope of trend does not change). In view 
of the fact that both the Westerlund (2006a) cointegration test and the Banerjee and Carrion-
i-Silvestre cointegration test only generate individual country break dates, a Chow test is 
conducted on the two most frequent structural dates which are then exogenously 
incorporated as break point estimates for the panel to determine breaks dates across the 
entire panel.  
 
6.2.4 Long-run Coefficients and Error Correction Term 
 
Having established cointegration, it is important to determine the speed of adjustment as 
well as the long-run elasticities associated with the cointegration relationships. The speed 
of adjustment is estimated dynamic fixed effect estimators (DFE) following Pesaran, Shin 
and Smith (1999), Weinhold (1999) and Salim, Yao and Chen, (2017). The DFE maintains 
constant slope parameters in the long and short-run.  Having established cointegration at the 
panel and time series levels, the long-run parameters are estimated with panel FMOLS.   
 
 




6.2.5 Calculation of Efficiency Levels 
 
With the establishment of the presence of two regime breaks through a Chow test, the last 
stage of the analysis was to estimate the structural break incorporated aggregate Cobb-
Douglas production function from which the levels of TFP, NFP and the contribution of 
(CIQLEG) are determined. Secondly the growth rates of TFP (GTFP), NFP (GNFP) and 
IQLEG (GCIQLEG) are calculated to provide evidence of the role IQLEG plays in 
efficiency gains as well as its growth rate in the 21 SSA countries (See Chapter Two, Section 
2.8).  
 
6.3 Results  
 
6.3.1 Unit Root Test with Structural Breaks Results 
Individual Country Unit Root Test Results 
Results from the three-time series unit root tests (Table 6.1 Panels A, B, C, D), namely the 
Lee and Strazicich (2004) LM unit root test with a level break, the Im, Lee and Tieslau 
(2010) transformed LM statistic unit root test with a break in level and the ILT (2010) Cross-
sectionally Augmented unit root test with a break in the level of a trended model.  Ten out 
of twenty-one countries provided evidence of unit root properties for all variables. Kenya, 
Mali, Tanzania and Zimbabwe are the countries that exhibit unit root properties with and 
without structural breaks.  The rest of the countries are Cote d’Ivoire, Gabon, Mozambique, 
Niger, Sudan and South Africa. The importance of structural breaks is confirmed as the 
results show that structural breaks make a difference in the unit root testing as five countries 
from the no break tests are eliminated when breaks are introduced.  




Table 6.1: Panel A: Unit Root Tests with One Level and Trend Break for LGDPPC  
 ILT (2010) Transformed LM ILT (2010) Cross-sectionally 
Augmented LM 










LM stat lag 
Level 
Break 
Botswana -5.344 0 2007 -4.795 0 2007 -1.983 1 2008 
Cote d’Ivoire -2.665 0 2007 -2.751 0 2007 -2.108 4 2010 
Congo -3.630 0 2001 -3.538 0 2001 -3.386* 8 2006 
Gabon -2.666 0 2010 -3.802 0 2010 -3.322* 7 2007 
Ghana -5.344 0 2001 -4.984 0 2001 -2.989 5 2010 
Gambia -7.220 4 1992 -7.438 4 1992 -3.357* 0 1998 
Kenya -2.793 0 2005 -2.697 0 2005 -2.670 5 2012 
Madagascar -2.674 3 1997 -2.327 3 1997 -2.856 0 2007 
Mali  2.995 3 2009  3.375 3 2009 -3.004 3 2000 
Mozambique -0.334 2 2003 -0.638 2 2003 -3.022 2 2000 
Malawi -5.830 4 1992 -5.877 4 1992 -1.779 7 2000 
Niger -2.945 0 2004 -2.628 0 2004 -1.946 2 1999 
Nigeria -8.387 4 1996 -12.65 4 1996 -2.725 8 2003 
Sudan  2.493 2 2008   3.161 2 2008 -2.093 6 2008 
Senegal -0.399 2 2000 -1.196 2 2000 -2.313 2 1996 
Sierra Leone -4.948 4 1995 -4.728 4 1995 -1.993 7 2001 
Tanzania -3.124 0 2003 -2.659 0 2003 -2.683 5 2010 
Uganda -8.278 4 1995 -12.64 4 1995 -1.748 1 2010 
South Africa  3.300 3 2007  2.616 3 2007 -2.998 7 2005 
Zambia -4.634 0 1999 -4.614 0 1999 -6.140*** 8 1996 
Zimbabwe -4.330 4 1993 -3.943 4 1993 -2.523 5 2011 
The critical values for the ILT (2010) tests are -4.904, -3.950 and -3.635 for the 1%, 5% and 10% significant levels, respectively. The Lee and   
Strazicich (2004) test has -4.239, -3.566 and -3.211 critical values for the 1%, 5% and 10% significant levels, respectively.  




            Table 6.1: Panel B Unit Root Test with One Level and Trend Break for LFD 
 ILT (2010) Transformed LM ILT (2010) Cross-sectionally 
Augmented LM 










LM stat lag 
Level 
Break 
Botswana -2.835 0 2006 -3.083* 0 2006 -3.0876* 7 2002 
Cote d’Ivoire -2.130 3 2001 -1.227 3 2001 -2.6096 4 1995 
Congo -4.716** 0 1993 -4.706** 0 1993 -2.7163 3 2008 
Gabon -1.595 0 2002 -1.444 0 2002 -5.3096*** 1 2011 
Ghana -2.510 3 1993 -2.220 3 1993 -3.1913 1 1996 
Gambia -1.438 3 2006 -0.958 3 2006 -3.2435* 3 1997 
Kenya -2.215 1 1998 -1.553 1 1998 -3.2858* 6 1997 
Madagascar -4.716** 0 2006 -4.657** 0 2006 -2.5411 3 2003 
Mali 2.207 2 2003 1.419 2 2003 -2.0962 4 2002 
Mozambique 0.009 2 1994 -0.150 2 1994 -3.1107 8 1999 
Malawi -1.062 1 2006 -1.062 1 2006 -3.1893 7 2000 
Niger -1.280 0 1995 -1.297 0 1995 -3.2829* 6 2004 
Nigeria -4.924*** 0 2005 -4.803** 0 2005 -3.3489* 8 2007 
Sudan -1.654 0 1999 -2.910 0 1999 -1.9807 1 2008 
Senegal -4.718** 0 1993 -4.656** 0 1993 -3.4126* 8 1995 
Sierra Leone 1.976 2 2006 1.883 2 2006 -2.6029 7 1998 
Tanzania -2.041 3 1998 -0.964 3 1998 -4.2872*** 1 2004 
Uganda -5.118*** 0 2004 -4.965*** 0 2004 -4.7096*** 8 2006 
South Africa 1.908 2 2001 1.758 2 2001 -2.3888 5 2006 
Zambia -0.006 3 1993 -0.118 3 1993 -2.7668 2 1996 
Zimbabwe -1.009 3 2006 -0.878 3 2006 -3.5357* 1 2009 
               The critical values for the ILT (2010) tests are -4.904, -3.950 and -3.635 for the 1%, 5% and 10% significant levels, respectively. The Lee and   
Strazicich (2004) test has -4.239, -3.566 and -3.211 critical values for the 1%, 5% and 10% significant levels, respectively 




              Table 6.1: Panel C: Unit Root Test with One Level Break for LINS 
 ILT (2010) Transformed LM ILT (2010) Cross-sectionally 
Augmented LM 










LM stat lag 
Level 
Break 
Botswana -2.836 0 2006 -5.023*** 0 2006 -4.6141*** 8 2004 
Cote d’Ivoire -1.418 0 1997 -1.925 0 1997 -2.3558 1 2009 
Congo -4.713** 0 1993 -4.578** 0 1993 -1.5889 2 1998 
Gabon -2.030 0 2001 -3.969** 0 2001 -2.9976 2 1991 
Ghana -2.590 0 1993 -2.394 0 1993 -2.1971 1 2002 
Gambia -3.600 0 2005 -5.148*** 0 2005 -6.3738*** 1 1997 
Kenya -1.336 0 1996 -1.700 0 1996 -3.9800** 4 1995 
Madagascar -4.713** 0 1993 -4.568** 0 1993 -2.2548 8 2004 
Mali -1.819 0 2000 -3.440** 0 2000 -2.4508 7 2011 
Mozambique -2.044 1 1992 -0.718 1 1992 -2.8548 7 2001 
Malawi -3.048 0 2004 -5.067*** 0 2004 -3.2384* 8 2001 
Niger -1.278 0 1995 -1.748 0 1995 -5.3590*** 8 2005 
Nigeria -4.504** 0 1992 -4.356** 0 1992 -2.7590 8 2010 
Sudan -1.652 0 1999 -2.862 0 1999 -4.4002*** 8 1995 
Senegal -5.290*** 0 1996 -5.220*** 0 1996 -3.6508* 5 2000 
Sierra Leone -2.622 0 2003 -4.743 0 2003 -2.0123 5 2010 
Tanzania -1.238 0 1994 -1.714 0 1994 -2.2085 6 1995 
Uganda -4.291** 0 1991 -4.254** 0 1991 -1.6041 6 2000 
South Africa -1.523 0 1998 -2.331 0 1998 -2.7961 7 1995 
Zambia -5.114*** 0 1995 -4.950*** 0 1995 -2.7961 7 1995 
Zimbabwe -2.292 0 2002 -4.396 0 2002 -3.1325 1 2004 
                 The critical values for the ILT (2010) tests are -4.904, -3.950 and -3.635 for the 1%, 5% and 10% significant levels, respectively. The Lee and   
   Strazicich (2004) test has -4.239, -3.566 and -3.211 critical values for the 1%, 5% and 10% significant levels, respectively 




               Table 6.1: Panel D Unit Root Test with One Level and Trend Break for LCKPP 
 ILT (2010) Transformed LM ILT (2010) Cross-sectionally 
Augmented LM 










LM stat lag 
Level 
Break 
Botswana -2.835 0 2006 -4.645** 0 2006 -1.8997 1 1996 
Cote d’Ivoire 1.824 4 2002 0.562 4 2002 -3.0422 1 2011 
Congo -4.929*** 0 2005 -5.075*** 0 2005 -2.8579 1 1995 
Gabon -2.029 0 2001 -2.041 0 2001 -2.3748 1 1997 
Ghana -2.592 0 1993 -2.861 0 1993 -2.9140 3 1995 
Gambia -3.595 0 2005 -6.739*** 0 2005 --2.3940 1 2005 
Kenya 1.746 2 1999 1.297 2 1999 -2.3670 6 2006 
Madagascar -4.717** 0 2006 -4.726** 0 2006 -2.6615 7 2006 
Mali 1.781 2 2003 3.172 2 2003 -1.5313 7 1996 
Mozambique 0.013 3 1994 0.063 3 1994 -2.8839 2 2012 
Malawi -3.043 0 2004 -4.681** 0 2004 -2.7744 2 2009 
Niger 2.153 2 1998 1.672 2 1998 -3.6301* 6 2001 
Nigeria -4.927*** 0 2005 -5.107*** 0 2005 -1.4986 5 2000 
Sudan -2.108 2 2000 -2.099 2 2000 -3.5649* 7 2004 
Senegal 0.010 3 1993 0.078 3 1993 -3.1263 8 2005 
Sierra Leone -1.957 2 2004 -2.78 2 2004 -1.5993 7 1998 
Tanzania 2.924 3 1997 1.962 3 1997 -1.0297 8 2005 
Uganda -5.120*** 0 2004 -5.371*** 0 2004 -3.3799* 1 1995 
South Africa 2.931 3 2001 2.131 3 2001 -2.9746 1 1995 
Zambia 0.003 4 1994 0.391 4 1994 -2.1900 1 1997 
Zimbabwe -2.289 0 2002 -2.883 0 2002 -2.2398 1 2011 
                 The critical values for the ILT (2010) tests are -4.904, -3.950 and -3.635 for the 1%, 5% and 10% significant levels, respectively. The Lee and   
   Strazicich (2004) test has -4.239, -3.566 and -3.211 critical values for the 1%, 5% and 10% significant levels, respectively 
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It is interesting to note that the number of countries that exhibit unit root properties are 10 
when there are no breaks and 10 when there are breaks. The elimination of certain countries 
buttresses the assertion that structural breaks often render non-stationary series more 
stationary (See Ben-David and Papell 1998; ILT, 2010; Amsler and Lee, 1995; Carrion-i-
Silvestre, Barrio-Castro and Lopez-Bazo, 2005). Whilst the Lee and Strazicich (2004) tests 
resulted in the selection of 11 countries, the ILT (2010) transformed test (TLM) yielded a 
total of 10 whilst the ILT (2010) cross-sectional augmented test (CALM) yielded 7 
countries. To provide confirmation, only countries that had unit root properties in at least 
two tests were selected. 
 
 Panel Stationarity Test Results 
The results for all variables on the panel front depicted in Table 6.2 indicate that the null 
hypothesis of stationarity is strongly rejected in favour of the alternative of unit root when 
the test is run providing for two structural breaks in the level of the panel with a trend in the 
model.  Thus, the Carrion-i-Silvestre, Barrio-Castro and Lopez-Bazo (2005) panel 
stationarity test provided evidence in support of the unit root with a p-value of the test 
statistic being 0.000 for both the Bartlett and the Quadratic spectral kernel regardless of the 
assumption concerning the heterogeneity in the long-run variance estimate.  
 
These results indicate that the null hypothesis of panel stationarity is strongly rejected. The 
LWZ information criteria was used to determine the breaks. The result of the panel 
stationarity test with breaks confirmed the results from the panel unit root tests without 
structural breaks. The evidence however seemed to be stronger for the test that included 
level breaks, which were determined at the individual country level. The conclusion drawn 
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from the two tests is that, at the panel level, all the variables have unit root with or without 
structural breaks and cross-sectional dependence. 
 
Table 6.2: Carrion-i-Silvestre, Barrio-Castro and Lopez-Bazo (2005) Panel Stationarity 
Test with Breaks 
Variable Bartlett Test (p-value) Quadratic Test (p-value) 
Homo Hetero Homo Hetero 
LGDPPC 7.795*** 19.162*** 7.235*** 15.406*** 
     
LFD 6.889*** 6.104*** 10.175*** 14.938*** 
     
LINS 3.073*** 3.883*** 2.0431** 5.995*** 
     
LCKPP 6.895*** 6.325*** 35.2814*** 90.864*** 
    
Note: The null hypothesis is that variables are stationary. The panel is made up of 21 SSA countries over 31 
years. Break points are estimated based on LWZ information criteria and allowing for a maximum of mm" = 
2 Structural breaks. The long-run variance is estimated using both the Bartlett and the Quadratic spectral kernel 
with automatic spectral window bandwidth selection as in Andrews (1991), Andrews and Monahan (1992) 
and Phillips and Sul (2003) as conducted in Carrion-i-Silvestre, Barrio-Castro and Lopez-Bazo (2005). (***), 
(**) and (*) denote rejection at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively 
 
 
Evidence of Stability Test 
A country by country analysis of the need to include structural breaks in the cointegration 
analysis shows that the Engle-Granger ADF t-ratio statistic rejects the null of non - 
cointegration for only 10% at the 5% significance level and 30% at the 10% significance   
level. However, the Gregory and Hansen (1996) ADF t-ratio test shows that, with a single 
regime shift, 40% of the sample rejects the null hypothesis of cointegration at the 5% level 
of significance. The inclusion of a single structural break thus changes the cointegration 
status of the selected countries considerably. To further complement the above tests, results 
from the mean-F statistic and sup-F statistic from Hansen (1992) result in 90% and 90% 
rejection of the null at 10% significance level, respectively. The outcome of the various tests 
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for stability therefore makes an initial case for including structural breaks in the 
cointegration models (Banerjee and Carrion-i-Silvestre, 2015). 
 
6.3.2 Cointegration Test Results 
Individual Country Results 
Results from the Gregory and Hansen (1996) test for the level break with trend (C/T), the 
regime change, and the full structural break (C/T/S) models are presented in Table 6.3. 
These results suggest that, for the C/T break, both the ADF*(t) and Phillips (Zt) statistics 
suggest the presence of cointegration in Mali, Mozambique, Niger and Sudan with the 
cointegration test, with break dates of 2010, 2009, 1992 and 2009, respectively. These four 
countries again significantly rejected the null of no cointegration for the full structural break 
model (C/S/T).  
 
The full structural break model reported structural breaks in 2005, 1996, 1995 and 2006 for 
the Phillips (Zt) for the four countries, respectively, and 2005, 2001, 2004 and 1992, 
respectively, for the four countries with the ADF*(t) statistic. However, for the regime shift, 
Gabon, Mali, Mozambique, Niger and Tanzania are the countries that rejected the null of 
no cointegration with 2009, 1999, 2003, 2006 and 1999 as the break date estimates. It is 
interesting to note that, for the Gregory and Hansen cointegration test, out of the 10 
countries, Mali, Mozambique, Niger and Sudan significantly rejected the null of no 
cointegration for each type of structural break, although the break dates varied.  
 
Six countries rejected the null of no cointegration in the Hatemi-J (2008) cointegration test. 
The Hatemi-J (2008) cointegration test extends the Gregory and Hansen (1996) test by 
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considering two regime shifts. Results presented on Table 6.4 are indicative of the fact that 
the break affects both the level and slope of the cointegrating vector of the model. Results 
from applying this test for the Modified ADF*(t) test (MADF), Cote d’Ivoire, Gabon, Mali, 
Mozambique, Niger and Sudan suggest evidence of cointegration with break estimates of 
1995 and 2004, 1999 and 2003, 1997 and 2005, 1996 and 2004, 1996 and 2003, and 2001 
and 2004, respectively.  
 
Mali, Mozambique, Niger and Sudan strongly rejected the null of no cointegration in the 
presence of two structural breaks. Kenya, South Africa, Tanzania and Zimbabwe did not 
reject the null of no cointegration. The Modified Philips (Zt) statistic indicates that, apart 
from Gabon, all the countries that had cointegrated variables in the Gregory and Hansen 
(1996) test, were still cointegrated. Cote d’Ivoire, Mali and Mozambique reported the same 
break dates as in the Modified ADF*(t) test.  
 
Sudan’s estimated break dates were 1995 and 2001. It is interesting to note that with the 
introduction of two structural breaks, the evidence in support for cointegration becomes 
stronger. This implies that more countries reject the null especially for the Modified 
ADF*(t) test when two structural breaks are considered. The incorporation of events that 
shift the intercept and the slope of the cointegrating vector leads to higher rejections of the 
null.   
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Table 6.3: Gregory and Hansen (1996) Cointegration with a Structural Break  
Country 
C/T C/S C/S/T 
ADF BREAK Zt BREAK ADF BREAK Zt BREAK ADF BREAK Zt BREAK 
Cote d'Ivoire -3.32 2008 -2.92 1990 -4.01 1993 -3.20 2003 -4.93 2005 -3.72 2002 
Gabon -4.29 2010 -4.87 2006 -5.59* 2009 -4.98 2000 -5.67 2004 -4.97 2004 
Kenya -4.25 1992 -4.70 1989 -5.64 1995 -4.25 1993 -5.29 1993 -5.38 1993 
Mali -5.80** 2010 -5.9** 2010 -5.97* 1999 -6.7*** 1999 -9.25*** 2005 -9.41*** 2005 
Mozambique -71.19*** 2009 -5.27 1990 -18.34*** 2003 -8.45*** 1996 -23.86*** 2001 -8.46*** 1996 
Niger -5.35* 1992 -5.44* 1992 -5.72 2006 -5.82* 1996 -6.28* 2004 -6.39** 1995 
Sudan -5.35* 2009 -4.99 2010 -6.45 2001 -5.14 1998 -7.14*** 1992 -6.31* 2006 
South Africa -4.4 1990 -3.97 2002 -5.06 2005 -4.91 1998 -5.28 2005 -5.11 2000 
Tanzania -4.85 2003 -4.64 2003 -5.92* 1996 -6.31** 2010 -4.95 2004 -4.93 2003 
Zimbabwe -4.3 2002 -3.55 2005 -5.06 2002 -4.75 2003 -4.72 2004 -4.69 2003 
Critical Values for Gregory and Hansen (1996) for C/T are Z-t at 1%=-6.05, 5%= -5.57 and 10%= -5.33 for C/S; Z-t at 1% = -6.51   5% = -6.00 and 10% is -5.75 and critical 
values for C/S/T; 1% = -6.89, 5%= -6.32 and 10%= -6.16 (H0: No Cointegration).  (***), (**) and (*) denote rejection at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively 
 
 









AR Breaks Zt Breaks 
Cote d'Ivoire -7.1480* 0 (1995,2004) -7.270* (1995,2004) 
Gabon -9.3827*** 4 (1999,2003) -5.702 (1991,1993) 
Kenya -6.0789 3 (1996,2005) -6.160 (1993,2002) 
Mali -8.3276*** 0 (1997,2005) -8.470*** (1997,2005) 
Mozambique -7.9608*** 0 (1996,2004) -9.349*** (1996,1996) 
Niger -8.8661*** 0 (1996,2003) -9.781*** (1996,2001) 
Sudan -8.0725*** 2 (2001,2004) -8.942*** (1995,2001) 
South Africa -7.0594 3 (1989,1999) -6.033 (1990,1998) 
Tanzania -7.0672 1 (1993,2002) -5.165 (1994,2004) 
Zimbabwe -5.8728 0 (1994,2003) -5.973 (1996,2001) 
 Note: Null hypothesis is no cointegration. Hatemi-J Critical Values 1% = -7.833   5% = -7.352 and  
10% is -7.118.  (***), (**) and (*) denote rejection at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively 
 
 
The results from the individual countries suggest that when institutions for high quality 
growth are incorporated into TFP in the Cobb-Douglas production framework, financial 
development and economic growth have a long-run association. The preceding statement 
holds for Cote d’Ivoire, Gabon, Mali, Mozambique, Niger and Sudan in the presence of 
different types of structural breaks. The results support the finance-institutions-growth 
hypothesis as proposed by Demetriades and Law (2006), Murinde (2012), Balach and Law 
(2015) and Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998). However, this association does not 
hold for Kenya, South Africa, Tanzania and Zimbabwe and so does not support Law, 
Azman-Saini and Ibrahim (2013), Pagano and Jappelli (1993) and Levine (2005). 
 
Panel Cointegration with Structural Breaks Results 
With the establishment of panel unit roots in variables, the results for the panel cointegration 
tests are presented. The Westerlund (2006a) cointegration test rejects its null hypothesis of 
cointegration even when there are multiple structural breaks. The results presented in Table 




6.5 show that, for the SSA selected countries, institutional quality as per Rodrik (2000) has 
no significant relationship with financial development, capital and economic growth even 
when level and trend structural breaks are accounted for. This result confirms the outcomes 
of the Pedroni (1999) and Westerlund (2005) cointegration tests conducted in the previous 
section without structural breaks. Evidence from Menyah, Nazlioglu, and Wolde-Rufael, 
(2014) and Gries and Meierrieks, (2013), support the result of no cointegration among 
financial development and economic growth in a group of SSA countries.  
 
The Westerlund (2006a) results are however contrary to the school of thought that views 
institution quality as the game changer for financial development to make significant 
positive impact on growth in developing countries based on the experience of the developed 
world that have seemingly robust financial systems. These include Acemoglu, Johnson and 
Robinson (2004), Djankov, McLeish and Shleifer (2007), Anayiotos and Toroyan (2009), 
Osili and Paulson (2008), Beck, Levine and Loayza, (2000). 
 
Table 6.5:  Westerlund (2006a) Panel Cointegration Test with Breaks 
Model One break Two breaks 
break in constant 21.701 19.829 
break in constant and 
trend 
15.837 25.416 
Note: Null hypothesis: Cointegration. Breaks are for individual countries. Critical values  
are on the left tail of the standard normal distribution. (***), (**) and (*) denote rejection  
at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively 
 
 
It is important to state that the results of the Westerlund (2006a) cointegration test for a 
single level break with trend, as well as that for two breaks in level and trend seem to 
confirm the Gregory and Hansen (1996) level and trend break test results. That is because,  




only four out of 21 countries rejected the null of cointegration whilst the Hatemi-J (2008) 
test with two regime shifts performed slightly better. This may be partly due to the fact that 
the Westerlund (2006a) cointegration test does not make room for regime shifts. An 
important issue for consideration could be that of regime shifts with a trend at the panel 
level. It is important to incorporate cross-sectional dependence as the panel has clearly 
exhibited the existence of cross-sectional dependence at the univariate level. It is against 
this background that the Banerjee and Carrion-i-Silvestre (2015) test is considered next. 
 
Panel Cointegration with Structural Breaks and Cross-Sectional Dependence 
The results for the panel cointegration test by Banerjee and Carrion-i-Silvestre (2015) are 
presented in Table 6.6. The results indicate that for all models estimated, both the Pseudo t- 
ratio and the Bias rho-tests for LGDPPC, LFD, LINS and LCKPP reject the null of no 
cointegration at all levels of significance and conclude that cointegration exists among the 
variables. Indeed, Model A, which includes a level break with a time trend, indicates that 
42.86% of the individual countries reject the null of cointegration at the 5% level of 
significance; whilst in Model B, which includes a regime shift, 52.38% rejected the null at 
the 5% level of significance.  
 
With respect to the presence of common stochastic trends, both the parametric and non-
parametric MQ tests strongly support the presence of common factors. This is confirmed 
when both tests yield the maximum number of common factors, 12. This implies that it is 
of paramount importance to account for any common factors as conducted by the BC (2015) 
test to avoid any misspecification or incorrect results. Indeed, with the inclusion of common 
factors and two regime shifts, the results contrast what was depicted in the Westerlund 




(2006a) LM statistic. This may be an indication that the Westerlund (2006a) cointegration 
test may be relatively inadequate to accommodate strong cross-sectional dependence.  
Table 6.6: Banerjee and Carrion-i-Silvestre (2015) Cointegration in Panel Data with 
Breaks and Cross-section Dependence 
  Model A Model B 
Pseudo-t  -13.6080 -4.2411 
Bias rho-test -21.3534 -11.9865 
% Individual rejections at the 5% level of sig  52.38% 42.86% 
Common stochastic trends   
MQ test (Non - parametric) -29.5177 -28.8943 
N̂Pr : Number of common factors (Non parametric) 12 12 
MQ test (Parametric) -29.6621 -28.6889 
P̂r : Number of common factors (Parametric) 12 12 
Note: Parametric Statistics for the Panel Cointegration Test. Sample: 1985-2015. The null hypothesis is no 
cointegration. Under the null hypothesis both statistics have an N (0, 1) distribution. Full panel (N=21), Cross-
section dependence. Model A includes a level shift with a time trend and model B includes two regime shifts 
with a time trend. Modal common breaks were identified in 1989 and 2009 
 
The BC (2015) test thus provides strong evidence in favour of a stable long-run relationship 
between GDPPC, FD, INS and CKPP.  The most common break dates identified are 1989 
and 2009, which is similar to the dates from the Carrion-i-Silvestre, Barrio-Castro and 
Lopez-Bazo (2005) test and Chin and Eto (2005). The Chow test results from Table 6.7 
further confirms the existence of the break dates of 1989 and 2009. Overall, the BC (2015) 
test has confirmed the hypothesis that institutional quality linked efficiency gains are made 
in the finance-growth nexus in the SSA panel when structural breaks and cross-sectional 
dependence are accounted for.  
 
Table 6.7: Chow Testing for the Common Break Points 
Test Statistics df p-value 
Chow test 35.4739*** 4,643 0.0000 
Note: Null no breaks at specified break points. The rejection of the null provides  
evidence to support the presence of structural breaks at stated years. (***), (**)  
and (*) denote rejection at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 




The importance of structural breaks needs to be stressed here. The Westerlund (2006a) 
cointegration test does not make provision for a regime Shift. It may be conjectured that; 
the presence of regime shifts as indicated by Banerjee and Carrion-i-Silvestre (2015) may 
have made the impact of structural beaks significant. Again, the depiction of common-
factors is an indication that a property that corrects for non- spatial CSD was built into the 
BC (2015) test. According to BC (2015), this property is strong enough to allow for a greater 
effect on the adverse effects of CSD compared to other similar tests. Based on this, even the 
level break model in the BC test is able to capture the significant effect of structural breaks. 
In addition, the time series cointegration test results make a strong case for the importance 
of structural breaks given that both the Hatemi-J (2008) and Gregory and Hansen (1996) 
cointegration tests generate entirely different sets of countries with cointegration variables 
from the Engle-Granger (1987) and Johannsen (1999) cointegration tests.  
 
This result brings to the fore the importance and effect of structural breaks on economic 
phenomena and interactions and relations among economic variables. These results support 
the hypothesis that financial development, enhanced financial development and institutional 
quality have a long-run relation or association with economic growth as propelled by higher 
productivity levels. Work done by Akinci, Akinci and Yilmaz (2014), Huang (2005), Bordo 
and Raussaeu (2006), Huang (2010), Acemoglu, Gallego and Robinson (2014), Balach and 
Law (2015) and Demetriades and Law (2006) affirm this position, while Papaioanno (2007) 
contrasts these findings. However, these results are not based on models with structural 
breaks except for Huang (2010) who conducts before and after studies.  
 
 




6.3.3 Structural Breaks in SSA  
Individual Country Structural Break Analysis 
The level break with trend shift estimates in the Gregory and Hansen (1996) test show that 
Congo was marked by very series political and tribal wars mainly involving the Tsutsi rebels 
in the 1998-2000 era and the country was renamed the Democratic Republic of Congo. The 
president, Laurent-Desire Kabila installed as president in 1997 was overthrown and shot in 
2001. In Mali, the year 1999 specified for both test statistics is close to the year 2000 when 
the ban on political parties was lifted in the country after a military coup imposed the ban 
in 1994. Mozambique becoming a member of the Commonwealth in 1995 seemed to be a 
plausible reason for a regime break in the estimated year of 1996.   
 
Senegal is estimated to have had a regime break in 1996, which is close to the era when the 
military wing of the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC) began an 
armed rebellion against the government of Senegal. Finally, under the Gregory and Hansen 
(1996) test with a regime break, the estimated break year of 1997 in Sierra Leone reflects a 
coup d’état in May 1995. The army deposed President Kabbah, the constitution was 
suspended and a ban was placed on demonstrations whilst political parties were abolished. 
In 1997, the Commonwealth suspended Sierra Leone and sanctions were imposed by the 
UN. The supply of arms and petroleum products was barred (www.bbc.com). 
 
In terms of the Hatemi-J (2008) test of cointegration with two regime shifts, the results show 
that more countries experience breaks in both level and slope. Since the Hatemi-J (2008) 
cointegration with two breaks is an extension of the Gregory and Hansen (1996) test, the 




 findings from both tests are compared. The first country of interest was Congo, which 
recorded regime changes in 2000 and 2003 in both tests.  The same can be said for Mali, 
Mozambique and Senegal. Congo was quite turbulent in the 2001 period.  
 
Due to political unrest and tribal conflicts, the United Nations Security Council drafted a 
5,500-strong United Nations’ force to monitor the ceasefire between rebels and government 
forces, and between Rwandan and Ugandan forces although the fighting continued. The war 
was estimated to have taken two and a half million lives. In the same year, Congo’s 
president, Laurent Kabila was assassinated.  On the flip side, Gabon reports two regime 
shifts in the Hatemi-J (2008) test with a cointegrating relationship among variables whilst 
the results were not significant for same in the Gregory and Hansen (1996) test. 
Interestingly, Gabon moved from being insignificant under one break to significant under 
two regime breaks.   
 
Having found evidence of cointegration from the individual country tests, panel 
cointegration tests are conducted to increase the power of the tests. It must be noted that in 
the time series analysis, some countries were removed from the sample as a result of 
stationarity properties of their data at levels. It is interesting to note that the panel unit root 
and stationarity tests yielded evidence of non-stationarity for the dataset when taken 
together as a panel. For this purpose, the Pedroni (1999, 2004) and Westerlund (2005) panel 
cointegration tests that did not allow for any structural breaks were first employed and then 
we applied panel cointegration tests in the presence of structural breaks. 
 
 




Panel Structural Breaks Analysis 
The importance of structural breaks in studies and analyses premised in SSA cannot be 
overemphasized as the region is characterized by several occurrences that have the potential 
to change the structure of the economy. The 1980s to early 2000s were years characterized 
by the World Bank’s structural adjustment programs for countries such as those in the SSA 
and especially the West African zone. Ghana and Nigeria in West Africa, and Zambia, 
which is in eastern SSA, are the commonly cited ones.  
 
These structural adjustments, which affected the whole continent as they were adopted by 
many countries in the region, came with conditions such as financial liberalization. This 
liberalization typically saw many countries changing their financial structure and opening 
their economies to higher levels of international trade as well as moving away from fixed 
foreign exchange regimes. Many countries transitioned from military rule into democracies 
during the 1990s and early 2000s. On the other side of structural changes, SSA countries 
continued to experience armed tribal wars and ethnic conflicts, which affected the structure 
of the economy. The Liberian war, Rwandan genocide and Burundi wars in the 1990s had 
a toll on the continent as many countries joined the war.  
 
In the late 1980s and up to the mid-1990s, the southern region of the continent underwent 
many transformations. Notable among these transformations were the creation of a 
decolonized Namibia; the end of apartheid in South Africa; Boko Haram insurgency and 
Niger Delta conflicts in Nigeria in 2009; the Ivorian civil war in 2010; the Tuareg 
insurgency rebellion in Mali in the 2007 to 2009 period; and the Azawad insurgency in 
Niger from 2007 to 2009.  




The financial crises of 2006 to 2008 in Europe and North America took its toll on the African 
continent as a whole and may have resulted in a shift in the structure of the continent’s 
financial sector and economy as a whole. Essers (2013) and Allen and Giovannetti (2011) 
among others attest to the effects of the financial crises on SSA. Indeed, this was a period 
when Africa, as a continent, moved from post-colonization unstable political regimes, 
closed and repressive economic system to democratization, open and liberal economic 
systems and the continent began to embrace globalization at a fast pace.  
 
The underlying fact is that the model, without structural breaks, may have been misspecified 
as the results change when a single break among the many, which may have affected SSA 
and more specifically these 21 countries, is recognized. The overall conclusion from this 
section is that financial development and institutions have long-run associations with 
economic growth. However, for a region like SSA, neglecting the role played by structural 
breaks may distort the outcome of this long-run association and thus affect both policy and 
economic outcomes.  
 
6.3.4 Cointegration Regressions and Error Correction  
Individual Country Long-run Coefficients and Error Correction  
To examine the relationship between growth, financial development, institutional quality 
and capital stock at the individual country level, the four countries that are cointegrated in 
both the Gregory and Hansen (1996) and the Hatemi-J (2008) cointegration tests were 
selected. The selection of countries was based on the Zt statistics as the test has the 
advantage of allowing for general forms of serial correlation when compared to the ADF 
statistic. It is also the best in terms of size and power (You and Sarantis, 2012). 




Considering the fact that the Gregory and Hansen (1996) full break model incorporates all 
three types of structural breaks, we selected the model that represents this full break and 
estimate an OLS regression and an error correction term using the Engle-Granger (1987) 
two-step method. These countries include Mali, Mozambique, Niger and Sudan. The long-
run relationships between variables are investigated in each of these countries to ascertain 
the speed of adjustment as well as the elasticities associated with each of the variables. Table 
6.8 reports the regression coefficients and ECT.    
 
The adjustment coefficients for all four countries are between 0 and -1, strongly significant 
and higher in magnitude compared to the no-break case. Indeed, Mali’s error correction 
term of -0.877 is significantly higher than the -0.572 in the no break case. These relatively 
higher speeds of adjustment indicate that, when structural breaks are incorporated into 
specifying long-run dynamic relationships between economic growth, financial 
development and institutional quality, the system adjusts to equilibrium much more quickly 
than when there are no structural breaks. Mozambique had the highest adjustment factor of 
93.95% to show that 93.95% of disequilibrium in the system is corrected within a year. The 
rest of the countries also exhibited very high speeds of adjustment and thus further 
established the long-run causal relationships among financial development, institutional 
quality, capital and economic growth in these four countries.  
  
With respect to the various elasticities estimated from the least squares regressions, the 
coefficient of technological progress is positive and highly significant before the trend 
break. However, it becomes insignificant in Mali and Sudan after the break. A negative NFP 
could be because Mali underwent some political instability, severe food shortage due to 




locust infections and a prolonged conflict fuelled by rebels in the 2004 and 2006 period. 
Sudan faced a major war period from 2005 and beyond. Before and after the structural break, 
Mali, Mozambique and Sudan’s institutional quality variable was not significantly 
associated with growth whilst it was highly significant in Niger. However, after each 
country’s structural break, institutional quality development was found to be significant in 
Mali, Sudan and Niger, although the relationship seems to be negative in Sudan.  
 
However, only Mali and Niger have the break parameter associated with financial 
development to be negative. Interestingly, Niger’s financial development and institutional 
quality after the break have a negative effect with economic growth. Bezemera, Grydakib 
and Zhanga (2014) attribute a negative but significant financial development to a shift in 
the composition of credit in recent decades, away from non-financial business and towards 
real estate asset markets. Rousseau and Wachtel (2011) state that it is because the short-run 
effect may be negative as a result of the financial crisis. Both the shift from non-financial 
business and financial crises are viable explanations for Niger and Mali (Ketteni, 
Mamuneas, Stengos and Savvides, 2007). 
 
 
Both financial Development and institutional quality were insignificant in Mozambique 
before and after the break, while only institutions are insignificant in Mali and Sudan. These 
findings are in line with Kandi (2009) and Olson (1992; 1996). The negative and statistically 
significant coefficient indicates deterioration in institutional quality, a situation that may 
provide opportunities for connected businesses from the politically elite and interest groups 
who have motivation to lobby the government solely in their favour, affecting the state 




effectiveness to deal with market failure and potentially adversely affect economic 
prosperity. Capital stock in Niger was found to be insignificant before and after the break. 
This does not conform to apriori expectations as proposed by Pagano (1993) and 
Demetriades and Law (2006).  
 
 
For the panel, Table 6.9 indicates for the OLS estimator, all parameters were significant 
before and after the breaks, although the signs were different.  Interestingly, for both the 
FMOLS and the OLS estimators, the slope shifts in 2009 revealed a negative parameter was 
significant. The effect of the 2008 global financial crisis could be evident here. The 
estimates for institutional quality were also negative in slope shift of the 1989 for both 
estimators. This could also be attributable to the weak institutional framework that propelled 
the need for the economic recovery programs in SSA. Capital was found to have a 
significantly positive association with growth in the pooled OLS estimation whilst only the 
first regime was significant for capital in the FMOLS estimator.  
 
 
Whilst the level shift in 1989 was positive for both estimators that of 2009 was negative. 
For both estimators, the time trend was negatively associated with GDPPC growth. This 
negative parameter estimate indicates that, on average, the value of GDP per capita growth 
fell in the panel. Effectively the results indicate that FD, INS and CKPP have a significant 
and positive relationship with economic growth in the SSA region. Thus, the proposed role 
of IQLEG conforms to theoretical standpoints. The speed of adjustment is negative, 
significant and the value falls between zero and negative one. The value shows that the 




economy of the panel is able to go back to its equilibrium position 9.98% of the time. This 
is interesting since it is an indication that even when structural breaks are considered, with 
adequately working institutions and better financial development, about 90% of the system 
at the panel level remains in disequilibrium by the next period. 




      Table 6.8: Time Series Regression Coefficients and ECT with a Structural Break in Level, Trend and Coefficient Slope 
COUNTRY 
MALI MOZ NIGER SUDAN 
coeff. std. error coeff. std. error coeff. std. error coeff. std. error 
D1 8.2055* 4.5690 -0.8751 1.7565 2.7088*** 0.6321 -0.7898 4.3376 
TREND 0.0022*** 0.0004 0.0035*** 0.0004 0.0019*** 0.0002 0.0038*** 0.0001 
TRENDD1 0.0859 0.0578 0.0551*** 0.0160 0.0083** 0.0038 0.0101 0.0535 
LFD 0.5518*** 0.1503 -0.1123 0.0787 0.3090** 0.1369 -0.1391*** 0.0371 
LINS -0.1511 0.1113 0.0255 0.0657 0.2149*** 0.0653 0.0007 0.0362 
LCKPP 0.1772*** 0.0588 1.9484*** 0.3792 0.1173 0.1971 0.2677*** 0.0344 
LFDD1 -2.5425* 1.3031 -0.0551 0.2938 -0.4626*** 0.1525 -0.0313 0.8274 
LINSD1 1.1536 0.7927 -0.0714 0.1845 -0.3763*** 0.1165 0.3791 0.3602 
LCKPPD1 -0.7616* 0.4364 -2.0544*** 0.4003 0.1026 0.2496 -0.1609 0.1608 
ECT -0.8771***     (0.3068) -0.9395***  (0.1859) -0.8261***  (0.1786)  -0.8832***  (0.1784) 
Note: (***), (**) and (*) denote rejection at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Standard errors in (). The break date (D1) for Mali is 2005, Niger, 1996,  
Mozambique, 1995 and Sudan, 2006. FMOLS estimation 
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Table 6.9: Panel Cointegration Vectors and Error Correction Models 
Variable Pooled OLS FMOLS ECT  
Speed of Adjustment   
-0.0998*** 
(0.0209) 
    
LFD 
0.2444*** 0.2316***  
(0.0079) (0.0106)  
    
LFD1989 
0.0144** 0.0229**  
(0.0068) (0.0105)  
    
LFD2009 
-0.0807*** -0.0876***  
(0.0076) (0.0125)  
    
LINS 
0.3920*** 0.4187***  
(0.0136) (0.0160)  
    
LINS1989 
-0.2694*** -0.2894***  
(0.0143) (0.0172)  
    
LINS2009 
0.1964*** 0.2331***  
(0.0249) (0.0308)  
    
LCKPP 
0.0943*** 0.0974***  
(0.0026) (0.0047)  
    
LCKPP1989 
0.0352*** 0.0365  
(0.0023) (0.0044)  
    
LCKPP2009 
0.0043* -0.0015  
(0.0025) (0.004)  
   
D1989 
0.6978*** 0.7173***  
(0.0316) (0.0485)  
    
D2009 
-0.2137** -0.2816***  
(0.0715) (0.1042)  
    
TIME TREND 
-0.0024*** -0.0028***  
(0.0004)  (0.0003)  
AIC 1.9434 -0.1632  
BIC 2.1363 -0.0058   
Notes: The results are based on the two break point estimates derived from Banerjee and Carrion (2015)  
cointegration test with a regime shift and trend. (***), (**) and (*) denote rejection at 1%, 5% and 10%, 
respectively. Standard errors in (). Error Correction Term (ECT) was obtained from a dynamic fixed  
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These results are similar to Esso (2010) who studies the cointegrating and causal 
relationship between financial development and economic growth in the ECOWAS sub-
region between 1960 and 2005. Esso (2010) reveals a long-run relationship between 
financial development and economic growth in six countries, namely Burkina Faso, Cape 
Verde, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Liberia and Sierra Leone. The results are obtained from the 
application of the Gregory and Hansen cointegration tests with level, level with trend as 
well as regime shifts. The results are consistent with Prochniak and Wasiak (2017) and 
Bist and Bista (2018).  
6.4   Productivity Generation  
6.4.1 The Cobb-Douglas Production Function-TFP, NFP and Contribution of 
IQLEG to Productivity with Structural Break in Individual Countries  
The annual contribution of IQLEG to TFP for Mali, Mozambique, Niger and Sudan are 
discussed in this section. These tables depict the estimated role played by financial 
development conditioned on institutional quality towards the overall productivity of the 
production function framework each year in each country holding all other variables 
constant whilst the figures provide a pictorial view of the estimates. Whilst the results 
for all four countries are discussed in the main text, only the table and figure for Mali are 
presented in the main text with the rest provided in Appendix D. 
 
TFP, NFP and Contribution of IQLEG to Productivity in Mali with a Break 
The highest level of IQLEG was in 2011 whilst the lowest was in 1995 when the 
contribution was 1.8322. Before the break (1985-2005), the average contribution of 
IQLEG to productivity was 30.27% whilst it increased slightly to 30.95% after the break 
(Table 6.10).  
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         Table 6.10: Productivity Estimations with a Break for Mali 
Levels of TFP, NFP and CIQLEG   Growth Rate of TFP, NFP and CIQLEG 
Year TFP NFP IQLEG   Year TFP NFP IQLEG 
1985 6.2895 4.4092 1.8804  1985 Na na na 
1986 6.2846 4.3689 1.9156  1986 -0.0050 -0.0402 0.0353 
1987 6.2559 4.3257 1.9302  1987 -0.0287 -0.0432 0.0145 
1988 6.3000 4.3999 1.9001  1988 0.0441 0.0742 -0.0301 
1989 6.3119 4.4358 1.8761  1989 0.0119 0.0358 -0.0239 
1990 6.2529 4.3612 1.8917  1990 -0.0590 -0.0745 0.0156 
1991 6.3297 4.4050 1.9248  1991 0.0768 0.0438 0.0330 
1992 6.2612 4.3309 1.9302  1992 -0.0686 -0.0741 0.0055 
1993 6.2454 4.3680 1.8773  1993 -0.0158 0.0371 -0.0529 
1994 6.2380 4.3919 1.8460  1994 -0.0074 0.0239 -0.0313 
1995 6.1985 4.3662 1.8322  1995 -0.0395 -0.0257 -0.0138 
1996 6.2162 4.3412 1.8750  1996 0.0177 -0.0250 0.0427 
1997 6.2321 4.3547 1.8774  1997 0.0159 0.0135 0.0024 
1998 6.2760 4.3966 1.8794  1998 0.0439 0.0419 0.0020 
1999 6.3016 4.4384 1.8632  1999 0.0256 0.0418 -0.0162 
2000 6.2703 4.3949 1.8755  2000 -0.0313 -0.0435 0.0123 
2001 6.3805 4.4831 1.8974  2001 0.1102 0.0882 0.0220 
2002 6.3786 4.4215 1.9571  2002 -0.0020 -0.0616 0.0597 
2003 6.4312 4.4304 2.0007  2003 0.0526 0.0090 0.0436 
2004 6.4079 4.3898 2.0180  2004 -0.0233 -0.0406 0.0173 
2005 6.4294 4.4324 1.9970  2005 0.0215 0.0426 -0.0210 
2006 6.8185 4.5061 2.3124  2006 na na na 
2007 6.8794 4.5906 2.2888  2007 0.0609 0.0845 -0.0236 
2008 6.9485 4.6705 2.2780  2008 0.0692 0.0799 -0.0108 
2009 7.0242 4.7761 2.2481  2009 0.0757 0.1057 -0.0299 
2010 7.1238 4.8503 2.2736  2010 0.0996 0.0741 0.0255 
2011 7.2340 4.9455 2.2884  2011 0.1101 0.0952 0.0149 
2012 7.1872 5.0364 2.1507  2012 -0.0468 0.0909 -0.1377 
2013 7.1903 5.1071 2.0831  2013 0.0031 0.0707 -0.0676 
2014 7.2505 5.2094 2.0411  2014 0.0602 0.1023 -0.0420 
2015 7.2995 5.2998 1.9997  2015 0.0490 0.0904 -0.0414 
Mean rates in selected periods    Mean growth rates in selected periods 
(1985 – 2005) 6.2996 4.3927 1.9069  (1985 – 2005) 0.0070 0.0012 0.0058 
(2006 – 2015) 7.0956 4.8992 2.1964  (2006 – 2015) 0.0534 0.0882 -0.0347 
Notes: NFP: net factor productivity (technical progress); TFP: total factor productivity; CIQLEG: 
Contribution of institutional quality linked efficiency gain to total factor productivity. All series are 
in natural logarithm. GNFP: growth rate of net factor productivity (technical progress); GTFP: 
growth rate of total factor productivity; GIQLEG: growth rate of contribution of institutional quality 









Figure 6.1:  TFP, NFP and Contribution of IQLEG to Productivity in Mali  









86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12 14
Total Factor Productivity
Net Factor Productivity  
Source: Author, 2019 
 
Implicitly, the occurrence of the break did not change the level of IQLEG by much. NFP 
was consistent over the period and increased slightly after the break. The evidence 
supports a positive contribution of IQLEG towards the growth rate of TFP before the 
break but a negative contribution after the break. In terms of the growth rates, 
interestingly, negative growth rates were experienced for CIQLEG in the second regime, 
although that was the highest average contribution period in terms of magnitude. This 
shows that during the second regime, NFP was high whilst IQLEG was negatively 
impacting productivity. Figure 6.1 depicts the levels of the average NFP and TFP. The 
gap between the two lines provides a visual idea of the contribution of IQLEG.  
 
The figure shows that Mozambique’s IQLEG level was negative throughout the period 
under study. It is interesting to note that IQLEG was rather decreasing productivity 
IQLEGMLI 
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significantly over the period. TFP was decreased by about 5.59% and 13.27%, 
respectively, before and after the break. Maybe the occurrence and aftermath of a sixteen-
year civil war crippled the nation’s financial system. The contribution of IQLEG to the 
nation’s productivity was negative. IQLEG contribution slowed down the growth of TFP 
by decreasing NFP growth by approximately 86% and 8% in the first and second regime, 
respectively. Sudan’s IQLEG followed the same pattern as Mozambique with an average 
contribution of negative 7.24% and negative 5.52% before and after the break, 
respectively. Generally, although IQLEG contributed negatively to TFP, it increased 
over the period under study (Appendix D, Tables D1 and D3 and Figures D1 and D3). 
 
The contribution of IQLEG to Niger’s TFP was positive but reduced in magnitude over 
the period. Indeed, the contribution of financial development conditioned on quality 
institutions fell in magnitude over the period following the structural break. The average 
contribution before the break was 1.9038 compared to 3.8595 for NFP whilst it reduced 
to 1.6021 after the break. The contribution to the growth of TFP was negative for both 
periods. It is interesting to note that whilst TFP’s growth was negative in the first regime, 
it become positive after the break. Table D2 in Appendix D and Figure D2 from the same 
Appendix show the decreasing gap between NFP and TFP  
 
6.4.2 The Cobb-Douglas Production Function- Panel TFP, NFP and Contribution 
of IQLEG to Productivity with Structural Breaks  
The average annual contribution of IQLEG to TFP is listed on Table 6.11 whilst Figure 
6.2 presents a graphical view of the contribution of IQLEG. In terms of magnitude, the 
highest level of IQLEG was in 2010 whilst the lowest was in 1991 when the contribution 
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was 2.1097. In the first regime (1985-1989) the average contribution of IQLEG to TFP 
was 31.81% whilst it contributed to 70.69% of the growth of TFP. In the second regime, 
TFP fell slightly, although the average contribution of IQLEG rose slightly. This implies 
that NFP decreased slightly in the second regime. The highest TFP level was realised in 
the third regime for the entire panel, although NFP continued to fall on the average. The 
highest contribution of IQLEG to the growth of TFP was in the second regime when NFP 
was interestingly growing negatively. The lowest was the contribution of IQLEG 
occurring in the third regime. This shows that during the third regime, the contribution 
of NFP to productivity was high whilst that of IQLEG was low.  
 
Figure 6.2 shows that the contribution of IQLEG to TFP was fairly stable until when the 
third regime begun. The wider gap shows that, from 2009, the panel of countries on the 
average increased the role of financial development and institutional quality played in 
productivity enhancement and growth. This era is the immediate aftermath of the global 
financial crisis of 2007/2008 and the beginning of the recovery period. In this third 
regime, oil prices fell from about $147 to $32 in 2008, which made net importers of oil 
benefit.  
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Table 6.11: Levels of Panel NFP, TFP and CIQLEG with Two Regime Breaks 
Levels of NFP, TFP and CIQLEG  Growth Rate of NFP, TFP and CIQLEG 
Year TFP NFP IQLEG  Year TFP NFP IQLEG 
1985 6.7309 4.5897 2.1413  1985 na na na 
1986 6.7218 4.5805 2.1413  1986 -0.0091 -0.0092 0.0001 
1987 6.7181 4.5763 2.1418  1987 -0.0037 -0.0042 0.0005 
1988 6.7385 4.5856 2.1530  1988 0.0204 0.0093 0.0111 
1989 6.7540 4.5964 2.1576  1989 0.0155 0.0108 0.0047 
1990 6.7235 4.6109 2.1126  1990 na na na 
1991 6.7269 4.6172 2.1097  1991 0.0034 0.0063 -0.0029 
1992 6.6804 4.5638 2.1165  1992 -0.0465 -0.0534 0.0068 
1993 6.6781 4.5495 2.1286  1993 -0.0023 -0.0143 0.0121 
1994 6.6541 4.5371 2.1170  1994 -0.0240 -0.0124 -0.0116 
1995 6.6544 4.5420 2.1124  1995 0.0002 0.0048 -0.0046 
1996 6.6719 4.5530 2.1189  1996 0.0175 0.0110 0.0065 
1997 6.6859 4.5531 2.1328  1997 0.0140 0.0001 0.0139 
1998 6.6998 4.5724 2.1274  1998 0.0139 0.0194 -0.0055 
1999 6.7011 4.5682 2.1328  1999 0.0013 -0.0042 0.0055 
2000 6.6993 4.5584 2.1409  2000 -0.0018 -0.0099 0.0081 
2001 6.7094 4.5533 2.1561  2001 0.0101 -0.0051 0.0152 
2002 6.7077 4.5491 2.1586  2002 -0.0017 -0.0042 0.0025 
2003 6.7187 4.5511 2.1676  2003 0.0111 0.0021 0.0090 
2004 6.7340 4.5490 2.1850  2004 0.0152 -0.0021 0.0174 
2005 6.7371 4.5399 2.1972  2005 0.0031 -0.0091 0.0122 
2006 6.7457 4.5287 2.2170  2006 0.0086 -0.0112 0.0198 
2007 6.7606 4.5259 2.2347  2007 0.0149 -0.0028 0.0178 
2008 6.7623 4.5153 2.2469  2008 0.0017 -0.0106 0.0122 
2009 6.7607 4.5069 2.2538  2009 -0.0016 -0.0084 0.0068 
2010 6.7819 4.4856 2.2963  2010 na na na 
2011 6.7809 4.4778 2.3031  2011 -0.0010 -0.0078 0.0068 
2012 6.8128 4.5045 2.3083  2012 0.0319 0.0267 0.0051 
2013 6.8375 4.5255 2.3119  2013 0.0247 0.0210 0.0037 
2014 6.8515 4.5484 2.3031  2014 0.0141 0.0229 -0.0088 
2015 6.8455 4.5440 2.3015  2015 -0.0060 -0.0044 -0.0016 
Mean rates in selected periods  Mean growth rates in selected periods 
(1985 – 1989) 6.7312 4.5899 2.1413  (1985 – 1989) 0.0058 0.0017 0.0041 
(1990 – 2009) 6.7099 4.5492 2.1607  (1990 – 2009) 0.0020 -0.0055 0.0074 
(2010 – 2015) 6.8256 4.5200 2.3056  (2010 – 2015) 0.0127 0.0117 0.0010 
Notes: NFP: net factor productivity (technical progress); TFP: total factor productivity; CIQLEG: 
Contribution of institutional quality linked efficiency gain to total factor productivity. All series are in 
natural logarithm. GNFP: growth rate of net factor productivity (technical progress); GTFP: growth rate 
of total factor productivity; GIQLEG: growth rate of contribution of institutional quality linked efficiency 
gain. Break Dates of 1989 and 2009 are based on the Banerjee and carrion-i- Silvestre (2015) regime break 
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6.5 Conclusion 
The objective of this chapter was to determine the role financial development enhanced 
by institutional quality as determined by Rodrik (2000) plays in productivity within the 
framework of the Cobb-Douglas production function when structural breaks are 
considered. Using panel and individual country cointegration analysis with 
endogenously determined single and multiple unknown level, trend and regime structural 
breaks, TFP was decomposed into net factor productivity and institutional quality linked 
efficiency gain. The goal was to establish whether IQLEG induced productivity levels 
over and above that of pure technical progress when structural breaks are present in this 
panel of countries (You and Sarantis, 2013; Banerjee and Carrion-i-Silvestre, 2015; 
Gregory and Hansen, 1996; Hatemi-J, 2008).  
IQLEG 
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Annual financial development, institutional quality and economic growth data were used 
at both the individual country and panel levels to conduct cointegration tests. Selected 
countries and the panel were used to estimate long-run relationships and speeds of 
adjustment. Production functions in the Cobb-Douglas framework were estimated for the 
selected countries as well as the panel to determine the contribution of IQLEG to 
productivity level and growth.  The contribution of IQLEG to productivity at the panel 
level was positive for all regimes. Whilst the panel without structural breaks could not 
provide evidence of a long run relationship between the variables, the introduction of 
structural breaks while accounting for CSD, resulted in positive CIQLEG. Structural 
breaks are therefore essential.  
 
The realisation of contributions from IQLEG over and above that of NFP within the 
Cobb-Douglas framework with regime breaks whilst accounting for strong cross-
sectional dependency suggests that the assertion by Rodrik (2000) that institutions are 
fundamental to high quality growth is confirmed here for the 21 SSA countries. We 
suggest that, by the very nature and organisation of their economies, these countries are 
positioned to possess and to benefit from institutional quality unlike SSA, which is often 
politically and economically unstable. The implications for all these tests are, however, 
the same: political instability, inadequate social insurance, poor regulation, conflicts and 
unstable macroeconomic conditions among others are likely to cause countries not to 








INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY IN THE FINANCE – GROWTH-NEXUS IN SUB- 
SAHARAN AFRICA - AN ESTIMATION OF THE CONSTANT ELASTICITY 
OF SUBSTITITION AND THE VARIABLE ELASTICITY OF SUBSTITUTION 
PRODUCTION FUNCTIONS WITH STRUCTURAL BREAKS 
7.1 Introduction  
The main argument in this study has been premised on the fact that, when institutions are 
adequately working, they work through financial development to improve efficiency and 
productivity levels. Premised on an extension of the neoclassical growth framework, this 
increase in productivity levels increases TFP beyond that generated by pure technical 
progress thus leading to higher growth. In the Chapters Five and Six, TFP was 
decomposed into pure technical progress and IQLEG within the Cobb-Douglas 
framework with the latter incorporating the effect of structural breaks and cross-sectional 
dependency.  
 
However, regarding the role of finance and institutions as growth enhancing through 
catalysing productive efficiency22, many studies have been premised on the Cobb-
Douglas production specification (Bist, 2018; Demetriades and Law, 2006; Balach and 
Law, 2015; Pagano, 1993). Indeed, the Cobb-Douglas production function has been the 
basis for previous sections in this research. As important and simple as the Cobb-Douglas 
specification is, it was conceptualised on some assumptions. These assumptions include 
constant returns to scale, a unitary elasticity of substitution and homogeneity of a single 
                                                 
22 Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Osili and Paulson (2008), Beck, Levine, and Loayza (2000)  
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degree among others. Again, there are a few draw backs of the Cobb-Douglas production 
function.  
 
These draw backs, as mentioned in Chapter Two of this thesis primarily include its 
inability handle a large number of inputs, the restrictiveness of the assumption of perfect 
competition and the fact that it is largely unrealistic by assuming constant returns to scale. 
In this thesis, to overcome the possible unwanted effects of the limitations of the Cobb-
Douglas function, alternative production functions in the form of the CES and VES are 
adopted to determine the long run relationship between finance, institutional quality, 
capital and growth when the underlying Cobb-Douglas assumptions are varied. 
assumptions are varied. This is done to provide additional insights into, and make room 
for testing the model under other circumstances that may arise in the real world and SSA 
specifically. It is against this background that this section is dedicated to testing the 
financial development-institutional quality-economic growth relationship using the 
Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) and Variable Elasticity of Substitution (VES) 
production specifications.  
 
The CES and the VES production functions are explored as tools to check the robustness 
of the claims being made in this research. In this section, the level of extra efficiency 
gained from decomposing TFP into pure technical progress and IQLEG when the CES 
and VES production functions are being considered for the panel of 21 countries in SSA 
is explored. It is important to note that, the desired contribution is for the average 
contribution of CIQLEG > 0.  Secondly, the relationship is examined with and without 
two regime structural breaks. This study therefore contributes both theoretically and 
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empirically to the importance of the nature of the production function for economic 
growth models within the finance and institution literature for SSA.  
 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: a brief empirical methodology is 
discussed. The fourth section entails estimations followed by the presentation and 
analysis of the findings for the panel estimations. The last section concludes and 
recommends ways in which the research can be extended and conducted in the future. 
 
7.2 Empirical Methodology 
7.2.1 Models 
The dataset described in Chapter Four, Section 4.2 is used for estimations. Based on the 
derivations from Chapter Two, Sections 2.7 and 2.8 and the years for the structural breaks 
used in estimating the coefficient relationships in Chapter Six23, the empirical models to 
be estimated are stated below: 
The extended CES model without structural breaks is given as  





+ (1 − 𝛿)] +
𝑣𝑖𝑡 ,   𝑖 = 1,2, …21,   𝑡 = 1,2, … ,31   (Panel data).                  (7.1) 





+ (1 − 𝛿)] +
𝑣𝑡 ,       𝑡 = 1,2, … ,31   (Time series).                          (7.2) 
Where, 𝛼0 is the constant, 𝛼1 is the coefficient of the time trend, 𝛼2 is the coefficient of 
institutional quality, 𝛼3 is the coefficient of financial development, 𝜑 is the elasticity of 
                                                 
23 Following You and Sarantis (2013), the structural breaks applied in the CES and VES framework are 
exogenous. 
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substitution between capital and labour with 𝛿, 𝜌 as constant parameters and 𝑣𝑖𝑡  the error 
term.      
The empirical model for the extended CES with two regime structural breaks is presented 
below: 
𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐷1989 + 𝛼2𝐷2009 + 𝛼3𝑔. 𝑡 + 𝛼4𝑙𝑛𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼5𝑙𝑛𝐼𝑁𝑆𝐷1989𝑖𝑡 +






(1 − 𝛿)] + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 ,    𝑖 = 1,2, … 21,   𝑡 = 1,2, … ,31   (Panel data)  (7.3)   
𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐶𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐷1989 + 𝛼2𝐷2009 + 𝛼3𝑔. 𝑡 + 𝛼4𝑙𝑛𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑡 + 𝛼5𝑙𝑛𝐼𝑁𝑆𝐷1989𝑡 +






(1 − 𝛿)] + 𝑣𝑡 ,     𝑡 = 1,2, … ,31  (Time series)               (7.4) 
Where, 𝛼0 is the constant, 𝛼1 is the coefficient of first break at level, 𝛼2  coefficient of 
second break at level, 𝛼3 is the coefficient of the time trend, 𝛼4 is the coefficient of 
institutional quality, 𝛼5  the coefficient of first shift in institutional quality, 𝛼6  the 
coefficient of second shift in institutional quality, 𝛼7 is the coefficient of financial 
development, 𝛼8  the coefficient of first shift in financial development, 𝛼9  the 
coefficient of the second shift in financial development, 𝜑 is the elasticity of substitution 
between capital and labour with 𝛿, 𝜌 as constant parameters and 𝑣𝑖𝑡  the error term.   The 
extended VES without Structural Breaks 
𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑔. 𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑙𝑛𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑙𝑛𝐹𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝜔𝜑𝑙𝑛𝐶𝐾𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑡 + [(1 −
𝜔)𝜑] 𝑙𝑛[1 + (𝜂 ∗ 𝐶𝐾𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑡)] + 𝑣𝑖𝑡     𝑖 = 1,2, …21,   𝑡 = 1,2, … ,31    (Panel data)       (7.5) 
𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐶𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑔. 𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑙𝑛𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑙𝑛𝐹𝐷𝑡 + 𝜔𝜑𝑙𝑛𝐶𝐾𝑃𝑃𝑡 + [(1 −
𝜔)𝜑]𝑙𝑛[1 + (𝜂 ∗ 𝐶𝐾𝑃𝑃𝑡)] + 𝑣𝑡     𝑡 = 1,2, … ,31  (Time series)              (7.6)  
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where, 𝛼0 is the constant, 𝛼1 is the coefficient of the time trend, 𝛼2 is the coefficient of 
institutional quality , 𝛼3 is the coefficient of financial development,  is the elasticity of 
substitution between capital and labour with 𝜔,𝜑 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜂 denoting constant parameters. 
The extended VES with Structural Breaks is given as  
𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷1989 + 𝛽2𝐷2009 + 𝛽3𝑔. 𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑙𝑛𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑙𝑛𝐼𝑁𝑆𝐷1989𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽6𝑙𝑛𝐼𝑁𝑆𝐷2009𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑙𝑛𝐹𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑙𝑛𝐹𝐷𝐷1989𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑙𝑛𝐹𝐷𝐷2009𝑖𝑡 + [(1 − 𝜔)𝜑]𝑙𝑛[1 +
(𝜂 ∗ 𝐶𝐾𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑡)] + 𝑣𝑖𝑡  𝑖 = 1,2, … 21,   𝑡 = 1,2, … ,31      (Panel data)  (7.7) 
𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐶𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷1989 + 𝛽2𝐷2009 + 𝛽3𝑔. 𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑙𝑛𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑙𝑛𝐼𝑁𝑆𝐷1989𝑡 +
𝛽6𝑙𝑛𝐼𝑁𝑆𝐷2009𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑙𝑛𝐹𝐷𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑙𝑛𝐹𝐷𝐷1989𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑙𝑛𝐹𝐷𝐷2009𝑡 + [(1 − 𝜔)𝜑]𝑙𝑛[1 +
(𝜂 ∗ 𝐶𝐾𝑃𝑃𝑡)] + 𝑣𝑡   𝑡 = 1,2, … ,31      (Time series)                (7.8) 
where, 𝛽0 is the constant, 𝛽1 is the coefficient of first break at level, 𝛽2  coefficient of 
second break at level, 𝛽3 is the coefficient of the time trend, 𝛽4 is the coefficient of 
institutional quality, 𝛽5  the coefficient of first shift in institutional quality, 𝛽6  the 
coefficient of second shift in institutional quality, 𝛽7 is the coefficient of financial 
development, 𝛽8  the coefficient of first shift in financial development, 𝛽9  the coefficient 
of second shift in financial development,  is the elasticity of substitution between 
capital and labour with  𝜔,𝜑 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜂 denoting constant parameters and 𝑣𝑖𝑡  the error term.  
As discussed in Chapter Four, Driscoll and Kraay HAC standard errors are applied 
against cross-sectional dependency in the nonlinear least square estimations.  
  
7.2.2 Generation of Productivity Levels and the Contribution of IQLEG 
The contribution of IQLEG is determined based Section 2.8 of Chapter Two with 
equations (2.26), (2.27) and (2.28) and for the CES production function and equations 
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(2.26), (2.29) and (2.30) for the VES production function. The productivity levels are 
generated when structural breaks are considered and when they are not  
 
7.3 Estimation Results and Findings for the CES Production Specification 
7.3.1 Non-linear Least Squares Parameter Estimates without Breaks in Mali- 
CES 
The results from the non-linear least squares estimation for Mali presented in Table 7.1 
indicate that, apart from institutional quality, the time trend and the intercept, all other 
variables are not significantly linked to growth. Indeed, financial development within 
CES framework for Mali, although positive is not significant. Within the Cobb-Douglas 
framework however, all variables in Mali were found to be significantly associated with 
economic growth. Interestingly institutional quality was found to be negatively 
associated with growth in Mali within the CES framework.   








[95% Conf. interval 
Constant -32.2312 7.1635 -4.50 0.0000 -47.016 -17.4465 
Time trend 0.0192 0.0040 4.83 0.0000 0.0110 0.0274 
LINS  -0.1672 0.0806 -2.08 0.0490 -0.3336 -0.0009 
LFD  0.1699 0.1591 1.07 0.2960 -0.1583 0.4982 
  -0.6710 2.7876 -0.24 0.8120 -6.4243 5.0822 
  -6.1590 13.387 -0.46 0.6500 -33.789 21.471 
  0.0014 0.0094 0.15 0.8800 -0.0180 0.0209 
Wald Test      
 =1 0        
0.36 0.21      
. 0.5545p value   . 0.6496p value        
Notes: Non-linear least squares estimates are Driscoll and Kraay heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation-
consistent (HAC) standard errors. The Wald Test –Chi-square (1) statistics value is used and probability 
in brackets.  
 
The Wald test indicates that the CES production function for Mali is not significantly 
different from that of the Cobb-Douglas in Mali. This is because we fail to reject constant 
returns to scale ( 1  ) and the unitary elasticity of substitution ( 0  ) hypotheses. In 
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the absence of structural breaks, the CES production technology for Mali supports the 
IQLEG hypothesis proposed in this thesis. 
 
7.3.2 Panel Non-linear Least Squares Parameter Estimates without Breaks – CES 
The findings for the CES production form on Table 7.2 indicates that the coefficient of 
time trend is significant, revealing that there is a significant effect of technological 
progress. The institutional quality and financial development were both significant. This 
implies that both financial development and institutional quality significantly influence 
the efficiency of technology positively. The results obtained from the Wald test rejects 
the hypothesis that there are constant returns to scale, that is, ( 1  ) and again rejects 
the claim that there is unity elasticity of substitution ( 0)  . Hence, the production 
function cannot suggest unity elasticity of substitution for CES making it significantly 
different from the Cobb-Douglas production form. As such, the CES provides robust 
confirmation for the long-run relationship among LGDPPC, LFD, LCKPP and LINS for 
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Table 7. 2: Panel NLLS Regression Estimates for CES without Structural Breaks  
Variables Coef. Std. Err. Z-value P-value [95% Conf. Interval] 
Time trend 0.0027 0.0001 23.04 0.0000 0.0024 0.0029 
LINS 0.1754 0.0280 6.26 0.0000 0.1205 0.2304 
LFD 0.2304 0.0215 10.69 0.0000 0.1881 0.2726 
  -79.6082 5.8211 -13.68 0.0000 -91.017 -68.199 
  -0.0029 0.0002 -11.71 0.0000 -0.0034 -0.0024 
  -0.0010 0.0001 -9.47 0.0000 -0.0012 -0.0008 
Wald Test      
 =1 0        
857 137.17      
p-value=0.000 p-value=0.000      
Notes: Non-linear least squares estimates are Driscoll and Kraay heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation-
consistent (HAC) standard errors. The Wald Test –Chi-square (1) statistics value is used and probability 
in brackets.  
 
 
7.3.3 Non-linear Least Squares Parameter Estimates with a Break in Mali – CES 
The findings for the CES production form on Table 7.3 indicate that the constant in the 
first regime was still significant and negative. The trend coefficient in the second regime 
was insignificant whilst the significant coefficient in the first regime confirms positive 
technological advancement between 1985 and 2005 in Mali. Institutional quality is 
weakly significant but negative before the break and insignificant after the break. The 
results for Mali are similar to the CES without breaks as the general observation is that 
IQLEG is not statistically significant in the CES with a full structural break.  
 
This implies that both financial development and institutional quality significantly 
influence the efficiency of technology positively. The results obtained from the Wald 
test fails to reject the hypothesis that there are constant returns to scale, that is,   =1. 
The Wald test also fails to rejects the claim that there is unity elasticity of substitution 
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( 0)  . The production function cannot suggest unity elasticity of substitution for CES 
with a full regime change, making it significantly similar to the Cobb-Douglas 
production form in Mali. 
 
Table 7.3: NLLS Regression Estimates for CES in Mali with a Structural Break  






[95% Conf. interval 
Constant -74.8535 13.9700 -5.360 0.0000 -103.994 -45.713 
2005D  
3.6260 55.1113 0.070 0.9480 -111.334 118.586 
Time trend 0.0412 0.0073 5.670 0.0000 0.0260 0.0564 
Time trend2005 -0.0007 0.0278 -0.020 0.9810 -0.0587 0.0574 
LINS  -0.1380 0.0785 -1.760 0.0940 -0.3017 0.0258 
2005LINSD  
0.5801 0.4602 1.260 0.2220 -0.3798 1.5400 
LFD  -0.1731 0.1725 -1.000 0.3280 -0.5329 0.1867 
2005LFDD  
-0.8931 0.5949 -1.500 0.1490 -2.1341 0.3478 
  -0.5833 11.4404 -0.050 0.9600 -24.448 23.2809 
  0.3931 7.2544 0.050 0.9570 -14.7393 15.5255 
  0.4649 9.1624 0.050 0.9600 -18.6476 19.5773 
Wald Test      
 =1 0        
0.02 0.00      
. 0.8913p value   . 0.9573p value        
Notes: Non-linear least squares estimates are Driscoll and Kraay heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation-
consistent (HAC) standard errors. The Wald Test –Chi-square (1) statistics value is used and probability 
in brackets. Mali’s full regime break occurred in 2005. 
 
 
7.3.4 Non-linear Least Squares Parameter Estimates with Two Regime Shifts – 
CES 
To determine the effect of structural breaks on the model specification for the CES 
production function, the first step was to analyse the results from the non-linear least 
squares regression with structural breaks in 1989 and 2009 as was done in the Cobb-
Douglas case. The results are presented in Table 7.4. Both level breaks in 1989 and 2009 
are highly significant and have a positive effect on growth. The results also indicated 
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that, for the CES specification, institutional quality was significant in both the first and 
second regimes. However, in the third regime, the effect of institutional quality on 
economic growth was negative. Interestingly, financial development was not significant 
in the second regime. The slope of the time trend in the CES was also positive and 
significant indicating that IQLEG positively influenced efficiency.  
 
Table 7.4:  Panel NLLS Regression Estimates for CES with Two Regime Shifts 
Variables Coef. Std. Err. Z-value P-value [95% Conf. Interval] 
1989D  
0.5547 0.1465 3.79 0.0000 0.2676 0.8417 
2009D  
0.9565 0.3956 2.42 0.0160 0.1810 1.7319 
Time trend 0.0023 0.0001 18.91 0.0000 0.0021 0.0026 
LINS  0.4007 0.0521 7.70 0.0000 0.2987 0.5028 
1989LINSD  -0.2368 0.0567 -4.18 0.0000 -0.3479 -0.1258 
2009LINSD  -0.1175 0.1109 -11.06 0.2890 -0.3349 0.0999 
LFD  0.2397 0.0357 6.71 0.0000 0.1697 0.3098 
1989LFDD  
0.0208 0.0350 0.59 0.5520 -0.0478 0.0895 
2009LFDD  
-0.1400 0.0475 -2.94 0.0030 -0.2332 -0.0468 
  -0.0010 0.0001 -9.92 0.0000 -0.0013 -0.0008 
  -0.9359 0.0792 -1.82 0.0000 -1.0911 -0.7808 
  -33.385 7.1973 -4.64 0.0000 -47.4917 -19.279 
Wald Test      
 =1 0        
35.87 112.87      
. 0.000p value   . 0.000p value        
Notes: Non-linear least squares estimates are heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation-consistent (HAC) 




In the CES context, both financial development and institutional quality are strongly 
positive in parameters before the break. Again, this result is interesting as it confirms the 
importance of IQLEG for productivity and hence growth in the 21 SSA countries as 
depicted by the Cobb-Douglas specification. The results obtained from the Wald test 
shows that the hypothesis that the returns to scale parameter,  showing a constant 
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return to scale, i.e.   =1 was rejected in the CES production function with breaks.  
Hence, the CES production function with breaks does not suggest unity elasticity of 
substitution as hypothesized in the Wald test leading to the conclusion that, overall, in 
the presence of two regime structural changes, there is enough evidence that the CES 
production function estimated here is significantly different from the Cobb-Douglas 
production function.  
 
 
7.4 Estimation Results and Findings for the VES Production Specification 
7.4.1 The VES Non-linear Least Squares Parameter Estimates without Breaks in 
Mali  
In the absence of structural breaks, the VES production’s non-linear least squares 
estimates indicate that all parameters are significantly related to growth. The significant 
time trend is an indication of technological progress that was advancing in Mali over the 
period. The Wald test provides evidence to support the fact that the VES without breaks 
is significantly different from the Cobb-Douglas production technology. The results 
support those of the Cobb-Douglas framework without structural breaks. Overall, the 
VES production function robustly confirms the results obtained for Mali supporting the 
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[95% Conf. interval 
Constant -29.0088 14.7466 -1.97 0.0610 -59.4442 1.4266 
Time trend 1.7805 0.0077 231.66 0.0000 1.7647 1.7964 
LINS 0.2767 0.0788 3.51 0.0020 0.1141 0.4392 
LFD 0.5017 0.1700 2.95 0.00 0 0.1509 0.8526 
  0.9868 0.0653 15.11 0.0000 0.8520 1.1216 
  -0.2530 0.1103 -2.29 0.0310 -0.4806 -0.0253 
  -0.2959 0.0000 -210000.00 0.0000 -0.2959 -0.2959 
Wald Test      
 =1 0        
129.04 4300000      
. 0.000p value   . 0.000p value        
Notes: Non-linear least squares estimates are Driscoll and Kraay heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation-




7.4.2 Panel VES Non-linear Least Squares Parameter Estimates without Breaks  
 
The outcome of the Wald test in the panel VES framework presented in Table 7.6 
provides evidence for the rejection of the hypothesis that there are constant returns to 
scale ( 1  ). The hypothesis that there is unity elasticity of Substitution 0   is also 
rejected. Hence, the production function cannot suggest unity elasticity of substitution 
for the VES making the VES estimator significantly different from the Cobb-Douglas 
specification. The results from the VES production function suggest that the coefficients 
of institutional quality and financial development are both positive and significant. This 
implies that both financial development and institutional quality significantly positively 
influence the efficiency of technology and subsequently economic growth in SSA.  The 
time trend whose coefficient is a measure of technological advancement was also 
positive and significant.  
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Table 7.6: Panel NLLS Regression Estimates for VES without Structural Breaks  






Time trend 0.0023 0.0001 44.25 0.0000 0.0022 0.0024 
LINS 0.2506 0.0316 7.92 0.0000 0.1886 0.3127 
LFD 0.3235 0.0483 6.69 0.0000 0.2288 0.4183 
  0.0714 0.0445 1.60 0.1090 -0.0159 0.1587 
  -0.1272 0.0486 -2.62 0.0090 -0.2225 -0.0319 
  0.8437 0.0763 11.06 0.0000 0.6941 0.9932 
Wald Test      
 =1 0        
537.32 122.28      
. 0.1421p value   . 0.000p value        
 Notes: Non-linear least squares estimates are Driscoll and Kraay heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation-






7.4.3 The VES Non-linear Least Squares Parameter Estimates with a Break in 
Mali 
When a structural break was introduced in the level, trend and cointegration slope of the 
model within the VES framework, the Wald test in Mali provides evidence that the VES 
with a break is significantly different from the Cobb-Douglas function. Table 7.7 shows 
that, in the first regime, only financial development is not significant. However, after the 
break, both financial development and institutional quality were significant. Financial 
development, however, had a negative coefficient. Unlike the VES without structural 
breaks in Mali, the results for the VES with structural breaks do not fully support that of 
Mali. In the structural break case, the IQLEG hypothesis is not fully supported in all 
regimes. The significant time trend in the first regime is an indication of technological 
progress that is advancing in Mali over the period.  
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z-value p-value [95% Conf. interval] 
Constant -73.2370 13.6840 -5.35 0.0000 -101.7813 -44.6926 
2005D  2.3467 38.7227 0.06 0.9520 -78.4274 83.1208 
Time trend 0.0403 0.0071 5.65 0.0000 0.0255 0.0552 
Time trend2005 0.0007 0.0189 0.03 0.9730 -0.0388 0.0401 
LINS  -0.1408 0.0760 -1.85 0.0790 -0.2993 0.0178 
2005LINSD  0.6038 0.3956 1.53 0.1430 -0.2214 1.4289 
LFD  -0.1408 0.1664 -0.85 0.4070 -0.4879 0.2062 
2005LFDD  -1.2200 0.4850 -2.52 0.0210 -2.2316 -0.2083 
  0.9451 0.1465 6.45 0.0000 0.6394 1.2507 
  -0.2948 0.1089 -2.71 0.0140 -0.5220 -0.0676 
  -0.2945 0.0092 -31.90 0.0000 -0.3137 -0.2752 
Wald Test      
 =1 0        
141.29 1017.76      
. 0.000p value   . 0.000p value        
Notes: Non-linear least squares estimates are Driscoll and Kraay heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation-





7.4.4 The Panel VES with Two Regime Shifts  
Applying a non-linear least squares estimator to the VES production function with two 
regime breaks in 1989 and 2009, the results are presented in Table 7.8. The estimated 
results indicate that, for the VES production function when two regime breaks are 
applied, the coefficient of the time is negative but significant implying that technological 
advancement slowed down. The changes in level of the model for both regimes are both 
positive and significant. The coefficients institutional quality in the first regime is not 
significant whilst it is negative and insignificant in the second regime. It is, however, 
negative but significant in the third regime. Thus, the first and second regimes are similar 
to the results obtained in the case when there are no structural breaks in the Cobb-
Douglas function.  
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Financial development in the first regime has a positive association with growth 
confirming that, whilst the relationship is negative in the second regime, it is insignificant 
in the third regime. These results confirm the position of the non-uniform or linear 
relationship between finance and growth (Berkes, Panizza and Arcand, 2012). The VES 
with breaks results thus supports the CES and Cobb-Douglas results in the presence of 
breaks. Indeed, all three production specifications emphasize the importance of IQLEG 
for productivity and hence growth in SSA. A careful study of the Wald test results 
provides evidence for the strong rejection of the null of unity elasticity of substitution 
but the non-rejection of the null of constant returns to scale. The VES production function 
is thus significantly different from the Cobb-Douglas production function.  
 
Table 7.8: Panel NLLS Regression Estimates for VES with Two Regime Shifts 
Variable Coef. Std Err Z-value P-value| [95%Conf.Interval] 
Constant 49.9987 9.4117 5.3100 0.000 31.5171 68.4803 
1989D  
2.4601 0.6262 3.9300 0.000 1.2304 3.6897 
2009D  
5.7209 1.5721 3.6400 0.000 2.6338 8.8080 
Time trend -0.0239 0.0047 -5.0600 0.000 -0.0332 -0.0146 
LINS  0.1216 0.2231 0.5400 0.586 -0.3166 0.5597 
1989LINSD  
-0.1737 0.2427 -0.7200 0.474 -0.6502 0.3028 
2009LINSD  
-1.6829 0.4629 -3.6400 0.000 -2.5918 -0.7740 
LFD  0.8332 0.1370 6.0800 0.000 0.5642 1.1022 
1989LFDD  
-0.4394 0.1497 -2.9400 0.003 -0.7334 -0.1454 
2009LFDD  
-0.1837 0.1956 -0.9400 0.348 -0.5677 0.2003 
  -0.4296 0.2403 -1.7900 0.074 -0.9014 0.0422 
  -5.8736 4.6765 -1.2600 0.210 -15.057 3.3097 
  -0.6661 0.1233 -5.4000 0.000 -0.9082 -0.4240 
Wald Test      
 =1 0        
2.16 29.20      
. 0.1421p value   . 0.000p value        
Notes: Non-linear least squares estimates are Driscoll and Kraay heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation-
consistent (HAC) standard errors. The Wald Test –Chi-square (1) statistics value is used and probability 
in brackets 
 
   
242 
 
7.5 Production Function Productivity Levels for the CES Function 
7.5.1 Panel CES Production Function without Structural Breaks 
The coefficients of the non-linear least squares estimators described and applied in the 
production of results in Table 7.2 were used in the determination of the productivity 
levels and growth rates of the CES production specification. The level of productivity in 
the form of TFP, NFP and the contribution of financial development and institutional 
quality (CIQLEG) are presented in Table 7.9, while the graphical representation of the 
contribution of IQLEG can be seen in Figure 7.1.   
 
 
The general observation in the CES framework is that, compared to the Cobb-Douglas 
framework, the average contribution of IQLEG to productivity was higher at 31.80% 
with the mean contribution to economic growth from IQLEG to the growth of TFP within 
the CES being 70%. To confirm the negative trend coefficient, the average contribution 
of NFP to growth over the period was negative. The CES production function in Mali 
was not estimated since the model was not significantly different from the Cobb-Douglas 
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Table 7.9: Productivity Levels for Panel CES Production Function - No Structural 
Breaks 
Levels of TFP, NFP and CIQLEG  Growth Rate of TFP, NFP and CIQLEG 
Year TFP NFP IQLEG  Year TFP NFP IQLEG 
1985 6.7141 5.2727 1.4414  1985 na Na na 
1986 6.7082 5.2646 1.4437  1986 -0.0058 -0.0082 0.0023 
1987 6.7058 5.2642 1.4416  1987 -0.0024 -0.0003 -0.0021 
1988 6.7269 5.2851 1.4418  1988 0.0211 0.0209 0.0002 
1989 6.7428 5.2982 1.4446  1989 0.0159 0.0131 0.0028 
1990 6.7382 5.3085 1.4297  1990 -0.0047 0.0103 -0.0149 
1991 6.7424 5.3173 1.4251  1991 0.0043 0.0089 -0.0046 
1992 6.6970 5.2650 1.4320  1992 -0.0454 -0.0524 0.0069 
1993 6.6966 5.2490 1.4476  1993 -0.0004 -0.0160 0.0156 
1994 6.6746 5.2345 1.4401  1994 -0.0220 -0.0145 -0.0075 
1995 6.6766 5.2382 1.4385  1995 0.0020 0.0037 -0.0017 
1996 6.6956 5.2496 1.4459  1996 0.0189 0.0114 0.0075 
1997 6.7099 5.2513 1.4585  1997 0.0143 0.0017 0.0126 
1998 6.7242 5.2717 1.4525  1998 0.0144 0.0204 -0.0060 
1999 6.7255 5.2672 1.4583  1999 0.0012 -0.0045 0.0058 
2000 6.7237 5.2582 1.4655  2000 -0.0018 -0.0090 0.0072 
2001 6.7336 5.2527 1.4808  2001 0.0099 -0.0055 0.0154 
2002 6.7317 5.2523 1.4794  2002 -0.0019 -0.0004 -0.0015 
2003 6.7424 5.2525 1.4899  2003 0.0107 0.0002 0.0105 
2004 6.7561 5.2463 1.5098  2004 0.0137 -0.0062 0.0199 
2005 6.7541 5.2318 1.5223  2005 -0.0020 -0.0145 0.0125 
2006 6.7619 5.2213 1.5406  2006 0.0078 -0.0105 0.0184 
2007 6.7756 5.2192 1.5564  2007 0.0137 -0.0021 0.0157 
2008 6.7756 5.2086 1.5670  2008 0.0000 -0.0106 0.0106 
2009 6.7720 5.2001 1.5720  2009 -0.0035 -0.0085 0.0050 
2010 6.7868 5.2205 1.5663  2010 0.0147 0.0205 -0.0057 
2011 6.7767 5.2044 1.5722  2011 -0.0101 -0.0161 0.0060 
2012 6.8036 5.2258 1.5778  2012 0.0270 0.0214 0.0056 
2013 6.8221 5.2419 1.5802  2013 0.0185 0.0161 0.0024 
2014 6.8261 5.2496 1.5765  2014 0.0040 0.0076 -0.0037 
2015 6.8056 5.2267 1.5788  2015 -0.0205 -0.0228 0.0023 
Mean rate 6.7428 5.2500 1.4928   Mean rate 0.0030 -0.0015 0.0046 
Notes: NFP: net factor productivity (technical progress); TFP: total factor productivity; CIQLEG: 
Contribution of institutional quality linked efficiency gain to total factor productivity. All series are in 
natural logarithm. GNFP: growth rate of net factor productivity (technical progress); GTFP: growth rate 
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Source: Author, 2019 
 
7.5.2 Panel CES Production Function with Two Regime Structural Breaks 
The coefficients of the non-linear least squares estimators with two regime shifts 
described and applied in the production of results in Table 7.4 were used in the 
determination of the productivity levels and growth rates of the CES production 
specification in the presence of structural breaks. The level of productivity in the form 
of TFP, NFP and the contribution of financial development and institutional quality 
(CIQLEG) are presented in Table 7.10. The general observation is that, over the period, 
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Table 7.10: Productivity Levels for Panel CES Production with Two Regime Shifts 
Levels of TFP, NFP and CIQLEG   Growth Rate of TFP, NFP and CIQLEG 
Year TFP NFP IQLEG   Year TFP NFP IQLEG 
1985 6.7070 4.5841 2.1230  1985 Na na na 
1986 6.7058 4.5824 2.1233  1986 -0.0012 -0.0016 0.0004 
1987 6.7049 4.5814 2.1235  1987 -0.0008 -0.0010 0.0002 
1988 6.7270 4.5934 2.1336  1988 0.0220 0.0120 0.0101 
1989 6.7438 4.6056 2.1381  1989 0.0168 0.0122 0.0046 
1990 6.7398 4.6284 2.1114  1990 Na na na 
1991 6.7450 5.2307 1.5143  1991 0.0052 0.6023 -0.5971 
1992 6.7008 5.1791 1.5217  1992 -0.0442 -0.0516 0.0074 
1993 6.7016 5.1651 1.5366  1993 0.0008 -0.0140 0.0149 
1994 6.6806 5.1542 1.5264  1994 -0.0211 -0.0108 -0.0102 
1995 6.6826 5.1597 1.5230  1995 0.0021 0.0054 -0.0034 
1996 6.6995 5.1690 1.5305  1996 0.0169 0.0093 0.0075 
1997 6.7143 5.1695 1.5448  1997 0.0148 0.0005 0.0143 
1998 6.7284 5.1898 1.5386  1998 0.0141 0.0203 -0.0062 
1999 6.7288 5.1842 1.5446  1999 0.0004 -0.0056 0.0060 
2000 6.7259 5.1730 1.5528  2000 -0.0029 -0.0111 0.0082 
2001 6.7341 5.1648 1.5693  2001 0.0082 -0.0082 0.0164 
2002 6.7301 5.1603 1.5698  2002 -0.0040 -0.0045 0.0005 
2003 6.7377 5.1574 1.5803  2003 0.0076 -0.0029 0.0105 
2004 6.7452 5.1449 1.6003  2004 0.0075 -0.0125 0.0200 
2005 6.7309 5.1173 1.6136  2005 -0.0143 -0.0276 0.0133 
2006 6.7336 5.0995 1.6341  2006 0.0027 -0.0178 0.0205 
2007 6.7420 5.0899 1.6521  2007 0.0084 -0.0096 0.0180 
2008 6.7360 5.0717 1.6644  2008 -0.0059 -0.0182 0.0123 
2009 7.3507 6.0451 1.3056  2009 0.0043 0.0073 -0.0030 
2010 7.3551 6.0524 1.3026  2010 na na na 
2011 7.3302 6.0224 1.3078  2011 -0.0249 -0.0301 0.0052 
2012 7.3548 6.0414 1.3134  2012 0.0247 0.0191 0.0056 
2013 7.3676 6.0528 1.3148  2013 0.0128 0.0114 0.0014 
2014 7.3659 6.0513 1.3146  2014 -0.0017 -0.0015 -0.0002 
2015 7.3461 6.0267 1.3193  2015 -0.0199 -0.0245 0.0047 
Mean rates in selected periods    Mean growth rates in selected periods 
(1985 – 1989) 6.7177 4.5894 2.1283  (1985 – 1989) 0.0092 0.0054 0.0038 
(1990 – 2009) 6.7544 5.1727 1.5817  (1990 – 2009) 0.0000 0.0237 -0.0237 
(2010 – 2015) 7.3529 6.0389 1.3140  (2010 – 2015) -0.0018 -0.0051 0.0033 
 NFP: net factor productivity (technical progress); TFP: total factor productivity; CIQLEG: Contribution 
of institutional quality linked efficiency gain to total factor productivity. All series are in natural logarithm. 
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During the first regime, the average contribution of IQLEG to the level of TFP is 31.69%. 
The average contribution decreased consistently for the second and third regimes with 
23.45% and 17.87%, respectively. In terms of the contribution of growth of IQLEG to 
growth of TFP, the results indicate that TFP did not grow during the second regime due 
to IQLEG completely countering any growth in NFP, 35.20% contributed to the negative 
growth of TFP whilst NFP contributed positively to TFP growth. During the third regime, 
growth in IQLEG was positive although NFP and TFP grew at negative rates. Only the 
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Source: Author, 2019 
 
The general observation in the CES framework with breaks as depicted in Figure 7.4 is 
that, compared to the Cobb-Douglas framework with breaks, the contribution of IQLEG 
IQLEG 
   
247 
 
to the level of productivity through TFP was higher in the Cobb-Douglas context. For all 
three regimes, the contribution to TFP in the Cobb-Douglas function was averaged at 
about 33% whilst it was about 24% in the CES case with regime shifts. Although the 
contribution of NFP grew in each regime, the fall in growth rate of TFP could be 
attributed to the global financial crises and the negative effects of the structural 
adjustment programs in the 1990s.  
 
7.6 Production Function Productivity Levels for the VES Function 
7.6.1 The VES Production Function in Mali without Structural Breaks 
The highest level of IQLEG was in 2011 whilst the lowest was in 1995 when the 
contribution was 1.8322. Before the break (1985-2005), the average contribution of 
IQLEG to productivity was 30.27% whilst it increased slightly to 30.95% after the break 
(Table 7.11). Implicitly, the occurrence of the break did not change the level of IQLE by 
much. NFP was consistent over the period and increased slightly after the break. The 
evidence supports a positive contribution of IQLEG towards the growth rate of TFP 
before the break but a negative contribution after the break.  
 
In terms of the growth rates, interestingly, negative growth rates were experienced for 
CIQLEG in the second regime although that was the highest average contribution period 
in terms of magnitude. This shows that, during the second regime, NFP was high whilst 
IQLEG was negatively impacting productivity. Figure 7.3 depicts the levels of the 
average NFP and TFP. The gap between the two gives a visual idea of the contribution 
of IQLEG. The figure shows that the levels of NFP and TFP increased significantly after 
the break compared to the period before the break.  
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Table 7.11: Productivity Levels for VES in Mali without a Break 
Levels of TFP, NFP and CIQLEG   Growth Rate of TFP, NFP and CIQLEG 
Year TFP NFP IQLEG   Year TFP NFP IQLEG 
1985 5.9020 6.8487 -0.9466  1985 Na na na 
1986 5.9334 6.8890 -0.9557  1986 0.0333 0.0012 0.0321 
1987 5.9700 6.9294 -0.9594  1987 0.0032 -0.0101 0.0132 
1988 6.0125 6.9697 -0.9572  1988 0.0760 0.0907 -0.0147 
1989 6.0538 7.0100 -0.9563  1989 0.0441 0.0539 -0.0097 
1990 6.0743 7.0504 -0.9760  1990 -0.0228 -0.0734 0.0506 
1991 6.1262 7.0907 -0.9645  1991 0.1065 0.1226 -0.0161 
1992 6.1610 7.1311 -0.9701  1992 -0.0416 -0.0562 0.0146 
1993 6.1551 7.1714 -1.0164  1993 0.0338 -0.0562 0.0899 
1994 6.2103 7.2118 -1.0014  1994 0.0350 0.0795 -0.0445 
1995 6.2510 7.2521 -1.0011  1995 0.0137 0.0188 -0.0051 
1996 6.2752 7.2925 -1.0173  1996 0.0766 0.0256 0.0509 
1997 6.3189 7.3328 -1.0139  1997 0.0290 0.0360 -0.0069 
1998 6.3573 7.3731 -1.0158  1998 0.0513 0.0463 0.0050 
1999 6.3773 7.4135 -1.0362  1999 0.0327 -0.0092 0.0418 
2000 6.4135 7.4538 -1.0403  2000 -0.0252 -0.0387 0.0135 
2001 6.4708 7.4942 -1.0234  2001 0.1188 0.1509 -0.0321 
2002 6.5122 7.5345 -1.0223  2002 0.0038 -0.0129 0.0167 
2003 6.5418 7.5749 -1.0331  2003 0.0614 0.0227 0.0388 
2004 6.5881 7.6152 -1.0271  2004 -0.0064 0.0020 -0.0083 
2005 6.6042 7.6556 -1.0513  2005 0.0442 -0.0050 0.0492 
2006 6.6530 9.0054 -2.3524  2006 0.0404 0.0240 0.0164 
2007 6.6698 9.0464 -2.3766  2007 0.0262 0.0012 0.0250 
2008 6.7193 9.0874 -2.3681  2008 0.0368 0.0718 -0.0350 
2009 6.7470 9.1284 -2.3815  2009 0.0392 0.0486 -0.0093 
2010 6.8016 9.1694 -2.3679  2010 0.0535 0.0508 0.0026 
2011 6.8439 9.2104 -2.3665  2011 0.0439 0.0266 0.0173 
2012 6.8069 9.2514 -2.4445  2012 -0.0411 -0.0373 -0.0038 
2013 6.8087 9.2924 -2.4838  2013 -0.0029 -0.0034 0.0005 
2014 6.8256 9.3334 -2.5078  2014 0.0458 0.0463 -0.0005 
2015 6.8408 9.3744 -2.5336   2015 0.0031 -0.0013 0.0045 
Mean rates in selected periods    Mean growth rates in selected periods 
(1985 – 2005) 6.2528 7.2521 -0.9993  (1985 – 2005) 0.0334 0.0194 0.0140 
(2006 – 2015) 6.7717 9.1899 -2.4183   (2006 – 2015) 0.0245 0.0227 0.0018 
Notes: NFP: net factor productivity (technical progress); TFP: total factor productivity; CIQLEG: 
Contribution of institutional quality linked efficiency gain to total factor productivity. All series are 
in natural logarithm. GNFP: growth rate of net factor productivity (technical progress); GTFP: 
growth rate of total factor productivity; GIQLEG: growth rate of contribution of institutional quality 
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7.6.2 Panel VES Production Function without Structural Breaks 
The coefficients of the non-linear least squares estimators described and applied in the 
production of results in Table 8.4 were used in the determination of the productivity 
levels and growth rates of the VES production specification. The level of productivity in 
the form of TFP, NFP and the contribution of financial development and institutional 
quality (CIQLEG) are presented in Table 7.12 while the graphical representation of the 
contribution of IQLEG can be seen in Figure 7.4.  The general observation in the VES 
framework is that IQLEG contributed significantly to productivity and its growth. The 
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Table 7.12: Productivity Levels for Panel VES Production Function - No Structural 
Breaks  
Levels of TFP, NFP and CIQLEF   Growth Rate of TFP, NFP and CIQLEG 
Year TFP NFP IQLEG   Year TFP NFP IQLEG 
1985 6.8341 4.7976 2.0365  1985 Na na na 
1986 6.8179 4.7782 2.0397  1986 -0.0162 -0.0195 0.0032 
1987 6.8103 4.7735 2.0369  1987 -0.0076 -0.0047 -0.0029 
1988 6.8304 4.7931 2.0373  1988 0.0200 0.0196 0.0004 
1989 6.8460 4.8047 2.0413  1989 0.0156 0.0116 0.0040 
1990 6.8455 4.8254 2.0201  1990 -0.0005 0.0207 -0.0212 
1991 6.8511 4.8376 2.0135  1991 0.0056 0.0122 -0.0066 
1992 6.8078 4.7844 2.0233  1992 -0.0433 -0.0532 0.0098 
1993 6.8134 4.7679 2.0455  1993 0.0057 -0.0165 0.0222 
1994 6.7998 4.7645 2.0353  1994 -0.0137 -0.0034 -0.0103 
1995 6.8134 4.7803 2.0331  1995 0.0137 0.0159 -0.0022 
1996 6.8500 4.8062 2.0437  1996 0.0365 0.0259 0.0106 
1997 6.8610 4.7996 2.0614  1997 0.0110 -0.0067 0.0177 
1998 6.8766 4.8237 2.0529  1998 0.0156 0.0241 -0.0086 
1999 6.8785 4.8175 2.0610  1999 0.0020 -0.0062 0.0082 
2000 6.8790 4.8079 2.0712  2000 0.0005 -0.0096 0.0101 
2001 6.8923 4.7994 2.0928  2001 0.0132 -0.0085 0.0217 
2002 6.8955 4.8050 2.0905  2002 0.0033 0.0056 -0.0023 
2003 6.9144 4.8089 2.1055  2003 0.0188 0.0039 0.0150 
2004 6.9420 4.8083 2.1337  2004 0.0277 -0.0006 0.0282 
2005 6.9644 4.8131 2.1513  2005 0.0224 0.0048 0.0176 
2006 6.9908 4.8136 2.1771  2006 0.0264 0.0006 0.0258 
2007 7.0204 4.8211 2.1992  2007 0.0296 0.0075 0.0221 
2008 7.0379 4.8238 2.2141  2008 0.0176 0.0027 0.0149 
2009 7.0508 4.8297 2.2210  2009 0.0128 0.0059 0.0069 
2010 7.0903 4.8774 2.2129  2010 0.0395 0.0476 -0.0081 
2011 7.1210 4.8996 2.2214  2011 0.0307 0.0223 0.0084 
2012 7.1588 4.9296 2.2292  2012 0.0378 0.0300 0.0078 
2013 7.1920 4.9595 2.2326  2013 0.0333 0.0299 0.0034 
2014 7.2156 4.9883 2.2273  2014 0.0235 0.0288 -0.0053 
2015 7.2185 4.9880 2.2305  2015 0.0029 -0.0003 0.0032 
Mean rate 6.9393 4.8299 2.1094   Mean rate 0.0128 0.0063 0.0065 
Notes: NFP: net factor productivity (technical progress); TFP: total factor productivity; CIQLEG: 
Contribution of institutional quality linked efficiency gain to total factor productivity. All series are in 
natural logarithm. GNFP: growth rate of net factor productivity (technical progress); GTFP: growth 
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7.6.3 The VES Production Function in Mali with a Structural Break 
The contribution of IQLEG in Mali was negative overall thus reducing NFP instead of 
enhancing it. The results presented on Table 7.13 indicate that the negative contribution 
of IQLEG increased in size over the period under study. NFP was consistent and 
increased over the period. In terms of the growth rates, the negative contribution of 
IQLEG adversely affected the growth of TFP. Indeed, in both regimes, NFP was high 
whilst IQLEG was negatively impacting productivity. Figure 7.5 depicts the levels of the 
average NFP and TFP, whilst the gap between the two gives a visual idea of the 
contribution of IQLEG. Due to the negative contribution of IQLEG in Mali, TFP is below 
NFP. The gap also widens considerably after the break. The productivity levels again 
IQLEGVES 
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prove that the IQLEG hypothesis was not supported for Mali under the VES framework 
when a full regime break was introduced.   
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Table 7.13: Productivity Estimations for VES with a Break in Mali 
Levels of TFP, NFP and CIQLEG   
Growth Rate of TFP, NFP and 
CIQLEG 
Year TFP NFP IQLEG   Year TFP NFP IQLEG 
1985 5.9020 6.8487 -0.9466  1985 Na na na 
1986 5.9334 6.8890 -0.9557  1986 0.0313 0.0403 -0.0090 
1987 5.9700 6.9294 -0.9594  1987 0.0366 0.0403 -0.0037 
1988 6.0125 6.9697 -0.9572  1988 0.0425 0.0403 0.0022 
1989 6.0538 7.0100 -0.9563  1989 0.0412 0.0403 0.0009 
1990 6.0743 7.0504 -0.9760  1990 0.0206 0.0403 -0.0198 
1991 6.1262 7.0907 -0.9645  1991 0.0519 0.0403 0.0115 
1992 6.1610 7.1311 -0.9701  1992 0.0348 0.0403 -0.0056 
1993 6.1551 7.1714 -1.0164  1993 -0.0059 0.0403 -0.0463 
1994 6.2103 7.2118 -1.0014  1994 0.0553 0.0403 0.0149 
1995 6.2510 7.2521 -1.0011  1995 0.0406 0.0403 0.0003 
1996 6.2752 7.2925 -1.0173  1996 0.0242 0.0403 -0.0161 
1997 6.3189 7.3328 -1.0139  1997 0.0437 0.0403 0.0033 
1998 6.3573 7.3731 -1.0158  1998 0.0385 0.0403 -0.0019 
1999 6.3773 7.4135 -1.0362  1999 0.0200 0.0403 -0.0204 
2000 6.4135 7.4538 -1.0403  2000 0.0362 0.0403 -0.0042 
2001 6.4708 7.4942 -1.0234  2001 0.0573 0.0403 0.0170 
2002 6.5122 7.5345 -1.0223  2002 0.0414 0.0403 0.0010 
2003 6.5418 7.5749 -1.0331  2003 0.0296 0.0403 -0.0107 
2004 6.5881 7.6152 -1.0271  2004 0.0464 0.0403 0.0060 
2005 6.6042 7.6556 -1.0513  2005 0.0161 0.0403 -0.0242 
2006 6.6530 9.0054 -2.3524  2006 na na na 
2007 6.6698 9.0464 -2.3766  2007 0.0168 0.0410 -0.0242 
2008 6.7193 9.0874 -2.3681  2008 0.0495 0.0410 0.0085 
2009 6.7470 9.1284 -2.3815  2009 0.0276 0.0410 -0.0134 
2010 6.8016 9.1694 -2.3679  2010 0.0546 0.0410 0.0136 
2011 6.8439 9.2104 -2.3665  2011 0.0423 0.0410 0.0013 
2012 6.8069 9.2514 -2.4445  2012 -0.0370 0.0410 -0.0780 
2013 6.8087 9.2924 -2.4838  2013 0.0017 0.0410 -0.0393 
2014 6.8256 9.3334 -2.5078  2014 0.0169 0.0410 -0.0241 
2015 6.8408 9.3744 -2.5336   2015 0.0152 0.0410 -0.0258 
Mean rates in selected periods    Mean growth rates in selected periods 
(1985 – 2005) 6.2528 7.2521 -0.9993  (1985 – 2005) 0.0351 0.0403 -0.0052 
(2006 – 2015) 6.7717 9.1899 -2.4183   (2006 – 2015) 0.0209 0.0410 -0.0201 
Notes: NFP: net factor productivity (technical progress); TFP: total factor productivity; CIQLEG: 
Contribution of institutional quality linked efficiency gain to total factor productivity. All series are in 
natural logarithm.  GNFP: growth rate of net factor productivity (technical progress); GTFP: growth rate 
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7.6.4 Panel VES Production Function with Two Regime Structural Breaks 
The results for the VES in the presence for two regime shifts are quite different from the 
CES and the Cobb-Douglas framework, but are consistent with that of the CES. During 
the period before the first regime change, the average contribution of IQLEG to the level 
of TFP was 40.26%. The average contribution for the second and third regimes is 40.05 
% and 42.25%, respectively. These figures are higher than the average of 24% in the 
CES framework and 32% in the Cobb-Douglas function with breaks. Table 7.14 shows 
that, in terms of the contribution of growth of IQLEG to growth of TFP, the results 
indicate that CIQLEG to growth of TFP was negative in the first and third regimes. 
Interestingly, the CES framework generated the direct opposite of the results for the VES 
when it came to the growth rates of NFP, TFP and CIQLEG. Whereas the contribution 
of IQLEG to TFP was negative in the second regime of the CES form, it was 89.06% in 
the VES form. Figure 7.6 shows that the gap between NFP and TFP, the contribution of 
IQLEG to productivity widened in the third regime. 
 
These results are in line with Demetriades and Law (2006) who worked with the Cobb-
Douglas production function to find that institutional quality enhances growth when 
applied in TFP. The outcome, however, does not confirm the findings of Cecchetti and 
Kharroubi (2012) who conclude that the faster the financial sector grows, the slower the 
economy and thus productivity as a whole grows. The general finding here is that large 
and speedily growing financial sectors may tend to be very costly for the rest of the 
economy by negatively pulling in essential resources and thus slowing growth at the 
aggregate level for 21 OECD countries from 1980–2009.  
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Table 7.14: Panel Productivity Estimations for VES with Two Regime Shifts 
Levels of TFP, NFP and CIQLEG  Growth Rate of TFP, NFP and CIQLEG 
Year TFP NFP IQLEG  Year TFP NFP IQLEG 
1985 6.9488 4.1457 2.8032  1985 na na na 
1986 6.9628 4.1478 2.8150  1986 0.0139 0.0021 0.0119 
1987 6.9532 4.1498 2.8033  1987 -0.0096 0.0021 -0.0117 
1988 6.9319 4.1519 2.7800  1988 -0.0212 0.0021 -0.0233 
1989 6.9386 4.1540 2.7846  1989 0.0067 0.0021 0.0046 
1990 6.9232 4.1561 2.7671  1990 na na na 
1991 6.8874 4.1582 2.7292  1991 -0.0358 0.0021 -0.0379 
1992 6.8978 4.1603 2.7376  1992 0.0105 0.0021 0.0084 
1993 6.9096 4.1624 2.7472  1993 0.0117 0.0021 0.0096 
1994 6.8907 4.1645 2.7263  1994 -0.0188 0.0021 -0.0209 
1995 6.8825 4.1666 2.7159  1995 -0.0082 0.0021 -0.0103 
1996 6.8912 4.1686 2.7226  1996 0.0087 0.0021 0.0066 
1997 6.9128 4.1707 2.7421  1997 0.0216 0.0021 0.0195 
1998 6.9089 4.1728 2.7361  1998 0.0085 0.0021 0.0064 
1999 6.9174 4.1749 2.7425  1999 0.0085 0.0021 0.0064 
2000 6.9310 4.1770 2.7540  2000 0.0136 0.0021 0.0115 
2001 6.9519 4.1791 2.7728  2001 0.0209 0.0021 0.0188 
2002 6.9632 4.1812 2.7820  2002 0.0113 0.0021 0.0092 
2003 6.9742 4.1833 2.7909  2003 0.0110 0.0021 0.0089 
2004 6.9941 4.1854 2.8087  2004 0.0199 0.0021 0.0178 
2005 7.0111 4.1874 2.8236  2005 0.0170 0.0021 0.0149 
2006 7.0402 4.1895 2.8506  2006 0.0291 0.0021 0.0270 
2007 7.0677 4.1916 2.8761  2007 0.0276 0.0021 0.0255 
2008 7.0876 4.1937 2.8939  2008 0.0198 0.0021 0.0178 
2009 7.2762 4.1958 3.0804  2009 0.1887 0.0021 0.1866 
2010 7.2822 4.1979 3.0843  2010 na na na 
2011 7.2797 4.2000 3.0797  2011 -0.0025 0.0021 -0.0046 
2012 7.2772 4.2021 3.0752  2012 -0.0024 0.0021 -0.0045 
2013 7.2777 4.2042 3.0735  2013 0.0004 0.0021 -0.0017 
2014 7.2818 4.2062 3.0756  2014 0.0041 0.0021 0.0020 
2015 7.2814 4.2083 3.0730  2015 -0.0004 0.0021 -0.0025 
Mean rates in selected periods  Mean growth rates in selected periods 
(1985 – 1989) 6.9471 4.1498 2.7972  (1985 – 1989) -0.0026 0.0021 -0.0046 
(1990 – 2009) 6.9659 4.1760 2.7900  (1990 – 2009) 0.0192 0.0021 0.0171 
(2010 – 2015) 7.2796 4.2042 3.0754  (2010 – 2015) -0.0002 0.0021 -0.0023 
Notes: NFP: net factor productivity (technical progress); TFP: total factor productivity; CIQLEG: 
Contribution of institutional quality linked efficiency gain to total factor productivity. All series are in 
natural logarithm. GNFP: growth rate of net factor productivity (technical progress); GTFP: growth rate 
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7.7 Conclusion  
As a means of determining the robustness of the produced output, which resulted in the 
establishment of an existing relationship between finance and growth when institutions 
and structural breaks are considered, the CES and VES production specifications are 
estimated using non-linear least squares regression techniques. Both time series 
estimations with Mali as a case and panel estimations were considered with and without 
structural breaks. Mali was tested with one break in the level, trend and the cointegration 
vector using the Gregory and Hansen (1996) method. In the case of the panel, two 
common regime shift points are determined based on the results from the Banerjee and 
Carrion-i-Silvestre (2015) cointegration test applied to the model (You and Sarantis, 
2013). The estimated break dates were found to be 1989 and 2009.  
 
IQLEG 
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The results from Mali, the CES results showed that there was no significant difference 
between the CES function and the Cobb-Douglas function. With the VES, Mali’s results 
provide evidence although the contribution of IQLEG to productivity is positive, the 
introduction of a full regime shift significantly negates the impact of IQLEG on 
productivity.  As such, the presence of the structural breaks shows that, unlike the Cobb-
Douglas case, institutional quality and financial development were not able to move the 
Malian economy to a higher level. 
 
The CES result confirms the need for IQLEG or, better still, the role played by IQLEG 
in the finance-growth relationship. Unlike the Cobb-Douglas framework without 
structural breaks, the CES establishes a positive and significant association between 
financial development, institutional quality and economic growth. The contribution of 
IQLEG to productivity was positive. With the introduction of structural breaks, the CES 
confirms the outcome of the Cobb-Douglas framework, especially in the first regime. 
However, the contribution of IQLEG to growth, although positive, shrinks on average 
relative to when there were no breaks. Whilst the time trend in the Cobb-Douglas is 
negative but significant, it is positive in the CES framework. The outcomes of the Wald 
test on the elasticity of substitution also indicate that the CES framework is significantly 
different from the Cobb-Douglas framework in this panel. The results indicated that, 
overall, with the contribution of IQLEG to TFP was positive. 
 
When structural breaks were absent from the VES estimation, the results provided 
evidence of a positive and significant relationship between financial development, 
institutional quality and economic growth. The VES results thus confirmed that of the 
CES. The coefficient of the time trend parameter is likewise positive in the VES 
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framework. Again, the contribution of IQLEG to productivity is positive. With the 
introduction of structural breaks, the institutional quality was found to be insignificant in 
the first regime. However, financial development was significant and positive as 
happened in the Cobb-Douglas and CES production function. Overall, the VES model 
parameters with structural breaks provide evidence in support of institutional quality and 
structural breaks. Indeed, the VES with two regime breaks provided evidence of a 
slightly higher contribution of IQLEG relative to when the breaks were absent. The 
VES’s elasticity of substitution showed that it is significantly different from the Cobb-
Douglas framework.   
 
It is important to note that both finance development and institutional quality 
significantly contributed to productivity growth in the models without structural breaks 
although they were reported as insignificant in the Cobb-Douglas specification without 
breaks in Chapter Five. Indeed, the second alternative production specification, the VES 
function, confirms the need for institutional quality enhanced financial development. The 
results of the CES and VES with structural breaks, buttressed the results from the Cobb-
Douglas framework with structural breaks  
 
 It is therefore important for policy makers to pay close attention to sudden unexpected 
events that have the potential to transform the structure of the economy. A typical 
example is the onset of the global pandemic which started at the end of 2019. Another 
would be the 2007-2008 Global financial crises. Such events tend to affect economic 
outcomes in countries and should be significantly considered in policy making with 
respect to their propensity to have shift typical outcomes. structural breaks and the extent 
   
259 
 
of impact they may have on the financial systems in SSA given that policy makers are 
working to improve the institutional environment.  
  
For policy makers therefore, determining the underlying macroeconomic inputs-output 
relationships and the relevant elasticity of substitution ensures that scarce economic 
resources are not wasted in inefficiently determining productivity and growth. Like the 
Cobb-Douglas case, the CES and VES results indicated that the contribution of IQLEG 
and its growth rate needs to be of interest to policy makers in regions like SSA. It is 
important that other production forms are considered within the SSA context. The fact 
that financial development and institutional quality play a role, no matter how small, in 
productivity enhancement is worth stressing. With respect to the role of structural breaks, 
the general inference is that, placed within the different production forms, events that 
affect the structure of the economy of SSA countries may have significant impacts on 
















 The aim of this research is to examine whether institutional quality can work through 
financial development to contribute to higher productivity gains and hence GDP per 
capita growth. Specifically, the thesis sought to achieve four main goals. These are 
firstly, to capture both the market and non-market features of institutional quality in order 
to bring out the full contribution of institutional quality to economic growth within the 
framework of finance-growth nexus. The second goal was to investigate the role of 
market and non-market institutions in the finance -growth nexus for a group of twenty-
one SSA economies. Thirdly, this thesis sought to detect and account for structural breaks 
introduced by these historical events to produce more reliable estimates in our 
investigation. The final goal of this research was to consider the constant elasticity of 
substitution and the variable elasticity of substitution in addition to the Cobb-Douglas 
production function to not only relax the constraints but also check the robustness of the 
analysis.  
 
This thesis is premised on the proposition that productivity is enhanced with the 
interaction of institutions on financial development over and above that of pure technical 
progress in the Solow (1956) neoclassical framework. The Cobb-Douglas, constant 
elasticity of substitution, and variable elasticity of substitution specifications of the 
production function were all considered. The thesis is situated in 21 SSA countries spread 
across the region. Existing research in the finance-growth nexus shows that SSA does 
not make the most out of the introduction and application of higher levels of financial 
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development as do many advanced societies (Gries, Kraft, and Meierrieks, 2010; 
Menyah, Nazlioglu and Wolde-Rufael, 2014). The reasons assigned include the neglect 
of sound institutions that would ensure that finance is not only developing in levels or 
quantity but is also in quality through adequately working institutions.  
 
Rodrik (2000) hypothesizes that there are five main institutions that promote high-quality 
growth. These institutions are the protection of rights of parties involved in a contract; 
regulatory institutions; institutions for macroeconomic stabilisation; institutions for 
social insurance; and institutions of conflict management as well as institutions for 
economic freedom or democracy. Again, the literature emphasizes the role played by 
structural breaks and cross-sectional dependence in avoiding possible misspecification 
of models. In this thesis, by decomposing TFP into NFP and IQLEG using the Rodrik 
(2000) mix of institutions and financial development in the presence of level and regime 
structural breaks and cross-sectional dependence, the role of institutional quality in the 
finance-growth was investigated.  
  
In this study, using annual data from the WGI, WDI and the ICRG, the role of 
institutional factors as proposed by Rodrik (2000) was investigated for 21 SSA countries. 
Firstly, based on the Solow Neoclassical growth model, total factor productivity in the 
Cobb-Douglas framework was decomposed into pure technical progress and institutional 
quality linked efficiency gain. Panel and time series cointegration tests with variables 
that provided evidence of being integrated of the first order were used to determine 
possible long-run associations between variables. Models were estimated without 
structural breaks, with structural breaks and then with structural breaks and cross-
sectional dependence. Upon determination of cointegration, the speed of adjustment and 
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long-run cointegration coefficients were estimated to determine the size and direction of 
elasticities. Finally, the production functions were estimated to determine the 
contribution of IQLEG to TFP levels and growth rates to establish the empirical role of 
IQLEG in the financial development-economic growth relationship.  
 
8.2 Contribution to Literature 
As already previously discussed in the first Chapter, four main contributions to 
knowledge are generated in this thesis. Based on the available literature, research on the 
finance-institutions-growth nexus that captures both market and non-market features of 
institutional quality as proposed by Rodrik (2000) is rare, especially in the case of SSA.  
This research makes an initial attempt to combine both types of institutions within the 
finance-growth framework by testing the relationships between financial development, 
economic growth and economic and market and non-market institutions as proposed by 
Rodrik (2000) and democracy to capture efficiency gains through an extension of the 
Cobb-Douglas production function when TFP is decomposed into pure technical 
progress and institutional quality linked efficiency gain.  
 
The second contribution is that, although there’s some research work within the finance-
growth -institutions context premised on SSA, they are quite rare and have been focused 
on different groups of countries. In this study applies a group of countries that have not 
been used before in such a study. Indeed, based on the available literature, this is the first 
study in the finance-growth context in SSA that has applied the five institutions for high-
quality growth proposed by Rodrik (2000) and democracy to capture the market and non-
market features of institutional quality at the panel and individual country level.  
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Thirdly, as important as structural breaks are to analyses, previous studies within SSA, 
have rarely considered the impact of historical and possibly, future events in the form of 
structural breaks. the use of structural breaks in multivariate panel and individual unit 
root cointegration and non-linear least squares techniques within the finance-institutions-
growth relationship is another contribution to the best of my knowledge.  No study has 
applied the Westerlund (2006 a) as well as the Banerjee and Carrion-i-Silvestre (2015) 
cointegration techniques, which incorporates multiple structural breaks and cross-
sectional dependence in SSA in the finance-growth nexus. The use of structural break 
models in the form of Gregory and Hansen (1996) and Hatemi-J (2008) cointegration 
tests in time series studies for the finance-institutions-growth studies for individual 
countries in SSA is also a contribution.  
 
The final contribution involves the use alternative production functions in the form of 
the CES and VES production functions.  In view of the fact that previous work has been 
mainly focused on the Cobb-Douglas production framework, this thesis makes both a 
theoretical and empirical contribution to literature on the importance of the elasticity of 
substitution for efficiency gains in the finance-institutions-growth context. This study, 
for the first time compares the effect of IQLEG on productivity using the CES, VES and 
Cobb-Douglas production properties. Furthermore, the use of alternative production 
frameworks within the SSA has the added provides robustness to the analysis conducted.  
  




Five important findings can be summarized from the analysis in this study. Firstly, 
institutional quality as proposed by Rodrik (2000) works through financial development 
to generate higher productivity gains for the panel within the Cobb-Douglas framework 
only when structural breaks and cross-sectional dependence are considered.   Secondly, 
the results for the panel CES and VES production functions suggests that, institutional 
quality was able to work through financial development to generate higher productivity 
levels without structural breaks. Thirdly, with the introduction of two regime shifts, the 
contribution of institutional quality through financial development is mixed. However, 
overall, the panel results for the CES and VES with and without structural breaks provide 
strong support for associations between financial development, institutional quality and 
economic growth with the contribution of IQLEG to productivity in the VES framework 
being the highest. With and without structural breaks, the institutional variables and 
financial development as well as capital have a stable long-run relationship with growth 
per capita as described in the Cobb-Douglas production function. The panel CES 
production and the VES production technologies were also found to be significantly 
different from the Cobb-Douglas production function. 
 
The fourth finding is that, in the case of the time series cointegration estimations without 
structural breaks, 10 SSA countries provided support to establish a long-run causal 
relationship between financial development, institutional quality and economic growth. 
The results confirmed the theoretical foundations of a relationship between productivity 
and financial development when institutional quality improves. With the exception of 
Zimbabwe, Zambia and Kenya, the results for the other seven countries indicated that 
institutional quality works through financial development to generate higher productivity 
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levels. The evidence showed a deteriorating role of financial development and 
institutional quality in Zimbabwe when the Cobb-Douglas production function was 
estimated.  Upon the introduction of structural breaks, Mali and Niger provide evidence 
of FD and IQ generating higher productivity levels.  
 
Lastly, in the case of the time series, the CES production function, results from Mali, the 
case country indicated firstly that, there’s no significant difference between the CES and 
the Cobb-Douglas production functions whether or not structural breaks are considered.  
In addition, the case of the VES, although institutional quality works through financial 
development to generate higher productivity levels when there are no structural breaks, 
productivity is reduced when the structural break is introduced.  
 
8.4 Conclusions 
This research has demonstrated that the relationship between finance and growth in SSA 
over the period 1985 to 2015 using institutional quality represented by the high-quality 
growth institutions proposed by Rodrik (2000) is significant. This relationship works 
when the effect of structural breaks and cross-sectional dependence are incorporated into 
the panel framework. Indeed, the relationship between finance, institutional quality and 
economic growth is significantly positive to the extent that institutional quality further 
enhances the effect of finance in TFP to produce additional productivity levels over and 
above what would have been realized from pure technical progress alone. The study 
further confirms the importance of this relationship by estimating three alternative 
specifications of the production function to arrive at the conclusion that decomposing 
TFP into NFP and the effect of institutional quality linked with efficiency gain from 
financial development increases productivity and hence growth for the countries in SSA.  
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The CES production function and the VES production functions robustly confirm the 
need for improving the institutional environment even without structural breaks and 
increasing the productivity and hence growth levels and rates in SSA. Structural breaks 
however, make the effect of finance and institutions on growth more pronounced as they 
depict a more realistic reflection of the SSA economy. Effectively, when taken as a single 
panel, the results do not change from when the research is done on a time series basis for 
individual countries. Working on the financial sector and financial systems without 
paying attention to the institutional environment in SSA countries will not be beneficial. 
 
For all three production specifications, the contribution of IQLEG and its growth rate 
need to be of interest to policy makers in regions like SSA; and the fact that financial 
development and institutional quality play a role, no matter how small, in productivity 
enhancement is worth mentioning. Additionally, certain structure-changing events have 
a direct influence on the financial markets and affect subsequent efficiency through TFP 
when institutions are adequately working in the economy. Recent happenings with the 
global health pandemic created by the onset of the Novel Coronavirus (2019-nCoV) and 
its initial impact on the global economy is a typical example of a structural break. It is 
therefore important to capture the effect of different structural breaks on the finance 
growth relationship in SSA in formulating and implementing policy and forecasting 
since the absence of structural breaks will render many finance-growth related policies 
in SSA ineffective. 
 
8.5 Policy Recommendations 
An important and paramount role of finance is producing and allocating capital as well 
as enhancing productivity of capital. There are large information costs associated with 
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evaluating firms, managers, and market conditions before making investment decisions 
by individual investors and this may keep capital from flowing to its highest value use.  
Adequately working institutions would play the role of enhancing finance's ability to 
mitigate these costs. When the macro economy is stable, there is an absence of conflicts 
and wars, the rule of law is evident, and the states are politically stable, financial systems 
will operate in conducive environments to achieve desired results. The cost of acquiring 
and processing information by financial intermediaries will fall and hence improve 
resource allocation. Growth is accelerated when access to information is efficient. SSA 
countries need to place some emphasis on building adequate institutions that will 
complement the financial system's efforts at making financial information less costly and 
more efficient. Good institutions will ensure that stock markets play their role effectively 
to ensure faster productivity levels (Osman, Alexiou, and Tsaliki, 2011).  
 
From a policy perspective, the results in this study are consistent with the finance-growth 
hypothesis however are modified by improvements in the institutional environment, 
suggesting that financial development conditioned on institutional quality is a major 
factor influencing productivity and economic growth in the selected SSA as a whole. 
Again, in policy making, emphasis should be given to the strengthening of all forms of 
institutions such as those described by Rodrik as growth-promoting, which in themselves 
will eliminate or mitigate the events and phenomena that disrupt the underlying structure 
of the economy to achieve high and sustainable growth. The institutional quality needs 
to be strengthened (Karimi and Daiari, 2018).  
 
The essence of adequately working institutions whilst not being tampered down would 
only be evident when structural breaks are brought into SSA’s economic growth 
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determination. Again, to effect higher productivity and efficiency levels, nation states in 
SSA should emphasize the improvement of the institutional environment. Attention 
should be given to maintaining democratic dispensations devoid of conflicts. Again, the 
social insurance systems should be implemented and managed to ensure equity and 
fairness; whilst regulatory and contract enforcement institutions should be devoid of 
government interference and corruption. Additionally, institutions that manage the 
macro economy should institute policies that ensure a stable economy in terms of both 
fiscal and monetary policies.   
 
To realize stronger growth and sustain the improvements in financial conditions, indeed, 
the right mix of policies will remain one of the most important strategies that will help 
policy makers to achieve growth, strength and stability in the financial sector in SSA. 
Vital to this are policies that ensure that corporate or business investments are increased 
and that invigorates economic risk taking within strong institutional environments, which 
ensure that risks and costs associated with financial stability and development are not 
increased. Secondly, it is important to ensure a more resilient and robust domestic 
financial sector. These can be realised through formalising the sector with the right 
regulatory and monitoring apparatus in place and encouraging small-scale financial 
institutions such as microfinance institutions, especially in the largely small business and 
rural sector. This is likely to mitigate the impact of domestic and external imbalances 
that reduce resilience.  
 
8.6 Limitations and Areas for Future Research  
The research is limited in the sense that not all SSA countries had available data to enable 
them to be part of the sample. Again, with data collection, it would have been more 
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desirable for the period under study to have been longer than the 31 years under 
consideration. It is believed that, if the study had covered a longer time, some important 
structural events that may have occurred in the panel would have been captured to assist 
in policy formulation. It is recommended that future research be carried out on a global 
scale with many more developing countries included in the sample.  Secondly, the 
research considered the institutions as an aggregate measure. It would be interesting to 
investigate the impact of each individual institution suggested by Rodrik (2000) in the 
finance-growth framework in SSA. This is because it is likely that the effect of some 
institutions may be different across countries. The contribution each institution makes to 
productivity in the panel should be determined to help in identifying the specific role and 
weight that should be assigned to each institution in policy making.    
 
Future research may include individual institutional variables and the additional 
important areas within the financial sector such as microfinance sector, the non-bank 
financial institution sector, the stock markets and the insurance markets. The most 
prominent area of study for SSA has been, and still continues to be, the banking sector. 
However, there is the need to pay attention to the abovementioned sectors with respect 
to their cumulative or unique contribution to efficiency enhancement in SSA since these 
sub-sectors of the financial sector are steadily gaining prominence. This analysis should 
be extended to firm level data as well as to help in productivity enhancement across 
industries and firms. Finally, to engage all types of production functions in research as 
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APPENDIX A: List of Countries with Relevant Data in SSA 
Table A1: List of Countries with Relevant Data in SSA 
COUNTRY COUNTRY CODE REGION 
Botswana BWA Southern 
Congo, Rep COG Central 
Cote d'Ivoire CIV Western 
Gabon GAB Central 
Gambia GMB Western 
Ghana GHA Western 
Kenya KEN Eastern 
Madagascar MDG Southern 
Malawi MLW Southern 
Mali MLI Western 
Mozambique MOZ Southern 
Niger NIG Western 
Nigeria NGA Western 
Senegal SEN Western 
Sierra Leone SLE Western 
South Africa ZAF Southern 
Sudan SDN Eastern 
Tanzania United Rep. TZA Eastern 
Uganda UGA Eastern 
Zambia ZMB Southern 
Zimbabwe ZWE Southern 
Total  21 
Compiled by Author (2018) 
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APPENDIX B: NFP, TFP and CIQLEG for the Cobb-Douglas Production Function 
without Breaks 
 
Table B1: Zambia 
Levels of TFP, NFP and CIQLEG   Growth Rate of TFP, NFP and CIQLEG 
Year TFPZMB NFPZMB IQLEGZMB  Year TFPZMB NFPZMB IQLEGZMB 
1985 6.8754 6.9310 -0.0555  1985 na na na 
1986 6.8463 6.9020 -0.0557  1986 -0.0292 -0.0290 -0.0001 
1987 6.8374 6.8402 -0.0029  1987 -0.0089 -0.0618 0.0528 
1988 6.8627 6.9558 -0.0931  1988 0.0254 0.1156 -0.0902 
1989 6.8170 6.9254 -0.1084  1989 -0.0457 -0.0304 -0.0153 
1990 6.7730 6.9694 -0.1964  1990 -0.0440 0.0439 -0.0880 
1991 6.7349 6.9583 -0.2235  1991 -0.0381 -0.0110 -0.0271 
1992 6.6762 7.0367 -0.3605  1992 -0.0587 0.0783 -0.1370 
1993 6.6921 7.0837 -0.3916  1993 0.0158 0.0470 -0.0312 
1994 6.5434 6.9754 -0.4320  1994 -0.1487 -0.1083 -0.0404 
1995 6.4983 6.9271 -0.4288  1995 -0.0450 -0.0483 0.0033 
1996 6.4587 6.8784 -0.4197  1996 -0.0396 -0.0487 0.0091 
1997 6.4858 6.9196 -0.4338  1997 0.0271 0.0412 -0.0141 
1998 6.4686 6.9785 -0.5099  1998 -0.0172 0.0589 -0.0761 
1999 6.4994 6.9582 -0.4588  1999 0.0308 -0.0203 0.0511 
2000 6.5220 6.9388 -0.4167  2000 0.0226 -0.0194 0.0420 
2001 6.5569 6.9101 -0.3532  2001 0.0348 -0.0287 0.0635 
2002 6.5837 6.9220 -0.3383  2002 0.0269 0.0119 0.0149 
2003 6.6315 6.9312 -0.2997  2003 0.0478 0.0092 0.0386 
2004 6.6777 6.9960 -0.3183  2004 0.0462 0.0648 -0.0186 
2005 6.7236 7.0014 -0.2777  2005 0.0459 0.0054 0.0406 
2006 6.7523 6.9449 -0.1926  2006 0.0287 -0.0565 0.0852 
2007 6.7862 6.9496 -0.1634  2007 0.0339 0.0047 0.0292 
2008 6.8128 6.9596 -0.1468  2008 0.0266 0.0100 0.0166 
2009 6.8509 7.0200 -0.1690  2009 0.0381 0.0604 -0.0222 
2010 6.8923 7.0767 -0.1844  2010 0.0414 0.0568 -0.0154 
2011 6.8765 7.0399 -0.1633  2011 -0.0158 -0.0369 0.0211 
2012 6.9149 7.0468 -0.1319  2012 0.0383 0.0069 0.0314 
2013 6.9264 7.0819 -0.1555  2013 0.0115 0.0351 -0.0236 
2014 6.9342 7.0248 -0.0906  2014 0.0078 -0.0571 0.0649 
2015 6.9255 7.0282 -0.1027  2015 -0.0088 0.0034 -0.0121 
Mean rate 6.7238 6.9713 -0.2476  Mean rate 0.0017 0.0032 -0.0016 
Notes: NFP: net factor productivity (technical progress); TFP: total factor productivity; CIQLEG: 
Contribution of institutional quality linked efficiency gain to total factor productivity. All series are in 
natural logarithm. GNFP: growth rate of net factor productivity (technical progress); GTFP: growth rate 
of total factor productivity; GIQLEG: growth rate of contribution of institutional quality linked efficiency 
gain 
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Table B2: Gambia 
Levels of TFP, NFP and CIQLEG   Growth Rate of TFP, NFP and CIQLEG 
Year TFPGMB NFPGMB IQLEGGMB  Year TFPGMB NFPGMB IQLEGGMB 
1985 9.8924 8.9791 0.9133  1985 na na na 
1986 9.8558 8.9398 0.9159  1986 -0.0366 -0.0392 0.0026 
1987 9.6271 8.7181 0.9090  1987 -0.2287 -0.2218 -0.0069 
1988 9.7160 8.8391 0.8768  1988 0.0889 0.1211 -0.0322 
1989 9.7583 8.8963 0.8062  1989 0.0423 0.0572 -0.0149 
1990 9.7783 8.9126 0.8657  1990 0.0200 0.0163 0.0037 
1991 9.8015 8.9210 0.8804  1991 0.0232 0.0084 0.0148 
1992 9.7331 8.8632 0.8699  1992 -0.0684 -0.0578 -0.0106 
1993 9.7399 8.8801 0.8597  1993 0.0068 0.0169 -0.0101 
1994 9.7448 8.8978 0.8470  1994 0.0049 0.0177 -0.0127 
1995 9.7640 8.9200 0.8440  1995 0.0192 0.0223 -0.0030 
1996 9.7691 8.9300 0.8391  1996 0.0051 0.0099 -0.0048 
1997 9.8189 8.9709 0.8479  1997 0.0497 0.0409 0.0088 
1998 9.8517 9.0026 0.8491  1998 0.0328 0.0317 0.0011 
1999 9.7497 8.9161 0.8336  1999 -0.1020 -0.0865 -0.0155 
2000 9.7236 8.8928 0.8308  2000 -0.0261 -0.0233 -0.0028 
2001 9.7426 8.9081 0.8345  2001 0.0190 0.0153 0.0038 
2002 9.7450 8.9095 0.8355  2002 0.0024 0.0014 0.0009 
2003 9.7765 8.9369 0.8396  2003 0.0315 0.0274 0.0042 
2004 9.8046 8.9689 0.8357  2004 0.0280 0.0320 -0.0039 
2005 9.8715 9.0345 0.8370  2005 0.0669 0.0656 0.0013 
2006 9.8214 8.9655 0.8559  2006 -0.0501 -0.0690 0.0189 
2007 9.8539 8.9812 0.8727  2007 0.0326 0.0157 0.0169 
2008 9.7933 8.9148 0.8786  2008 -0.0606 -0.0665 0.0058 
2009 9.7627 8.8765 0.8862  2009 -0.0306 -0.0383 0.0077 
2010 9.8026 8.9440 0.8586  2010 0.0399 0.0675 -0.0277 
2011 9.8444 8.9883 0.8561  2011 0.0418 0.0442 -0.0024 
2012 9.8660 8.9945 0.8715  2012 0.0216 0.0062 0.0154 
2013 9.8937 9.0107 0.8830  2013 0.0277 0.0162 0.0115 
2014 9.9117 9.0267 0.8849  2014 0.0180 0.0161 0.0019 
2015 9.9282 9.0473 0.8809  2015 0.0165 0.0206 -0.0041 
Mean rate 9.7981 8.9351 0.8631  Mean rate 0.0012 0.0023 -0.0011 
Notes: NFP: net factor productivity (technical progress); TFP: total factor productivity; CIQLEG: 
Contribution of institutional quality linked efficiency gain to total factor productivity. All series are in 
natural logarithm. GNFP: growth rate of net factor productivity (technical progress); GTFP: growth rate 
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Table B3: Kenya 
Levels of TFP, NFP and CIQLEG   Growth Rate of TFP, NFP and CIQLEG 
Year TFPKEN NFPKEN IQLEGKEN   Year TFPKEN NFPKEN IQLEGKEN 
1985 6.5057 9.5729 -3.0672  1985 na Na Na 
1986 6.5398 9.6288 -3.0891  1986 0.0341 0.0559 -0.0218 
1987 6.5513 9.6361 -3.0847  1987 0.0116 0.0073 0.0043 
1988 6.5640 9.6435 -3.0794  1988 0.0127 0.0074 0.0053 
1989 6.5713 9.6717 -3.1004  1989 0.0072 0.0282 -0.0210 
1990 6.5614 9.6371 -3.0757  1990 -0.0098 -0.0346 0.0248 
1991 6.5384 9.5866 -3.0482  1991 -0.0231 -0.0505 0.0275 
1992 6.4904 9.6131 -3.1227  1992 -0.0479 0.0266 -0.0745 
1993 6.4441 9.6010 -3.1569  1993 -0.0463 -0.0122 -0.0341 
1994 6.4249 9.5701 -3.1452  1994 -0.0192 -0.0309 0.0117 
1995 6.4154 9.5897 -3.1743  1995 -0.0095 0.0196 -0.0291 
1996 6.4121 9.5717 -3.1596  1996 -0.0033 -0.0180 0.0146 
1997 6.4051 9.6025 -3.1974  1997 -0.0069 0.0308 -0.0377 
1998 6.4109 9.5480 -3.1371  1998 0.0057 -0.0545 0.0602 
1999 6.4175 9.5907 -3.1731  1999 0.0067 0.0427 -0.0360 
2000 6.4011 9.5873 -3.1861  2000 -0.0164 -0.0034 -0.0130 
2001 6.4202 9.6374 -3.2172  2001 0.0190 0.0501 -0.0311 
2002 6.4045 9.6129 -3.2084  2002 -0.0157 -0.0246 0.0089 
2003 6.4130 9.6488 -3.2358  2003 0.0086 0.0360 -0.0274 
2004 6.4375 9.6772 -3.2397  2004 0.0245 0.0284 -0.0039 
2005 6.4609 9.7152 -3.2544  2005 0.0233 0.0380 -0.0147 
2006 6.4650 9.7106 -3.2455  2006 0.0042 -0.0047 0.0088 
2007 6.4782 9.7197 -3.2414  2007 0.0132 0.0091 0.0041 
2008 6.4321 9.6805 -3.2484  2008 -0.0462 -0.0392 -0.0069 
2009 6.4188 9.6740 -3.2552  2009 -0.0132 -0.0064 -0.0068 
2010 6.4473 9.7148 -3.2675  2010 0.0284 0.0407 -0.0123 
2011 6.4482 9.7005 -3.2523  2011 0.0010 -0.0142 0.0152 
2012 6.4577 9.7304 -3.2727  2012 0.0095 0.0299 -0.0204 
2013 6.4790 9.7416 -3.2625  2013 0.0213 0.0111 0.0101 
2014 6.4947 9.7546 -3.2598  2014 0.0157 0.0130 0.0027 
2015 6.5146 9.7635 -3.2489  2015 0.0199 0.0090 0.0109 
Mean rate 6.4653 9.6494 -3.1841   Mean rate 0.0003 0.0064 -0.0061 
Notes: NFP: net factor productivity (technical progress); TFP: total factor productivity; CIQLEG: 
Contribution of institutional quality linked efficiency gain to total factor productivity. All series are in 
natural logarithm. GNFP: growth rate of net factor productivity (technical progress); GTFP: growth rate 
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Table B4: Madagascar 
Levels of TFP, NFP and CIQLEG   Growth Rate of TFP, NFP and CIQLEG 
Year TFPMDG NFPMDG IQLEGMDG      Year TFPMDG NFPMDG IQLEGMDG 
1985 6.1142 5.0756 1.0386  1985 na na na 
1986 6.1155 5.0693 1.0462  1986 0.0014 -0.0063 0.0077 
1987 6.1094 5.0610 1.0485  1987 -0.0061 -0.0083 0.0023 
1988 6.1282 5.0760 1.0522  1988 0.0188 0.0151 0.0037 
1989 6.1533 5.0952 1.0581  1989 0.0251 0.0192 0.0059 
1990 6.1755 5.1166 1.0589  1990 0.0222 0.0214 0.0008 
1991 6.0897 5.0353 1.0545  1991 -0.0858 -0.0813 -0.0045 
1992 6.0862 5.1270 0.9592  1992 -0.0035 0.0918 -0.0953 
1993 6.0985 5.1044 0.9942  1993 0.0123 -0.0227 0.0350 
1994 6.0920 5.0408 1.0512  1994 -0.0066 -0.0636 0.0570 
1995 6.1093 5.0633 1.0460  1995 0.0173 0.0225 -0.0052 
1996 6.1370 5.1200 1.0170  1996 0.0277 0.0567 -0.0290 
1997 6.1398 5.1041 1.0358  1997 0.0029 -0.0159 0.0187 
1998 6.1479 5.0710 1.0770  1998 0.0081 -0.0331 0.0412 
1999 6.1630 5.0937 1.0693  1999 0.0151 0.0227 -0.0076 
2000 6.1805 5.1198 1.0607  2000 0.0175 0.0261 -0.0086 
2001 6.2124 5.1500 1.0624  2001 0.0319 0.0302 0.0017 
2002 6.0442 5.0319 1.0123  2002 -0.1682 -0.1181 -0.0501 
2003 6.1110 5.0934 1.0176  2003 0.0668 0.0615 0.0053 
2004 6.1418 5.0868 1.0550  2004 0.0308 -0.0066 0.0373 
2005 6.1692 5.1024 1.0668  2005 0.0274 0.0156 0.0118 
2006 6.1975 5.1254 1.0722  2006 0.0283 0.0229 0.0054 
2007 6.2355 5.1606 1.0748  2007 0.0379 0.0353 0.0027 
2008 6.2897 5.2102 1.0794  2008 0.0542 0.0496 0.0046 
2009 6.2216 5.1578 1.0637  2009 -0.0681 -0.0524 -0.0157 
2010 6.1950 5.1216 1.0734  2010 -0.0266 -0.0362 0.0096 
2011 6.1848 5.1269 1.0579  2011 -0.0101 0.0053 -0.0154 
2012 6.1908 5.1420 1.0489  2012 0.0060 0.0151 -0.0091 
2013 6.1907 5.1138 1.0769  2013 -0.0001 -0.0282 0.0281 
2014 6.2022 5.1269 1.0753  2014 0.0115 0.0132 -0.0017 
2015 6.2116 5.1390 1.0727  2015 0.0095 0.0120 -0.0026 
Mean rate 6.1561 5.1052 1.0509   Mean rate 0.0032 0.0021 0.0011 
Notes: NFP: net factor productivity (technical progress); TFP: total factor productivity; CIQLEG: 
Contribution of institutional quality linked efficiency gain to total factor productivity. All series are in 
natural logarithm. GNFP: growth rate of net factor productivity (technical progress); GTFP: growth rate 
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Table B5: Malawi 
Levels of TFP, NFP and CIQLEG   Growth Rate of TFP, NFP and CIQLEG 
Year TFPMLW NFPMLW IQLEGMLW   Year TFPMLW NFPMLW IQLEGMLW 
1985 5.9072 4.2446 1.6625  1985 na na na 
1986 5.8526 4.2088 1.6438  1986 -0.0546 -0.0359 -0.0188 
1987 5.8108 4.1870 1.6238  1987 -0.0418 -0.0218 -0.0200 
1988 5.7840 4.1939 1.5901  1988 -0.0267 0.0069 -0.0336 
1989 5.7473 4.1467 1.6006  1989 -0.0368 -0.0473 0.0105 
1990 5.7593 4.1292 1.6301  1990 0.0120 -0.0175 0.0295 
1991 5.8157 4.1520 1.6637  1991 0.0564 0.0228 0.0336 
1992 5.7252 4.0443 1.6810  1992 -0.0904 -0.1077 0.0173 
1993 5.8062 4.1513 1.6549  1993 0.0809 0.1070 -0.0261 
1994 5.6875 4.0176 1.6699  1994 -0.1187 -0.1337 0.0150 
1995 5.8235 4.1789 1.6446  1995 0.1360 0.1613 -0.0253 
1996 5.8684 4.1719 1.6965  1996 0.0449 -0.0070 0.0519 
1997 5.8747 4.1625 1.7122  1997 0.0063 -0.0094 0.0158 
1998 5.8777 4.2112 1.6665  1998 0.0030 0.0487 -0.0457 
1999 5.8697 4.2083 1.6614  1999 -0.0080 -0.0029 -0.0051 
2000 5.8482 4.0995 1.7488  2000 -0.0215 -0.1088 0.0873 
2001 5.7608 4.0282 1.7326  2001 -0.0875 -0.0713 -0.0162 
2002 5.7430 4.1568 1.5862  2002 -0.0178 0.1286 -0.1464 
2003 5.7544 4.1646 1.5898  2003 0.0114 0.0078 0.0036 
2004 5.7603 4.1553 1.6050  2004 0.0059 -0.0093 0.0152 
2005 5.7322 4.1249 1.6074  2005 -0.0281 -0.0304 0.0023 
2006 5.7278 4.0756 1.6521  2006 -0.0045 -0.0492 0.0448 
2007 5.7901 4.0893 1.7008  2007 0.0623 0.0137 0.0487 
2008 5.8243 4.1653 1.6590  2008 0.0342 0.0760 -0.0418 
2009 5.8875 4.2452 1.6423  2009 0.0632 0.0799 -0.0167 
2010 5.9203 4.2354 1.6850  2010 0.0328 -0.0099 0.0427 
2011 5.9359 4.2075 1.7284  2011 0.0155 -0.0279 0.0434 
2012 5.9310 4.1944 1.7367  2012 -0.0048 -0.0132 0.0083 
2013 5.9548 4.2206 1.7342  2013 0.0237 0.0262 -0.0025 
2014 5.9822 4.2404 1.7418  2014 0.0274 0.0198 0.0077 
2015 5.9819 4.2223 1.7596  2015 -0.0003 -0.0181 0.0178 
Mean 
rate 
5.8305 4.1624 1.6681   Mean rate 0.0025 -0.0007 0.0032 
Notes: NFP: net factor productivity (technical progress); TFP: total factor productivity; CIQLEG: 
Contribution of institutional quality linked efficiency gain to total factor productivity. All series are in 
natural logarithm.  GNFP: growth rate of net factor productivity (technical progress); GTFP: growth rate 
of total factor productivity; GIQLEG: growth rate of contribution of institutional quality linked efficiency 
gain 
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Table B6: Nigeria 
Levels of TFP, NFP and CIQLEG  Growth Rate of TFP, NFP and CIQLEG 
Year TFPNGR NFPNGR IQLEGNGR  Year TFPNGR NFPNGR IQLEGNGR 
1985 6.8666 6.8088 0.0579  1985 Na na na 
1986 6.9728 6.9437 0.0291  1986 0.1061 0.1349 -0.0288 
1987 6.9809 6.8747 0.1062  1987 0.0081 -0.0690 0.0772 
1988 7.1027 6.9494 0.1533  1988 0.1218 0.0747 0.0471 
1989 7.1936 6.9637 0.2300  1989 0.0909 0.0143 0.0767 
1990 7.3248 7.1315 0.1933  1990 0.1312 0.1679 -0.0367 
1991 7.3283 7.0770 0.2513  1991 0.0035 -0.0545 0.0580 
1992 7.3410 6.9615 0.3795  1992 0.0126 -0.1155 0.1281 
1993 7.3470 6.9967 0.3503  1993 0.0061 0.0352 -0.0291 
1994 7.3468 6.9804 0.3664  1994 -0.0003 -0.0163 0.0161 
1995 7.3464 6.9411 0.4053  1995 -0.0004 -0.0393 0.0389 
1996 7.3788 6.9822 0.3966  1996 0.0324 0.0411 -0.0087 
1997 7.3454 7.0503 0.2951  1997 -0.0334 0.0681 -0.1015 
1998 7.3093 7.0766 0.2326  1998 -0.0361 0.0264 -0.0625 
1999 7.2516 6.9452 0.3063  1999 -0.0577 -0.1314 0.0737 
2000 7.2323 6.9733 0.2590  2000 -0.0193 0.0281 -0.0473 
2001 7.1988 6.9758 0.2229  2001 -0.0335 0.0025 -0.0361 
2002 7.1441 7.0536 0.0905  2002 -0.0547 0.0778 -0.1324 
2003 7.1225 6.9899 0.1326  2003 -0.0216 -0.0637 0.0421 
2004 7.2526 7.0894 0.1632  2004 0.1301 0.0995 0.0306 
2005 7.0551 6.9035 0.1516  2005 -0.1974 -0.1858 -0.0116 
2006 7.0948 6.9226 0.1722  2006 0.0397 0.0191 0.0206 
2007 7.1208 6.9962 0.1247  2007 0.0260 0.0736 -0.0476 
2008 7.1453 7.0730 0.0723  2008 0.0244 0.0768 -0.0524 
2009 7.1765 7.1561 0.0204  2009 0.0312 0.0831 -0.0519 
2010 7.2079 7.1201 0.0878  2010 0.0314 -0.0360 0.0674 
2011 7.2027 7.0958 0.1068  2011 -0.0052 -0.0242 0.0190 
2012 7.2119 7.0606 0.1514  2012 0.0092 -0.0353 0.0445 
2013 7.2169 7.0938 0.1231  2013 0.0050 0.0332 -0.0282 
2014 7.2218 7.0806 0.1412  2014 0.0048 -0.0132 0.0180 
2015 7.1948 7.0405 0.1543  2015 -0.0269 -0.0401 0.0132 
Mean rate 7.2011 7.0099 0.1912  Mean rate 0.0109 0.0077 0.0032 
Notes: NFP: net factor productivity (technical progress); TFP: total factor productivity; CIQLEG: 
Contribution of institutional quality linked efficiency gain to total factor productivity. All series are in 
natural logarithm. GNFP: growth rate of net factor productivity (technical progress); GTFP: growth rate 
of total factor productivity; GIQLEG: growth rate of contribution of institutional quality linked efficiency 
gain 
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Table B7: Sierra Leone  
Levels of TFP, NFP and CIQLEG   Growth Rate of TFP, NFP and CIQLEG 
Year TFPSLE NFPSLE IQLEGSLE   Year TFPSLE NFPSLE IQLEGSLE 
1985 6.0130 5.0534 0.9596  1985 na na na 
1986 6.0030 5.0297 0.9733  1986 -0.0100 -0.0238 0.0137 
1987 6.0481 5.1299 0.9182  1987 0.0451 0.1002 -0.0551 
1988 5.9532 5.0354 0.9178  1988 -0.0949 -0.0945 -0.0004 
1989 5.9467 5.0050 0.9416  1989 -0.0065 -0.0303 0.0238 
1990 5.9738 5.0788 0.8950  1990 0.0271 0.0737 -0.0467 
1991 6.0040 5.1801 0.8239  1991 0.0303 0.1013 -0.0711 
1992 5.8109 4.9466 0.8644  1992 -0.1931 -0.2335 0.0405 
1993 5.8492 4.9232 0.9261  1993 0.0383 -0.0234 0.0617 
1994 5.8624 5.1345 0.7279  1994 0.0131 0.2113 -0.1982 
1995 5.8190 5.1477 0.6713  1995 -0.0433 0.0132 -0.0565 
1996 5.9103 5.2072 0.7031  1996 0.0912 0.0595 0.0317 
1997 5.8356 5.0816 0.7540  1997 -0.0747 -0.1256 0.0509 
1998 5.8342 5.0727 0.7615  1998 -0.0014 -0.0089 0.0076 
1999 5.7865 4.9667 0.8198  1999 -0.0477 -0.1060 0.0583 
2000 5.8146 4.9910 0.8235  2000 0.0280 0.0243 0.0037 
2001 5.6944 4.8852 0.8092  2001 -0.1201 -0.1058 -0.0143 
2002 5.8741 5.0197 0.8544  2002 0.1797 0.1345 0.0452 
2003 5.9085 5.0257 0.8829  2003 0.0344 0.0059 0.0285 
2004 5.9200 4.9990 0.9210  2004 0.0115 -0.0267 0.0382 
2005 5.9200 4.9565 0.9635  2005 0.0000 -0.0425 0.0425 
2006 5.9438 4.9594 0.9844  2006 0.0238 0.0029 0.0209 
2007 5.9945 4.9518 1.0427  2007 0.0506 -0.0077 0.0583 
2008 6.0232 4.9015 1.1217  2008 0.0287 -0.0503 0.0790 
2009 6.0454 4.9174 1.1280  2009 0.0222 0.0159 0.0063 
2010 6.0851 4.9740 1.1111  2010 0.0396 0.0566 -0.0169 
2011 6.1227 4.9965 1.1262  2011 0.0376 0.0225 0.0151 
2012 6.2454 5.0988 1.1466  2012 0.1227 0.1024 0.0204 
2013 6.4141 5.2758 1.1383  2013 0.1687 0.1770 -0.0083 
2014 6.4400 5.3190 1.1210  2014 0.0259 0.0432 -0.0173 
2015 6.1923 5.0692 1.1231  2015 -0.2477 -0.2498 0.0021 
Mean rate 5.9770 5.0430 0.9340   Mean 
rate 
0.0060 0.0005 0.0055 
Notes: NFP: net factor productivity (technical progress); TFP: total factor productivity; CIQLEG: 
Contribution of institutional quality linked efficiency gain to total factor productivity. All series are in 
natural logarithm. GNFP: growth rate of net factor productivity (technical progress); GTFP: growth rate 
of total factor productivity; GIQLEG: growth rate of contribution of institutional quality linked efficiency 
gain 
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APPENDIX C: NFP, TFP and CIQLEG for the Cobb-Douglas Production Function 
with a Break 
Table C1: MOZAMBIQUE 
Levels of TFP, NFP and CIQLEF  Growth Rate of TFP, NFP and CIQLEG 
Year TFP NFP IQLEG  Year TFP NFP IQLEG 
1985 6.7003 7.0035 -0.3032  1985 na na na 
1986 6.6345 6.9565 -0.3219  1986 -0.0658 -0.0470 -0.0188 
1987 6.7251 7.0571 -0.3320  1987 0.0906 0.1006 -0.0100 
1988 6.7088 7.0486 -0.3397  1988 -0.0163 -0.0085 -0.0077 
1989 6.6965 7.0440 -0.3475  1989 -0.0123 -0.0045 -0.0078 
1990 6.6308 6.9793 -0.3485  1990 -0.0657 -0.0648 -0.0010 
1991 6.6419 7.0527 -0.4109  1991 0.0111 0.0735 -0.0624 
1992 6.5824 7.0118 -0.4294  1992 -0.0595 -0.0409 -0.0186 
1993 6.6264 7.0452 -0.4188  1993 0.0441 0.0334 0.0107 
1994 6.6164 7.0235 -0.4071  1994 -0.0100 -0.0217 0.0117 
1995 6.5451 6.9464 -0.4013  1995 -0.0713 -0.0771 0.0058 
1996 6.7170 7.1202 -0.4032  1996 0.1719 0.1739 -0.0020 
1997 6.2263 7.0840 -0.8577  1997 na na na 
1998 6.3168 7.1783 -0.8614  1998 0.0905 0.0942 -0.0037 
1999 6.3715 7.2411 -0.8695  1999 0.0547 0.0628 -0.0081 
2000 6.3707 7.2483 -0.8776  2000 -0.0009 0.0072 -0.0081 
2001 6.4662 7.3434 -0.8771  2001 0.0956 0.0951 0.0005 
2002 6.5283 7.4089 -0.8806  2002 0.0620 0.0655 -0.0035 
2003 6.5674 7.4502 -0.8828  2003 0.0391 0.0413 -0.0022 
2004 6.6191 7.4934 -0.8743  2004 0.0517 0.0432 0.0085 
2005 6.6811 7.5614 -0.8803  2005 0.0620 0.0680 -0.0060 
2006 6.7568 7.6453 -0.8885  2006 0.0756 0.0839 -0.0082 
2007 6.8072 7.6952 -0.8880  2007 0.0504 0.0499 0.0005 
2008 6.8559 7.7494 -0.8935  2008 0.0487 0.0542 -0.0055 
2009 6.8976 7.8065 -0.9089  2009 0.0416 0.0571 -0.0154 
2010 6.9444 7.8620 -0.9176  2010 0.0468 0.0556 -0.0088 
2011 6.9975 7.9161 -0.9186  2011 0.0531 0.0541 -0.0010 
2012 7.0545 7.9735 -0.9190  2012 0.0569 0.0573 -0.0004 
2013 7.1175 8.0427 -0.9251  2013 0.0631 0.0692 -0.0061 
2014 7.1746 8.1002 -0.9256  2014 0.0571 0.0576 -0.0005 
2015 7.2221 8.1581 -0.9359  2015 0.0475 0.0578 -0.0103 
Mean rates in selected periods  Mean growth rates in selected periods 
(1985 – 1996) 6.6521 7.0241 -0.3720  (1985 – 1996) 0.0015 0.0106 -0.0091 
(1997 – 2015) 6.7356 7.6294 -0.8938  (1997 – 2015) 0.0553 0.0597 -0.0043 
Notes: NFP: net factor productivity (technical progress); TFP: total factor productivity; CIQLEG: 
Contribution of institutional quality linked efficiency gain to total factor productivity. All series are in 
natural logarithm. GNFP: growth rate of net factor productivity (technical progress); GTFP: growth rate 
of total factor productivity; GIQLEG: growth rate of contribution of institutional quality linked efficiency 
gain 
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Table C2: Niger 
Levels of TFP, NFP and CIQLEF   Growth Rate of TFP, NFP and CIQLEG 
Year TFP NFP IQLEG   Year TFP NFP IQLEG 
1985 5.7925 3.8299 1.9627  1985 na na na 
1986 5.8279 3.8681 1.9599  1986 0.0354 0.0382 -0.0028 
1987 5.8032 3.8474 1.9558  1987 -0.0247 -0.0207 -0.0041 
1988 5.8446 3.8762 1.9684  1988 0.0414 0.0288 0.0126 
1989 5.8283 3.8524 1.9759  1989 -0.0163 -0.0238 0.0075 
1990 5.7870 3.8366 1.9504  1990 -0.0413 -0.0158 -0.0255 
1991 5.7858 3.8928 1.8929  1991 -0.0013 0.0562 -0.0575 
1992 5.6914 3.8642 1.8272  1992 -0.0944 -0.0287 -0.0657 
1993 5.6755 3.8548 1.8206  1993 -0.0159 -0.0093 -0.0066 
1994 5.6829 3.8563 1.8266  1994 0.0074 0.0014 0.0060 
1995 5.6761 3.8753 1.8009  1995 -0.0068 0.0190 -0.0258 
1996 5.5596 3.8882 1.6714  1996 na na na 
1997 5.5564 3.8590 1.6974  1997 -0.0032 -0.0293 0.0261 
1998 5.6230 3.9284 1.6946  1998 0.0666 0.0694 -0.0028 
1999 5.5858 3.9182 1.6676  1999 -0.0373 -0.0103 -0.0270 
2000 5.5394 3.9096 1.6297  2000 -0.0464 -0.0085 -0.0379 
2001 5.5751 3.9461 1.6290  2001 0.0357 0.0365 -0.0008 
2002 5.5720 3.9384 1.6336  2002 -0.0030 -0.0077 0.0046 
2003 5.5909 3.9643 1.6265  2003 0.0188 0.0259 -0.0071 
2004 5.5551 3.9391 1.6161  2004 -0.0357 -0.0253 -0.0105 
2005 5.5581 3.9542 1.6039  2005 0.0030 0.0151 -0.0121 
2006 5.5641 3.9963 1.5679  2006 0.0060 0.0421 -0.0360 
2007 5.5496 3.9995 1.5502  2007 -0.0145 0.0032 -0.0177 
2008 5.5927 4.0371 1.5555  2008 0.0430 0.0376 0.0054 
2009 5.5382 3.9819 1.5564  2009 -0.0544 -0.0553 0.0008 
2010 5.5676 3.9985 1.5692  2010 0.0294 0.0166 0.0128 
2011 5.5352 3.9778 1.5574  2011 -0.0324 -0.0206 -0.0118 
2012 5.6081 4.0569 1.5511  2012 0.0728 0.0791 -0.0063 
2013 5.6174 4.0666 1.5508  2013 0.0093 0.0096 -0.0003 
2014 5.6458 4.0918 1.5540  2014 0.0284 0.0252 0.0031 
2015 5.6406 4.0814 1.5592  2015 -0.0052 -0.0104 0.0052 
Mean rates in selected periods    Mean growth rates in selected periods 
(1985 – 1996) 5.7632 3.8595 1.9038  (1985 – 1996) -0.0116 0.0045 -0.0162 
(1997 – 2015) 5.5787 3.9767 1.6021   (1997 – 2015) 0.0043 0.0102 -0.0059 
Notes: NFP: net factor productivity (technical progress); TFP: total factor productivity; CIQLEG: 
Contribution of institutional quality linked efficiency gain to total factor productivity. All series are in 
natural logarithm. GNFP: growth rate of net factor productivity (technical progress); GTFP: growth rate 
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Table C3: Sudan 
Levels of TFP, NFP and CIQLEF   Growth Rate of TFP, NFP and CIQLEG 
Year TFP NFP IQLEG   Year TFP NFP IQLEG 
1985 6.8383 7.3928 -0.5545  1985 6.8383 7.3928 -0.5545 
1986 6.8645 7.4078 -0.5433  1986 6.8645 7.4078 -0.5433 
1987 6.9787 7.5063 -0.5276  1987 6.9787 7.5063 -0.5276 
1988 6.9518 7.4723 -0.5206  1988 6.9518 7.4723 -0.5206 
1989 7.0228 7.5186 -0.4957  1989 7.0228 7.5186 -0.4957 
1990 6.9446 7.4295 -0.4849  1990 6.9446 7.4295 -0.4849 
1991 6.9959 7.4859 -0.4900  1991 6.9959 7.4859 -0.4900 
1992 7.0319 7.5321 -0.5002  1992 7.0319 7.5321 -0.5002 
1993 7.0453 7.5436 -0.4983  1993 7.0453 7.5436 -0.4983 
1994 7.0190 7.5053 -0.4863  1994 7.0190 7.5053 -0.4863 
1995 7.0412 7.5205 -0.4793  1995 7.0412 7.5205 -0.4793 
1996 7.0402 7.5207 -0.4805  1996 7.0402 7.5207 -0.4805 
1997 7.0807 7.5607 -0.4800  1997 7.0807 7.5607 -0.4800 
1998 7.0287 7.5111 -0.4824  1998 7.0287 7.5111 -0.4824 
1999 7.0051 7.4759 -0.4708  1999 7.0051 7.4759 -0.4708 
2000 7.0205 7.4769 -0.4564  2000 7.0205 7.4769 -0.4564 
2001 7.0320 7.5002 -0.4682  2001 7.0320 7.5002 -0.4682 
2002 7.0259 7.5251 -0.4992  2002 7.0259 7.5251 -0.4992 
2003 7.0271 7.5506 -0.5235  2003 7.0271 7.5506 -0.5235 
2004 6.9868 7.5287 -0.5420  2004 6.9868 7.5287 -0.5420 
2005 6.9789 7.5483 -0.5693  2005 6.9789 7.5483 -0.5693 
2006 6.9818 7.5703 -0.5885  2006 6.9818 7.5703 -0.5885 
2007 7.1429 7.5399 -0.3970  2007 7.1429 7.5399 -0.3970 
2008 7.1691 7.5847 -0.4156  2008 7.1691 7.5847 -0.4156 
2009 7.1504 7.6011 -0.4507  2009 7.1504 7.6011 -0.4507 
2010 7.1274 7.5854 -0.4580  2010 7.1274 7.5854 -0.4580 
2011 7.1597 7.5847 -0.4250  2011 7.1597 7.5847 -0.4250 
2012 7.2787 7.6700 -0.3913  2012 7.2787 7.6700 -0.3913 
2013 7.2943 7.6403 -0.3460  2013 7.2943 7.6403 -0.3460 
2014 7.2928 7.6444 -0.3516  2014 7.2928 7.6444 -0.3516 
2015 7.3128 7.6622 -0.3494  2015 7.3128 7.6622 -0.3494 
Mean rates in selected periods    Mean growth rates in selected periods 
(1985 – 2006) 6.9973 7.5038 -0.5064  (1985 – 2006) 6.9973 7.5038 -0.5064 
(2007 – 2015) 7.2142 7.6125 -0.3983   (2007 – 2015) 7.2142 7.6125 -0.3983 
Notes: NFP: net factor productivity (technical progress); TFP: total factor productivity; CIQLEG: 
Contribution of institutional quality linked efficiency gain to total factor productivity. All series are in 
natural logarithm.  GNFP: growth rate of net factor productivity (technical progress); GTFP: growth rate 
of total factor productivity; GIQLEG: growth rate of contribution of institutional quality linked efficiency 
gain 
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APPENDIX D: DATA SOURCES 
1. The World Governance Indicators (WGI) 
Usually used as indicators of institutional quality, they are collated by the World Bank and consists of the 
traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised. This includes the process by which 
governments are selected, monitored and replaced; the capacity of the government to effectively formulate 
and implement sound policies; and the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern 
economic and social interactions among them. The data covers six main dimensions. These indicators are 
voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory 
quality, and rule of law as well as control of corruption (Kaufmann and Kraay, 2010).  The database 
provides data for over 200 countries, 48 of which are SSA countries. With over 30 metrics, it summarises 
views on the quality of governance provided by a large number of enterprise, citizen and expert survey 
respondents in industrial and developing countries. Updated annually, it currently has annual data from 
1960 to 2016. Indicators made up of individual and composite measures 
(www.wdi.worldbank.org/tables). This ordinal measurement is based on perceptions with values 
ranging from 2.5 as the weakest to 2.5 as the strongest. Karimi and Daiari (2018) and Law and Azman 
Saini (2012) employed the WGI in notable research.  
 
2. The International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) 
The ICRG is a source of institutional quality and risk data. The risk involved measures the loss of control 
over ownership or loss of benefit of enterprise due to government action. Twenty-two variables in three 
sub-categories are developed by the ICRG. These three are political, economic and financial risk. The 
Political Risk Services Group (PRSG) developed this database with Knack and Keefer (2011) as the main 
authors. One hundred and forty countries are featured on the ICRG and 32 of these are from sub-Saharan 
Africa. Covering over 30 metrics, the database provides a global clientele with political, economic, and 
financial risk ratings and forecasts for its universe of 140 developed, emerging, and frontier markets. The 
ICRG makes its risk assessments relevant by quantifying its forecasts and ratings across 140 countries, 
over a 40-year period, and applying them to the behaviour and protection of assets. There are over 40 years 
of data beginning from 1980. The database has both composite (weighted) and individual indicators (n 
www.epub.prsgroup.com). Indicator values range from very low risk (80 to 100 points) to very high 
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risk (zero to 49.9 points) for composite risk per country.  Whilst the political risk index has 12 components 
with 100 points, the financial risk index has five components with 50 points and the economic risk index 
has five components with 50 points. Measures are based on perceptions and measured in percentages. 
Researchers who have applied the ICRG data include Law et al. (2013), Asiedu (2004, 2006), Gadzar and 
Sherif (2015), Balach and Law (2015), and Bra¨utigam and Knack (2004).   
 
3. The World Development Indicators (WDI) 
The WDI offers indicators on global development with about 19 dimensions. The data is generated by the 
World Bank Group and provides development data for 217 countries of which 48 are from SSA. It is the 
primary World Bank collection of development indicators, compiled from officially-recognized 
international sources. It presents the most current and accurate global development data available, and 
includes national, regional and global estimates. The data is from 1960 to 2018 and is collected and updated 
annually. The indicators are usually in percentages and the data reflects both actual measurements and 
perceptions (see www.wdi.com). Donou-Adonsou and Sylvester (2016), Naceur, Blotevogel, Fischer 
and Shi (2017), Bra¨utigam and Knack (2004), Baltagi, Demetriades and Law (2009) and Chin and Ito 
(2005) have all applied the WDI in notable research work in finance-growth related contexts.  
 
4. Penn World Tables (PWT) 
The PWT uses the results of detailed price surveys from the International Comparison Program (ICP), 
which is run from the World Bank, and combines these with National Accounts data on GDP and its 
components (consumption, investment, trade) to arrive at real GDP for most countries in the world as far 
back as 1950. The quality of PWT depends on the price comparisons of ICP, The National Accounts data 
and how these are combined. It provides information on living standards: production, income and prices 
with seven dimensions and 43 measures. It is produced by the University of Pennsylvania with Feenstra, 
Inklaar and Timmer (2015) as the main authors and provides information for up to 189 countries with 46 
of them being SSA. The data collected begins from 1950 and goes to 2016 and it is frequently updated. It 
is made up of individual indicators as well as composite measures. The measures are actual measurements 
and are presented as ratios or percentages. The PWT is a standard data source for those interested in 
comparing living standards across countries and explaining differences in cross-country growth 
(www.febpwt.webhosting.rug.nl). The version used in this research was PWT 9.0. Evans, Green and 
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Murinde (2000); Bangake and Eggoh (2011) and Naceur, Blotevogel, Fischer and Shi (2017) applied the 
PWT in research work.  
   
 
